The US-Iran talks came to a stop as abruptly as they had started, without any deals being struck. It is not known if a revival is possible or if it was the non-redeemable end of the Islamabad talks. The uncertainty has once again left the global markets shaky.
While both parties were trying to find some common ground at Islamabad’s “Red Zone”, President Donald Trump was busy unbundling new threats, trying to scare the Iranians. He had left absolutely no window open for any negotiation. Going by the background noise, there was little negotiation that happened; it was just Trump threats being laid on the table. At the end of it all, the Pakistani Field Marshal had to see off the peace delegations even before the coffee on their table had cooled down.
Vice President Vance, on landing in Pakistan, indicated that the brief for him from the President was very clear—that there were non-negotiable terms & conditions that Iran had to accept. Iran, on its part, held out equally irrevocable conditions in terms of its stance on Hormuz, the Uranium issue and its proxies.
The US Vice President’s aircraft had barely lifted off the runway when President Trump pulled another trick out of his hat —he ordered a US naval blockade of Iran. Shifting from his earlier assertion that reopening the waterway is not his responsibility, President Trump has now taken a leaf out of Iran’s playbook and blockaded the Hormuz Strait. Contrary to Trump’s claim that the allies will join the blockade, many have raised concerns and refused to join in.
One is tempted to think what trajectory the crisis would have taken if, instead of a blockade, Trump had decided to deploy the same resources to open Hormuz for all—friends and foes alike. The whole world may have rallied around him and posed a big response dilemma for Iran. Did Trump throw a golden opportunity to become a statesman down the Strait ?
Iran is at a tipping point. Having walked down the path of defiance so far, it can opt for the confrontation to continue, but cannot be seen as surrendering. Trump, on the other hand, has a dilemma in hand. He is faced with the choice of walking the talk or making a compromise. In case of a compromise and dilution of his demands, Trump’s image will take a severe beating, creating another TACO scenario.
War or peace, the Gulf countries are staring at a “between the devil and the deep sea”, troublesome, post-war scenario. Anything less than ‘a totally defanged Iran under effective American control’, would leave them vulnerable. On the other hand, with Iran and its proxies significantly degraded militarily and economically, Israel is extremely well placed.
The Iran war has created an unprecedented crisis for the NATO. Europe has realised the necessity to come out of the shadows of America. A European security structure, sans the US, may well be on the cards. Contrary to Trump’s assertion, the US may have more to lose if such a structure comes about. This crisis will please Russia and China.
China may be well placed to prevent any immediate energy crisis. But, beyond that, there are problems. Venezuela and Iran, together, catered for almost 20 per cent of China’s oil imports, that too at a discounted price and on non-dollar terms. Drying up of these sources has given a severe beating to the Chinese interests. But there is a silver lining for China. As long as an anti-US regime survives in Iran, China could emerge as the most important and reliable ally for post-war Iran. Russia also has high stakes in neighbouring Iran. This makes the interests of China and Russia converge in Iran. It is evident that they cannot let Iran become a vassal state of the US. So, how far can they let the US push Iran? What is their red line with regard to the American actions against Iran? It’s a mystery the world is eagerly waiting to find out.
The war has also given China and Russia a fairly accurate measure of the US military power and how far the US can go in taking hard military decisions.
For the world at large, the West Asia war is unveiling a geopolitical reset and a compelling need for diversification of energy supply chains.
China may push the BRI initiative harder. Global South’s call for strategic autonomy and a multi-polar world stands vindicated.
Iran will not make things easy for Trump. Removing an entire layer of the regime has not resulted in putting in place an amenable regime that the US was hoping for. What will Trump do now? Will he accept a halfway home outcome, or will he choose to implement his threat of “erasing the Iranian civilisation”? Both options hold the potential to bring unpalatable outcomes for President Trump.
Will the ceasefire hold? Will the warring factions return to Islamabad or to a more talismanic venue?
The high-intensity Iran war was unsustainable for the warring factions. Both Iran and the US will want the ceasefire to continue even if there are no tangible outcomes during the initial sessions.
With no friends, but only camp followers at home and away, Trump may be desperate to find an exit route. What seemed a straightforward half-page quiz test has turned out to be the toughest examination for the President—a test for which he may secretly be wishing that he had prepared a little more. To make things tougher, his performance is under constant global scrutiny. The ceasefire gives him a much-needed respite and raises hopes of an honourable exit. Iran is in a worse situation. It had vowed to fight until death, but was being battered and bruised 24/7. Notwithstanding its brave and effective random strikes on value targets in the Gulf, Iran was being pushed to the brink. For Iran, it was a godsend that the ceasefire came about as a result of the US suing for peace talks and not Iran.
A prolonged ceasefire condition provides Israel a tailor-made window of opportunity to systematically degrade Hezbollah and Hamas in Lebanon and Gaza. But, while the negotiations and the Hormuz issue may boil over for some time, the conflict is unlikely to flare up again. Diplomatic sparring, military posturing, threats and counter-threats are likely to continue unabated.
(The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not purport to reflect the opinions or views of THE WEEK.)
