Delhi: 13 years after Justice Verma report, the missing police on the ground

The alleged gang rape of a 17-year-old girl at Delhi’s Astha Kunj Park, located a short distance from the busy Kalkaji Temple and ISKCON temple, has once again brought a familiar question into focus: how safe are women and children in public spaces, even 13 years after the Justice J.S. Verma Committee was tasked with rethinking India’s response to sexual violence?

The facts of the Kalkaji case are still part of an ongoing criminal investigation. Police say three men allegedly posed as policemen, threatened the teenager and her friend, and then sexually assaulted the girl. All three accused have been arrested. The investigation has relied on CCTV footage and other technical inputs.

The police response after the alleged crime was swift. But the case also raises a different question: what happened to the preventive policing architecture that the Verma Committee had envisioned?

The Justice Verma Committee submitted its report on January 23, 2013, following the December 2012 Delhi gang rape. Its recommendations went far beyond increasing punishment for rape. It proposed changes in policing, investigation, victim support, medical examination, education, and institutional accountability.

Among its recommendations was a simple but important one: increase the number of police personnel. It also called for developing community policing by training volunteers.

The idea was that policing could not remain confined to the police station. Police had to be more visible, accessible, and connected with the communities they served. That distinction is crucial in a case such as Kalkaji.

The question is not only how quickly police arrived after a PCR call at around 8:45 pm. It is also whether there was enough visible policing, patrolling, surveillance, and community engagement in a public park where two teenagers could allegedly be approached and isolated by three men.

Thirteen years after the Verma report, the shortage of police personnel remains a practical challenge.

Government data placed the Delhi Police’s sanctioned strength at 97,331, with 14,140 vacancies as of March 2026. That amounts to a significant gap between sanctioned and available manpower.

Every vacant post does not automatically translate into one fewer police officer on a particular street or in a particular park. But sustained vacancies can put pressure on a force that has to simultaneously manage law and order, investigations, emergency response, court duties, VIP security, and preventive patrolling.

The Verma Committee had anticipated precisely this institutional problem when it argued for strengthening the police force rather than relying only on tougher criminal provisions. The Verma Committee recognised that criminal justice begins before an FIR is registered.

It called for more police personnel and community policing, alongside police training to deal appropriately with sexual offences. It also proposed CCTV cameras at police-station entrances and questioning rooms, online FIR registration, and a duty on police officers to assist victims irrespective of jurisdiction.

The Delhi Police has subsequently developed several initiatives reflecting parts of this philosophy, including neighbourhood policing, area policing, women-safety programmes, e-Beat books, and community outreach.

But the existence of programmes is not the same as their uniform presence on the ground. That is the implementation question the Kalkaji case brings back.

A park may have CCTV coverage, but the larger issue is whether there is regular beat-level policing, whether vulnerable locations are identified, and whether residents have an effective channel to flag recurring safety concerns.

Delhi’s policing has increasingly acquired a technological layer—CCTV networks, emergency response systems, CCTNS, e-Beat systems, cyber capabilities, and forensic investigation.

Technology can significantly improve investigation. In the Kalkaji case, CCTV reportedly helped police reconstruct movements and identify suspects.

But cameras can tell investigators what happened after an event. They do not necessarily provide the human police presence that might prevent an offence or enable immediate intervention.

A camera can record a crime. A patrol officer can potentially interrupt it. A community volunteer may alert police to suspicious activity. A beat officer who knows the neighbourhood may identify patterns that are invisible in a centralised database.

The Verma Committee’s approach was therefore not technology versus policing. It was technology alongside a stronger human policing network.

The staffing question becomes more significant when viewed against the demands placed on the police.

Parliamentary and audit reviews have repeatedly flagged manpower shortages and gaps in specialised training. Women remain a relatively small proportion of the police force, despite repeated calls for greater representation. These figures do not by themselves establish a causal link with any individual crime. But they illustrate the institutional gap between the policing capacity envisaged after Nirbhaya and the demands placed on the force.

The Verma Committee wanted policing to become more professional, accountable, and responsive. That requires personnel, training, and institutional capacity, not simply new offences in the statute book.

The committee also proposed a Rape Crisis Cell, which would be immediately notified when an FIR concerning sexual assault was registered and provide legal assistance to the victim. It called for police officers to be trained to deal appropriately with sexual offences.

There have been significant changes since 2013. The criminal law was amended, new offences were introduced, and procedures concerning sexual offences were strengthened. But the broader Verma agenda was much larger than the Criminal Law Amendment.

In 2026, the Delhi Police inaugurated its first dedicated women's police station at Subzi Mandi, describing it as a specialised, victim-centric institution for crimes against women and children.

This does not mean the Delhi Police has not undertaken women-safety measures. It has. The issue is whether these initiatives collectively amount to the comprehensive, accessible, and community-linked policing architecture envisaged by the committee.

The Kalkaji incident occurred in a public park in the evening. That makes police visibility and beat-level intelligence particularly relevant.

The post-Nirbhaya response did change India’s criminal law substantially. New offences were introduced and punishments strengthened. But the Verma Committee’s vision was never confined to the statute book.

It imagined a system in which more police personnel, professional investigation, community participation, victim support, and institutional accountability worked together.

Thirteen years later, some pieces of that architecture are visible. Others remain works in progress. Police vacancies, the need for specialised training, and the continuing evolution of women-specific policing show that the institutional reform agenda has not been completed.

The Kalkaji case, therefore, raises a question larger than whether the accused will be convicted. It asks whether Delhi has built the everyday policing environment that the Verma Committee envisaged 13 years ago, or whether India has become better at investigating sexual violence after it happens than preventing it before it happens.