In the beginning of 2026, Gulf forces conducted a joint military exercise—Gulf Shield 2026—in Saudi Arabia, with participation from Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) member states. Gulf Shield 2026, by emphasising interoperability and integrated command-and-control, directly addresses this reality by attempting to knit together disparate national systems into a quasi-regional shield. The exercise, held in Saudi Arabia in January 2026, focused on air defence, missile interception, and counter-drone warfare—domains that demand a level of coordination. The strategic relevance of Gulf Shield 2026 becomes even clearer when viewed against the backdrop of emerging intra-Gulf frictions, particularly rising Saudi–UAE tensions, which sits uneasily with the rhetoric of collective security. This exercise is relevant for the trust-building that is increasingly becoming difficult to sustain in a Gulf region marked not only by external threats but also by internal strategic divergence. In this sense, Gulf Shield 2026 represents both a necessary response to regional instability and a stress test of GCC cohesion.
From a threat perspective, the exercise responds to the transformation of Middle Eastern conflict into a multi-domain battlespace, where missiles, UAVs, cyber tools, and electronic warfare are used to achieve strategic effects without large-scale conventional confrontation. Attacks on energy infrastructure, ports, desalination plants, and airports etc. have underscored the vulnerability of Gulf states whose economic lifelines depend on uninterrupted flows of energy, trade, and data. Air and missile defence thus becomes the first line of defence not only for national security but for regime stability, economic continuity, and global market confidence.
However, the deeper significance of the exercise lies in its political context. The GCC today is operating in a region experiencing simultaneous crises like Israel-Hamas conflict and its regional spillovers, persistent humanitarian crisis in Yemen, Iran–Israel shadow confrontation, and uncertainty surrounding the US actions. Gulf states are attempting to hedge, de-escalate, and diversify partnerships. In this context, exercises like Gulf Shield 2026 allow them to project preparedness without overt escalation, reinforcing deterrence while remaining nominally defensive.
At present, the unease in the Saudi–UAE relations increasingly complicate this picture. While Riyadh and Abu Dhabi remain formally aligned on many security issues, their strategic priorities have diverged in ways that directly affect regional stability. Yemen is the most visible example of this. The competing approaches have generated friction, undermining the idea of a unified Gulf security outlook even as shared threats persist. This divergence matters for collective defence because air and missile threats are not evenly distributed.
Gulf Shield 2026, therefore, operates in an environment where interoperability is being pursued amid uneven threat prioritisation, raising questions about the depth and durability of collective commitment. This military exercise can be interpreted as an attempt to restrict hard security cooperation from political and economic rivalry between nations. Air defence helps in safeguarding all Gulf states from shared missile and drone threats, making it a defensive, territory-based area where cooperation is urgent and politically acceptable despite differences. The exercise thus reflects a pragmatic GCC calculation i.e., even if unity is fraying in other arenas, collective survival imperatives necessitate cooperation in the skies.
The exercise exposes structural limitations of GCC security integration. With the persisting Saudi–UAE tensions, along with broader intra-Gulf competition, make it difficult to move from symbolic exercises to fully integrated defence architecture. Gulf Shield 2026 demonstrates progress in training and coordination, but it also highlights how far the GCC remains from the collective defence system.
The role of Gulf states in the current Middle Eastern turmoil is therefore deeply ambivalent. On one hand, they act as stabilisers—absorbing shocks, mediating conflicts, maintaining energy supplies, and preventing regional escalation from spiralling into global crisis. On the other hand, their rivalries, interventions, and competitive regional strategies can reproduce instability, particularly in fragile states like Yemen. Saudi–UAE tensions exemplify this duality wherein both states seek regional stability, yet their competing visions of order generate new fault lines. Gulf Shield 2026 should thus be seen as a broader Gulf strategy of managing disorder rather than resolving it. By strengthening air defence cooperation, GCC states aim to reduce vulnerability to external shocks and coercive tactics, buying space to pursue economic transformation and diplomatic repositioning. However, without addressing underlying intra-Gulf divergences—especially between Saudi Arabia and the UAE—such exercises risk remaining tactical fixes rather than foundations of a cohesive regional security order.
Gulf Shield 2026 is critically important not only because of the missile and drone threats it addresses, but because it reflects the paradox of Gulf security today. The deepening cooperation in response to shared dangers, unfolding alongside rising intra-Gulf competition and strategic divergence. The exercise underscores that the future of Gulf security as well as the larger Middle Eastern security will be shaped as much by how Gulf states manage their own rivalries as by how effectively they deter external adversaries. In a region defined by volatility, Gulf Shield 2026 represents both a shield against immediate threats and a mirror reflecting the fragile balance between unity and competition within the Gulf itself.
(The author is an assistant professor at Amity Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (AIDSS), Amity University, Noida.)
