Kerala's political future: Can the LDF reclaim its mandate and ideals?

THOUGH THE PEOPLE’S verdict was counted only on May 4, the LDF government had long lost its mandate, and, much before that, its left character. The party in Kerala was confined to the whims and fancies of one man: Pinarayi Vijayan.

He became the party’s state secretary in 1998, following the demise of Chadayan Govindan. Vijayan, then electricity minister, resigned and took up the leadership role.

Soon, he entered into a dialogue with the Muslim League for local body elections in 2000. In north Kerala, where he comes from, an electoral alliance with the League could have made the LDF unbeatable. However, in 1986, the CPI(M) had taken a policy decision not to align with any “communal party”, including the League. M.V. Raghavan—a leader with mass support—was expelled from the party for advocating such an alliance.

But Vijayan chose to ignore the party’s decision.

Over the years, Vijayan forged stronger alliances and electoral adjustments with many communal organisations and parties.

His position against the RSS was sharp, and he stuck to it till he became chief minister in 2016. This could be attributed to the electoral politics of north Kerala, where the CPI(M) and the RSS often sorted out differences physically. In short, his piloting of the party was dictated by prospective parliamentary gains and he tended to ignore ideological positions, including those that were organisationally binding.

In a party where decisions of the upper committees are binding on those lower in the hierarchy, Vijayan as party secretary filled the upper committees based on loyalties rather than political clarity or work experience. The party rectification documents flagged ‘parliamentarianism’, saying that it confined party activities to parliamentary gain, but the party programme in the state was confined to that alone. In Kerala, the party was defined as the state secretariat, the highest body in the state. And membership of that committee had personal loyalty as the main criteria.

Those who dared to point out policy deviations in party forums were demoted, punished or expelled. Some like T.P. Chandrasekharan, who continued doing so even after expulsion, were finished off (three CPI(M) members were convicted in the murder case). All these made criticism and self-criticism, the so-called oxygen of centralised democracy, non-existent. As such, internal democracy suffocated and a self-disciplined force started singing praises.

When Vijayan was party secretary, the secretary was the party; when he became chief minister, the chief minister became the party. In short, he was the key. A tamed party structure failed to raise an eyebrow. When V.S. Achuthanandan was chief minister, he had no say on what portfolio he would handle, leave alone the choice of ministers and their portfolios. There was a five-member cabinet subcommittee that would vet the agenda of the cabinet just before every cabinet meeting. But when Vijayan became chief minister, it was all left to him. By 2021, he could decide who should contest, who should be minister and so on. The other big names were careful to keep themselves smaller than him.

In between, there were corruption charges against Vijayan in the Lavalin case. The lower court discharged him, but a CBI appeal against that judgment is pending before the Supreme Court. His principal secretary, M. Sivasankar, was arrested in the 2020 gold smuggling case. The Serious Fraud Investigation Office charged Vijayan’s daughter, Veena, with fraud. A housing project for those who lost homes in the 2018 floods—funded by a UAE-based charity—was also mired in controversy. There were allegations of kickbacks and the investigation is on. Then there was the Sabarimala gold theft case, in which party men were jailed.

All these were unprecedented for the CPI(M), whose leaders had always approached the people with their heads held high, claiming that they could be small in number, but high on honesty. The party organisation was reduced to a mere public relations team that justified everything Vijayan did. In a party advocating materialism, he was god. Any criticism was blasphemy.

As expected, in a centralised pyramid structure, if the top is rotten, it is contagious. People who were seen as “hated” by Achuthanandan became “party relatives” to Vijayan. When Central agencies began investigating charges of corruption against him and his family, Vijayan’s longstanding position against majority communalism also vanished. Certain community leaders spitting communal venom were glorified instead of being exposed. Thus, the party’s perceived image as one with zero tolerance to corruption, communalism and nepotism took a severe beating.

Nevertheless, for those who think being leftist is not optional but a must for being human, they have to fight this out. The challenges posed by communal forces in India are growing by the day. The farmers and the working class are finding it difficult to make both ends meet, but economic yardsticks project another India. Only a left movement, inclusive of the farmers and the toiling masses, can take this nation forward. The going is tough but we need to be tough enough to get going. The CPI(M) needs a deconstruction. Their usual rectification gospel is not going to help. The results from Kannur are more than a wake-up call. It is a fire alarm. Your house is on fire. ‘Let those with ears hear what the spirit says.’ Else, the proverbial dustbin of history is waiting for them.

The writer is a technocrat and political commentator. He was IT adviser to former chief minister