The visuals of February in Syria began with security forces entering the Kurdish city of Qamishli, with no news of a hostile encounter. It was to enforce an administrative curfew. “Kurdish Question” and systematic exclusion reached their peaks due to the 1962 Hasakah Census, leaving it to be a third rail in the Syrian political landscape. Breaking the ice and marking it as a significant development of the Sharaa Era, Decree No. 13 of 2026 grants full citizenship rights to approximately 300,000 Kurds who are stateless Ajanib (foreigners) and Maktumeen (unregistered). The move suggests removing the bludgeon of ethnic nationalism and promoting integration. A carefully planned peace offering has a strategic motive. In exchange for legal recognition, the Kurdish military was asked to integrate into the state and to give up administrative autonomy over the Kurdish autonomous regions.
Mahin Siddiqui
From the ‘Exclusionary Arabist Model’, Syria is in transition towards a new state model, which can be of ‘New Umayyadism’. The past state model of the Ba’athist regime followed an “exclusionary Arabist” model, viewing non-Arab identities as a threat to the nation. This state perspective supported the suppression of the Kurmanji. According to the latest development, the 2026 Decree fundamentally designates Kurdish as a national language and Nowruz as a paid holiday. This cannot be reduced to mere symbolism. It is Syria’s initiative towards liberal nationalism, in which belonging is asserted through shared political participation rather than ethnic homogeneity. This was an effective move, granting rights and pulling SDF back into the state to stop their military overreach.
The Kurdish model serves as a beacon of hope but also a warning for other minorities. The silent observers of all the sectarian quivers, Syrian Christians, see an exemplar for their own cultural and property protections. In Aleppo and Idlib, efforts to return the confiscated properties of the Christians were carried out soon after the fall of Bashar al-Assad, to achieve a mosaic of loyalties. On the contrary, for Alawites, it is still an existential crisis, lacking territorial assets. Unlike the Kurds’ SDF, they don’t have any centralised military body to make a bargain for them. The state has taken punitive measures to integrate them. The whole process highlights President al-Sharaa’s lack of uniformity in inclusivity. Whereas the Druze of Sweida have doubled down on their demands for decentralisation and self-determination, the citizenship rights of the Kurds might just be a precursor to effectively re-centralise the Damascus-led autocracy.
For latest news and analyses on Middle East, visit: Yello! Middle East
Merely issuing a decree is not enough; formalising it through the Constitution is a gamble on success. The presidential decree is an executive act, vulnerable to the whims of future political shifts. For a ‘New Syria’, these presidential gifts can help transform the fractured state into a successful one. The push for constitutional amendments was made by Kurdish leaders. True inclusivity will be highlighted when the word “Arab” is removed from the state’s title. Without any formal structural changes, the state's fragile future remains at stake.
The reintegration of the new citizens adds to the hurdle for the state. One of the social problems that remains, by and large, is the reversal of the decades of “demographic engineering” in the Jazira region. Not only this, but there are no clear mechanisms on how the state will address the land disputes in the “Arab Belt”, a Ba’athist project to Arabise the northern areas of the Al-Hasakah governorate. Moreover, the plan to teach Kurdish remains hindered by a lack of staff and funding. The failure to deliver the ID Cards on time to the Maktumeen will widen the gap and might ignite the insurgency, which Sharaa might not want at this stage. An initiative by Sharaa to build the fractured state may attract reconstruction aid from the international community. All the stakes now depend on the timely delivery of the promises, which will ultimately decide whether it is actually “New Umayyadism” or simply a Ba’athist lexicon with a bit more inclusivity.
The full implementation of Decree No. 13 has tomorrow’s (February 5, 2026) deadline. This would be an ultimate test for the beginning of ‘New Syria.’ For the peace to be everlasting, the government should move to a more constructive approach rather than imbibe a ‘decree culture.’ Will the Qamishli tactics be able to turn the 60-year injustice into a state-building move?
The author is a doctoral candidate at the Centre for West Asian Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.
