TEHRAN
When the United States launched its attack against Iran on February 28, both countries were already engaged in talks. The negotiations that had continued until February 26 marked the second time since President Donald Trump’s inauguration in 2025 that the Islamic Republic and the US had entered nuclear talks. However, the US used those discussions as a mechanism of deception. When an agreement appeared imminent, a military incursion against Iran was launched in concert with Israel, as had happened during the 12-day conflict in June 2025. Crucially, this time it involved the martyrdom of the supreme leader, who served not only as Iran’s political head but also as a religious authority and leader with a vast global following.
The death of the supreme leader inflicted profound grief upon the Iranian people. A monumental wave of mourning, accompanied by overwhelming calls for “severe retaliation” and a “strong response” swept the nation, despite limited expressions of satisfaction from small, isolated factions.
Iran responded immediately, launching drone and ballistic missile strikes against Israel and US military installations in West Asia within hours. Iran had repeatedly issued public warnings and official diplomatic notes asserting that any aggression against its territory would inevitably trigger a regional war. Beyond Israel, which faced continuous bombardment through more than ten waves of missiles and drones in less than 72 hours, US bases surrounding Iran, along with several naval vessels, including the USS Abraham Lincoln, were struck and engaged. In response, the US and Israel continued their attacks, targeting not only missile sites and military facilities but also civilian infrastructure, including a primary school, a hospital and residential areas.
Owing to sustained media pressure and persistent threats from the Trump administration, the Iranian population had partly acclimatised to the prospect of conflict. The prevailing belief was that the conflict initiated last year had not concluded but had merely entered a period of suspension, capable of reigniting at any moment. Consequently, both citizens and state authorities undertook preparedness measures, including the stockpiling of essential goods, sanitation supplies and military material. As a result, the outbreak of hostilities did not produce the severe shock or disruption witnessed during the earlier surprise attack. Queues for petrol lasted only one day, and minor shortages of certain commodities were swiftly resolved.
The strong spiritual and religious bond between Iranians and their martyred supreme leader fostered a powerful sense of loyalty and cohesion. This was evident in the nightly gatherings of citizens and their families in major city squares, which served both as mourning rituals and affirmations of allegiance to the Islamic Republic. These gatherings also acted as a deterrent to the kind of street unrest seen recently, which was allegedly supported by the US and Israel. Alongside grief, feelings of vengeance and concern about the future persist. Continued military actions by the Iranian armed forces against enemy positions are presented as a response to public demands for retribution.
A widespread conviction has emerged among Iranians that the supreme leader established governance structures so robust that the state’s functioning does not depend on any single individual but on institutional and social frameworks. Within days of the conflict’s outbreak, all state affairs continued in accordance with established procedures, demonstrating that the absence of the leader did not impede operational planning. This resilience is presented as evidence of comprehensive contingency preparation. The Leadership Council, comprising the president, the chief justice and one of the Guardian Council’s jurists, was constituted on the second day to assume the functions of the supreme leader. The election of a new leader now rests with the Assembly of Experts, a body of 88 jurisprudential and religious scholars elected nationwide, which is legally required to convene at the earliest opportunity to select a successor. Ali Larijani, secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, has articulated a foreign policy centred on good neighbourliness and regional stability, stating that strikes will target only US military installations and assets located abroad, which under international law are regarded as extensions of US territory.
In contrast to the US, which is portrayed as seeking a limited war and a decisive strike, Iran has prepared for a protracted conflict. The Iranian public has resolved to eliminate what it sees as the persistent spectre of aggression from its airspace. The strategy articulated to achieve this objective involves imposing significant costs on the adversary in order to establish long-term deterrence.
This approach rests on two principal pillars. The first is to inflict maximum military damage on US and Israeli forces by targeting regional bases, personnel and hardware. The second is to raise global economic costs by influencing energy markets. Iran has blockaded the Strait of Hormuz, through which roughly 20 per cent of global energy supplies transit, preventing the passage of oil tankers. Tehran has also declared unequivocally that it will not resume negotiations with the US, asserting that talks are now perceived not as a path to agreement but as a precursor to further attack. The stated objective of these strategies is to secure long-term deterrence, enabling Iran to pursue its development within a framework of international security free from the shadow of war and coercion.
The author teaches at the University of Tehran.