The Indian Navy's presence on the eastern coast of Africa has reached historic levels of deployment as well as operations. From surface ships to air assets to intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets to marine commandos (MARCOS), the scale is unprecedented. Starting in October 2008, India has played a role in policing the sea lines of communication (SLOCs) in this region.
However, the uptick in deployment is a function of several factors.
First among them is the evolving instability in West Asia. With the US and UK navies committing their assets to Op Prosperity Guardian in the Red Sea to secure the SLOC from Houthi-backed attacks, the Gulf of Aden and the seas around it had plunged into a security vacuum. This emboldened the al-Shabab-linked Somali pirates to step up their operations after a lull of about six years.
Second, India has invested consistently over the last decades to enhance its stature as a blue water navy and thus project itself as a net security provider in the Western India Ocean Region (IOR) in general and off the east coast of Africa, specifically. This focus is clearly demonstrated with the operationalisation of the Indigenous Aircraft Carrier (IAC) 2, INS Vikrant, and now the Acceptance of Necessity for IAC 3, INS Vishal, being approved by the government.
Finally, the larger geopolitics evolving from the QUAD grouping and the expectations of other partners, namely the US, Japan and Australia, for India to play a more assertive role in maintaining a ‘rules-based order’ in the IOR, has pushed India to take up this constabulary role far off its territorial waters.
It is this last factor which has larger implications for the nation both economically and strategically. With the recent tour of EAM Jaishankar to Southeast Asia, India is signalling to the region that it is finally ready to put some real muscle behind its Act East Policy. While India has formulated its vision for this increasingly important region in its Look East Policy, which was upgraded to Act East under the current regime, the empirical evidence of its aspirations is few. To achieve tangible results in this context, the country needs to rebalance its focus relating to the continental space and maritime space.
This is especially true today with the upheaval in Myanmar and the hegemonic posturing by China in the continental domain. However, for achieving such reorientation, one of the biggest lacunae for New Delhi here is the lack of transshipment capabilities. This has forced India to be dependent on ‘feedering’ vessels which carry transshipped goods from China-built ports in neighbouring countries like Sri Lanka. In fact, 70 per cent of the country’s transshipment is to India. Thus, the ossified port network of India has been a sort of ‘self-goal’ in the geopolitical football it plays with China to establish regional hegemony.
To actualise the aspirations of Act East, New Delhi needs to focus on upping its game in the maritime economic arena. For this, dredging around the existing ports and developing harbours in its eastern and western seaboards should be categorised as a Mission Mode Project supervised at the highest levels.
A whole of government approach should be taken aligning various ministries to build the entire ecosystem around the maritime economic domain. Additionally, looping in our neighbours like Bangladesh for mutual development of ports for maritime trade, including assistance for dredging and development activities will further enhance India’s profile in the region while deepening interdependence in the face of an aggressive Chinese economic ingress through its Belt and Road Initiative. China should be made aware that there will be no ceding of space in the maritime sector, which is critical to fulfilling India’s aspiration to be a global power.
The other impact of India’s recent role in the Gulf of Aden and near about is that it has successfully exhibited a proof-of-concept to its QUAD partners. That New Delhi can play a positive and assertive role in the Indo-Pacific is not theoretical anymore. What is true in the continental domain is also true in the maritime domain; geolocation is a distinct advantage. While China has this advantage across India's northern borders, it is equally advantageous for New Delhi in the IOR.
The Indian Navy, being the only blue water navy in the region, is virtually the gatekeeper of the Malacca Strait, which enables over 30 per cent of world trade. China has a highly disproportionate dependence on the strait with the majority of its goods and more importantly, over 90% of its energy supplies passing through the Strait of Malacca. Its importance, though has been palpable, was officially recognised as the “Malacca Dilemma” by the former president of the People’s Republic of China and General Secretary of the Communist Party of China, Hu Jintao in 2003. President Xi has taken this insecurity to another extreme whereby, some argue, his aggression in the South China Sea and his fixation on security is rather an unconscious projection of his vulnerabilities viz a viz the Malacca Dilemma.
In order to not stroke such fears further, India has long followed the now-famous advice of former president, Deng Xiaoping, “hide your strength and bide your time.” For instance, New Delhi couched its IAC projects as Air Defence Ships for the fear of signalling a naval build-up, thereby triggering Beijing into an escalatory spiral far beyond its already aggressive armament plans.
However, with the Indian Navy growing from strength to strength and not being shy of demonstrating it, Deng’s advice seems to be a relic in our strategic mindset.
As the National Security Advisor, Ajit Doval, had indicated, New Delhi is focusing on making doctrinal shifts in its strategic posturing from “defensive defence to offensive defence.” The latest flexing of its operational muscles in the Western IOR, where the Chinese Navy also has an anti-piracy contingent in Djibouti, is a manifestation of such evolving doctrines.
The ‘silent service’ is making a lot of noise recently not just to manoeuvre for space within the country’s military budget allocation, but there seems to be a larger strategic signalling to its friends and foes alike that India is both willing and capable of leveraging its geographical advantage in the maritime domain if it is pushed too far on the continental or economic fronts.
Bhaskar Jyoti Mahanta, IPS, was former Assam DGP.
The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author's and do not purport to reflect the opinions or views of THE WEEK.
