POKHRAN2@20: Pakistan Army's 'jihadi' officers giving nukes to terrorists a real threat

Terrorists Representational image | Reuters

In December 2017, US President Donald Trump unveiled the new National Security Strategy for the US where he carefully pointed out the latest security threats not only to his own country but the world at large.

“The United States faces an extraordinarily dangerous world, filled with a wide range of threats that have intensified in recent years. When I came into office, rogue regimes were developing nuclear weapons and missiles to threaten the entire planet,” he said while unveiling the revised National Security Strategy that clearly spoke of the new category of threats that US nuclear weapons could be used to counter. Months later, in February this year, the Pentagon unveiled the new nuclear weapons strategy, which was more aggressive. Defence Secretary Jim Mattis said the changes reflect the need to “look reality in the eye” and not as we wish it to be.

Trump’s briefing at the White House can almost draw a parallel to the first briefing of Prime Minister Narendra Modi by the National Security Advisory Board at 7RCR( the prime minister's residence) when he took charge in 2014.

In 2014, the NSAB, headed by former foreign secretary Shyam Saran, listed out the future national security challenges and on top of its list was the need to bolster India's nuclear capabilities while developing “contingency plans” for the fast-paced developments regarding the Pakistani nuclear arsenal. The only difference was that unlike the US, India does not have a national security doctrine to deal with such threats. But the common threat listed out by both countries is real.

“India must take into account the possibility of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons or dangerous fissile material falling into the hands of jihadi or terrorist elements who may target India,” the draft doctrine on national security prepared by the NSAB said.

A key recommendation of the advisory board was to develop India's nuclear capabilities based on the no-first-use doctrine. “For a no-first-use doctrine to be credible, it should be backed with a robust retaliation capability, after suffering the first attack by the enemy. Unless you have survivable forces, you cannot have that capability,” it felt.

In his presentation, Saran said India needs to focus on not only having more nuclear submarines in the next few years, but also longer-range ballistic missiles that can be fired from those submarines. There was also stress on strengthening a ballistic missile defence system against the possibility of a first strike by the enemy.

As May 11 marks 20 years of the Pokhran–II nuclear tests by India, giving the country the stature of a nuclear weapons state, the evolution of India's nuclear deterrent requires focussed attention.

Arun Choudhry, former special director in the Intelligence Bureau, argues that there is no doubt that Pakistan's nuclear programme is directed against India and the threat of its capabilities finding their way into the hands of the jihadis in that country is not a very distinct possibility.

“It is after Pakistan's defeat in the 1971 war, that Pakistan's nuclear programme was created. Then-Pakistan president Zulfikar Ali Bhutto returned to Pakistan feeling humiliated after the Shimla Agreement and called upon Dr Abdul Qadeer Khan, former nuclear physicist and a German-trained metallurgist, asking him develop Pakistan's nuclear weapons capabilities within six months. This was the beginning of the setting up of the nuclear facility at Kahuta, an exercise that was focussed on India and over a period of time, Pakistan enhanced its nuclear capabilities clandestinely by getting nuclear fissile material from China and North Korea,'' Choudhry noted.

Choudhry said the reasons have not changed much today. Pakistan is wary of the fact that its conventional arsenal and warfare capabilities are “uneven” against India, and if India decides to cross the Line of Control, enter Muzaffarabad or other areas, then Pakistan can raise its 'nuke head'.

M.L. Kumawat, former special secretary (internal security) in the home ministry, said that the real “dirty bomb” threat from Pakistan comes from not the jihadis laying their hands on nukes, but something more dangerous.

''In my opinion, the actual danger is from jihadi officers within the Pakistan Army, who have a jihadist mindset. They are the real threat since they could use such options or even pass on the nuclear weapons to their friends in the jihadi organisations operating from Pakistani soil. This is something the national security brass must be wary of and prepare itself for. Today, we are thinking about a narrow security paradigm. We need to develop a more wholistic approach,'' he explained. Kumwat's fear is not unfounded.

A.S. Dulat, former chief of the Research and Analysis Wing, said that the threat from nuclear warheads or 'dirty bombs' (radioactive material extracted from radiological equipment), as they are popularly called, falling into the hands of rogue elements or jihadis is something the entire world is worried about.

“It is something not just India is worried about, but the US as well. It is a threat the entire world is discussing and preparing for,'' he said.

Choudhry explains that the “dirty bomb” trick first made the world sit up and take notice of it in a big way when American troops started withdrawing from Afghanistan.

''With the withdrawal of the US forces, sophisticated operational equipment of the US Army was left behind and made its way into the hands of the Taliban. This, in turn, also got passed on to the terrorist outfits like the Lashkar fighting alongside the Taliban in Afghanistan. Leaving the theatre unguarded was the biggest mistake as it also gave the idea that loosely guarded nuclear capabilities could also one day find their way into the hands of non-state actors,” he said.

Today, the security brass is drawing hope from the apparent belief of Pakistan's nuclear capabilities being obliquely controlled by the US. However, for a nation that has clearly refused to say that it is developing its nuclear strength for peaceful purposes, this makes a statement in itself. As a big nation, we have adopted a no-first use policy, but security experts rightly feel that it does not mean prioritising acquisition and deployment of nuclear submarines and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs).

This is what the Shyam Saran committee told Modi, and if there was someone who was keenly listening and making mental notes, it was National Security Advisor Ajit Doval.

This article is part of a series from THE WEEK on the 20th anniversary of the Pokhran-2 nuclear tests undertaken by the government of Atal Behari Vajpayee. The Pokhran-2 tests—which saw India test 5 nuclear weapons at Pokhran, Rajasthan on May 11 and 13, 1988—led to India declaring itself as a nuclear weapons state. This series covers archival materials on how THE WEEK covered the Pokhran tests in 1998, the preparedness of India's military in a nuclear age and the threat of terrorists getting their hands on 'dirty bombs'.