Following diplomatic engagements at the BRICS Summit 2026, India and China are cautiously moving towards normalizing relations, with recent meetings between leaders raising hopes for improved bilateral ties. Essential to this process is the free movement of people, which has been significantly hampered by visa restrictions imposed after the Galwan incident, negatively affecting trade, cultural, and academic exchanges. While historical precedents show that such disruptions are not uncommon, recent economic overtures, including increased Chinese imports from India and new direct flights, indicate a mutual recognition of the unsustainability of strained trade relations and a recalibration of approaches amidst shifting global trade patterns. Despite these positive economic signals, the absence of clear relaxation in visa policies remains a critical hurdle for smooth business interactions, underscoring the need for a streamlined visa regime and robust institutional frameworks to foster enduring friendly relations between the two Asian powers.

Following diplomatic engagements at the BRICS Summit 2026, India and China are cautiously moving towards normalizing relations, with recent meetings between leaders raising hopes for improved bilateral ties. Essential to this process is the free movement of people, which has been significantly hampered by visa restrictions imposed after the Galwan incident, negatively affecting trade, cultural, and academic exchanges. While historical precedents show that such disruptions are not uncommon, recent economic overtures, including increased Chinese imports from India and new direct flights, indicate a mutual recognition of the unsustainability of strained trade relations and a recalibration of approaches amidst shifting global trade patterns. Despite these positive economic signals, the absence of clear relaxation in visa policies remains a critical hurdle for smooth business interactions, underscoring the need for a streamlined visa regime and robust institutional frameworks to foster enduring friendly relations between the two Asian powers.

Following diplomatic engagements at the BRICS Summit 2026, India and China are cautiously moving towards normalizing relations, with recent meetings between leaders raising hopes for improved bilateral ties. Essential to this process is the free movement of people, which has been significantly hampered by visa restrictions imposed after the Galwan incident, negatively affecting trade, cultural, and academic exchanges. While historical precedents show that such disruptions are not uncommon, recent economic overtures, including increased Chinese imports from India and new direct flights, indicate a mutual recognition of the unsustainability of strained trade relations and a recalibration of approaches amidst shifting global trade patterns. Despite these positive economic signals, the absence of clear relaxation in visa policies remains a critical hurdle for smooth business interactions, underscoring the need for a streamlined visa regime and robust institutional frameworks to foster enduring friendly relations between the two Asian powers.

The bilateral meeting between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping on the sidelines of the BRICS Summit 2026 and the Special Representative talks held just days earlier between National Security Advisor Ajit Doval and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi have generated growing hope and optimism that this will be the beginning of the return of normalcy in India China relations.

One of the essential foundations of normal relations is the free movement of people between two countries, and active engagement in business, trade, cultural exchanges and academic collaboration. To achieve such a level of exchange, it is important to ensure a time-bound process for visas, following all procedures strictly. Till the Galwan incident, nationals from both countries were able to acquire the required the visa without much difficulty. The visa restrictions that came after the Galwan incident have altered the course of business, trade, cultural exchanges and even academic activities.

While trade between the countries continued, albeit in a limited manner, cultural and academic exchanges suffered the most during the period. History reminds us that even in ancient times, despite the harsh weather in Himalayan terrain, there was a steady flow of travellers, Buddhist monks and traders, which kept the bilateral relations vibrant and in high spirits.

These exchanges were not confined to trade alone but also included rich cultural exchange interactions between two of the most culturally advanced civilisations in the world. When cultural exchanges flourish, academic collaboration naturally follows. Unfortunately, over the past six years, we have witnessed disruptions to these once smooth cultural and academic engagements.

During World War II, Germany did not engage in cultural exchanges with its adversaries. Cultural interaction was either severed, redirected into propaganda, or confined to neutral and allied nations. During adverse situations, countries do snap ties with enemy countries as part of security measures. Similarly, India suspended all cultural interactions and academic exchanges immediately after the 1962 border conflict, reflecting the deep mistrust between the two countries. During this period, India obviously prioritised security concerns over bilateral cultural or academic diplomacy.

The exchanges were resumed only after the restoration of the ambassadorial post in 1976. India’s nuclear tests in 1998 once again led to a slowdown in bilateral relations.
After the 1962 war, India’s decision not to cooperate with China was both understandable and necessary considering the overriding security implications. India responded with similarly stern measures following the 1965 and 1971 wars with Pakistan, as well as in the aftermath of major terrorist attacks launched from across the border.

Since 1949, relations between the two countries have faced frequent disruptions for various reasons. The border issue and the Tibetan issue, particularly the issue of the Dalai Lama, played an important role in many of these setbacks. The disruption in 1998 may be regarded as a political response necessitated by India’s nuclear tests, rather than being directly tied to the major issues outlined above. Although China joined the chorus of Western countries, China’s approach was more about isolating India diplomatically rather than cutting off bilateral trade or exchanges.

However, following the Galwan incident, the relations witnessed a virtual standstill that lasted for nearly six years. The period also witnessed unnecessary rhetoric from various quarters, particularly around the notion of containing China. In the aftermath of the Galwan incident, there is no doubt that the government of India took strong and necessary measures. However, these actions were often amplified many times by certain quarters. India should now seriously reflect on whether such amplification is a good sign when the situation is already tense.

Every military action is invariably followed by diplomatic efforts aimed at reconciliation, and that is precisely what we are witnessing now. One must also recognise that Japan, once devastated by US bombing, now maintains close bilateral relations.


As both countries are in the midst of another round of improving relations, it is important to recognise that these frequent disruptions may not be good for the prospect of long-term friendly relations between the two Asian giants. Such interruptions highlight the persistence of mistrust, which will ultimately shape the future trajectory of the relationship.

Meanwhile, the bilateral exchanges between Prime Minister Modi and President Xi initiated at the Kazan BRICS Summit in 2024 after four years hiatus are beginning to yield dividends from India’s perspective. Published data suggests that China has increased imports from India, a move that may be aimed at narrowing the trade deficit. The trade deficit between India and China remains at an alarming level, and year after year it has continued to widen in China’s favour.

In the first five months of the current financial year, India’s exports to China rose 39 per cent year-on-year, reaching $9.6 billion. The key drivers of this growth were engineering goods, electronics, and petroleum products. Notably, India’s electronics exports to China recorded a year-on-year increase of nearly 15 per cent. However, given that the overall rise during the first five months remains relatively modest, it is unlikely to make a significant impact on narrowing the persistent trade deficit.

Trade figures from the first five months indicate that both India and China are making genuine efforts to improve economic ties. Both sides now recognise that deteriorated trade relations are unsustainable at a time when global trade patterns are shifting. In response to these changes, the two countries are recalibrating their approaches to trade and supply chain management. While India is actively seeking to expand trade with China, the success of this adjustment will ultimately depend on whether Indian manufacturers can sustain the pressures of higher volumes in the years ahead.

China’s introduction of a direct flight from Guangzhou to Delhi is another welcome development, reflecting the positive shift in the bilateral atmosphere, while also easing travel challenges for business communities.

However, there remain no clear indications of any relaxation in visa restrictions. For business interactions to proceed smoothly, a streamlined visa regime is essential, though it must, of course, be accompanied by appropriate checks and balances. However, a blanket restriction may negatively impact bilateral trade relations. It has been highlighted in the recent past that when a business delegation plans visits to either country to explore business opportunities, not all members are granted visas, defeating the very purpose of the visit.

Meanwhile, for stronger trade and business relations, it is essential to establish a government-sponsored or affiliated organisation with a robust institutional framework. At present, the mechanisms overseeing India–China business ties are widely regarded by industry as less than effective. An institutionalised body could yield significant dividends, even during periods of difficulty, as recent experience has shown.

The recent developments witnessed since 2024 in bilateral relations may well help restore the trajectory that people on both sides have long aspired to. They also underscore the reality that India and China cannot afford to remain in a state of self-isolation from one another for any extended period in the ever-changing global landscape. Moreover, both sides should address the irritants in their bilateral relations with greater pragmatism and maturity to prevent any escalation of tension. More importantly, any escalation of tensions between India and China will directly benefit India’s other adversaries in the region. 

(The author is a Senior Fellow, Centre for Public Policy Research, Kochi.)

(The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not purport to reflect the opinions or views of THE WEEK.)