TEHRAN
CONTRARY TO EARLY forecasts and calculations in Washington and Tel Aviv, the course of events has not necessarily unfolded as anticipated. Despite human and infrastructural losses, Iran now holds the upper hand. This advantage rests on four factors: a smooth transition of leadership, popular support, the impact of energy and economic warfare, and the military equation.
Several notable developments have been reported in the military domain. One is the economic asymmetry of the war: Iran’s low-cost drones compel the United States and Israel to deploy highly expensive missile defence systems. This has shifted the balance of the conflict. Another issue is the destruction of defence systems. Reports suggest that Iran has destroyed advanced US THAAD systems in the West Asian region. A further aspect is technological capture. Iran claims to have intercepted nearly 100 advanced American and Israeli drones so far. Among the most significant cases is the hacking of an advanced MQ-9 Reaper drone and its safe landing along with its weapons payload. If confirmed, this incident could open the door for Iran to reverse engineer advanced drone technologies. Air superiority through fighter aircraft remains largely in the hands of the opposing side, and Iran is seeking ways to address this challenge.
Two developments in recent days suggest that the US and Israel may be seeking a way out of the current situation. The first concerns a shift in targeting. In the absence of significant military targets for bombing, attacks have increasingly been directed toward residential homes, administrative buildings, hospitals, banks and public facilities. This shift—intended to intimidate the population and weaken social support for the political system—also constitutes an implicit acknowledgment that the initial military objectives have not been achieved. The second sign is the activation of diplomatic channels aimed at moving toward a ceasefire, although statements by Donald Trump suggesting that ending the war would be premature appear to confirm the complexity of this process. In recent days, the presidents of Turkey and France, along with other intermediaries, have undertaken repeated visits and communications in an effort to understand Iran’s position regarding negotiations and a possible ceasefire. Public pressure within the US and Europe, volatility in global markets, and the failure to achieve declared objectives have collectively elevated the discussion of diplomatic pathways.
Overall, Iran has thus far shown no indication of interest in a ceasefire under the current conditions. On the one hand, domestic public opinion demanding the punishment of the aggressors has become widespread within the country. On the other hand, the governing authorities cannot realistically move toward post-war governance and reconstruction without obtaining guarantees that such aggression will not recur in the future. For this reason, discussion of a ceasefire before reaching a point that ensures credible deterrence remains unacceptable from Iran’s perspective.
The author teaches at the University of Tehran.