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Bangladesh at a crossroads: Can India counter the rising Islamist tide?

India-Bangladesh relations and Islamist extremism are key concerns for regional stability, especially following the recent flawed elections and the rise of the BNP government

Hitting the streets: Jamaat supporters in Dhaka protest alleged irregularities and manipulation in the election results | AP
M.K. Narayanan

WHEN SHEIKH HASINA was forced out of office, it appeared to signify—to paraphrase Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney’s words—‘a rupture not a transition’.

The recent elections, though, suggest that as more things happen, the less they seem to change. The revolving door syndrome by which the Awami League is replaced by the Bangladesh Nationalist Party, and vice-versa, saw the latter return to power with a landslide victory.

This was a flawed election by any reckoning, considering that the Awami League was prevented from contesting, but a welcome aspect was that the fundamentalist Jamaat-e-Islami was roundly defeated.

It had been widely speculated that the elections would bring Islamist zealots to power, further exacerbating the recent anti-India slant in Bangladesh politics. The BNP’s victory is hence welcome, but given that its hostility towards India is only marginally less than its antipathy towards Hasina, India is hardly on a good wicket. The Jamaat-led alliance secured 77 seats, its highest tally, posing an overwhelming threat to India in future.

Ever since the religion first came to the region in the 13th century, the eastern part of (united) Bengal has been a bastion of Islam. With the partition in 1947, East Pakistan tilted further towards Islam. And even though East Pakistan and West Bengal revere the iconic poet Kazi Nazrul Islam as one of their own, their divide only seemed to widen over the years. Since the assassination of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman in 1975, relations between India and Bangladesh have been a roller-coaster ride. It is only during Hasina’s regime that the neighbours seemed to act with a common purpose, including that of keeping Islamist zealots at bay and preventing Pakistan from fanning anti-India feelings.

It was, hence, hardly surprising that within months of the Hasina regime’s fall, Bangladesh saw a sharp revival of Islamist extremist tendencies. Given the past record of the BNP, it is more than likely that it could go this way. The new government could also be inclined to strengthen its friendship with Pakistan and China to restrict India’s influence in South Asia.

Bangladesh stands at a crossroads today. While Hasina has much to answer for her heavy handed approach towards dissent, India, for its part, cannot avoid sharing the blame for the present state of Bangladesh-India relations. Following the assassination of Sheikh Mujibur, India had tried to assist the new country, though not always with success. More recently, however, this policy seemed to have ‘withered on the vine’. Consequently, India could proffer little advice and succour as the uprising took on an increasingly anti-Hasina and an anti-Hindu stand.

This has produced a widening ‘credibility gap’ between India and a post-Hasina Bangladesh. If the true test of diplomacy lies in being able to convince a friendly neighbour on how to manage a difficult situation, then India clearly failed to anticipate the seriousness of the situation and to suitably advise Hasina to modify her policies. It reflects poorly on India’s understanding of a situation that prevailed in its immediate neighbourhood.

The past cannot be resurrected or corrected. For now, India has the responsibility—both to itself and to the region—to act with greater understanding of the forces at work. Notwithstanding India’s grandstanding on occasion, it stands relatively isolated as of now, including in Asia. The recent US-Pakistan axis, the current China-Bangladesh-Pakistan linkages, China’s growing importance across East and Southeast Asia, and its less than friendly relations with India, all cast a shadow over the region and the latest events in Bangladesh have muddied the waters further. India, therefore, needs to be on guard and handle the situation in Bangladesh with care.

Establishing a proper modus-vivendi with the new BNP government is most important. China has already established itself as an important ally, and while this is largely evident in matters relating to trade and commerce, the former views Bangladesh as an ally in furthering its ambitions in South Asia. India has to act quickly before China consolidates this process.

What should, however, be of far greater concern is how to stem an Islamist tide that is sweeping across the Middle East and several parts of Asia and Africa. The right-wing extremist Islamist movement has steadily gained strength in recent years. Preventing Bangladesh from being drawn into the vortex of the Islamist revolution is vitally important for India’s future. It is extremist Islam rather than China, or the remnants of northeastern tribal groups, that pose a longer term challenge to India’s future. For the present, how to checkmate the extremist Islam torrent should be India’s primary concern.

How the situation in Bangladesh evolves may well be the key to India’s future. Properly orchestrated diplomatic steps and an ability ‘to see with the mind’s eye’ are important. India need not remain captive to Hasina; it is important to reach out to different segments of Bangladesh politicians, except the extremist fringe, to ensure a friendly Bangladesh. Wise heads in Delhi should try and shape a policy that would benefit India, Bangladesh and the region as a whole.

The writer is former director, Intelligence Bureau, former national security adviser, and former governor of West Bengal