A diplomatic tightrope: Navigating the complexities of India-Bangladesh relations

IT IS CONVENTIONAL wisdom within Indian diplomatic circles that Bangladesh presents a far more complex foreign policy challenge than Pakistan. The impact of the Partition in the East permeates the psyche and lives of tens of millions in one of the most densely populated regions of the world.

Bangladesh’s journey has not been easy—first as part of India, then of Pakistan, and now as an independent nation. The country is a large Muslim enclave surrounded by India. It displays a siege mentality and often defines sovereignty as separateness from India. When this separateness is threatened, or perceived to be threatened, there is pushback. Its people revolted when they sensed a similar threat from West Pakistan. The building of a unique identity that is neither Pakistani nor Indian is at the core of Bangladesh’s national project. Having been buffeted by opposing and competing ideologies for decades, and having paid the price in blood and otherwise, there is hope today that the post-1971 generation may succeed where their forefathers could not.

Beneath the idea of Bangladesh lies the reality of an intertwined and multilayered India-Bangladesh relationship. There is an India for every Bangladeshi, and a Bangladesh for every Indian, straddling geographical, economic, social and ideological specificities. The relationship has one meaning for the rickshaw puller who wishes to cycle from Akhaura to Agartala, and for the trader importing a cartload of boulders from Dauki to Tamabil, and quite another for policy mandarins in Dhaka playing on the regional and global chessboard.

India’s Bangladesh policy reflects this complexity. It may be led by the ministry of external affairs, but it has a multitude of internal drivers. Much effort goes into reconciling conflicting objectives within the officialdom in Delhi, and between Delhi and the neighbouring states, in the day-to-day administration of policy. This is a continuous enterprise that requires a few essential attributes: unfailing attention to the minutest details—many of which would surprise the uninitiated; knowledge, capacity, resilience and patience. It also entails accepting the structural limits to friendship, not between the average citizens of the two countries, but between the state apparatuses, when sovereignty comes into play.

We are today at a turning point in the relationship once again. In recent years, India has demonstrated how far it can go to strengthen ties. The initiatives and connectivity that India built with Bangladesh during the Hasina period were unprecedented and targeted towards the welfare of the common people. These included, among others, the settlement of longstanding boundary issues, people-to-people exchanges, non-reciprocal access to the Indian market, promotion of value chains, energy pipelines, rail, bus and water routes, capacity building, development assistance and cooperation on international and regional issues. Bangladesh, for its part, agreed not to weaponise its territory against India, with some exceptions.

It is possible to carry forward from where we left off. The first step has been taken with Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s outreach to Prime Minister Tarique Rahman, and his expression of willingness to work with him on all issues. This is important, as it settles the debate over the legitimacy question and the issue of the BNP’s record on India when it was last in office. This signalling will give space to Rahman to build internal consensus on how to move forward with India. The BNP’s election manifesto provides general guidance but avoids specifics. This gives flexibility to both sides. The return of Sheikh Hasina could be the first stumbling block and will require careful handling on both sides. So far, the signal from Delhi is that it will not allow the past to cloud the future. More than anyone else, Rahman himself is a beneficiary of a 17-year reprieve in London.

There are many low-hanging fruits that can kick-start the relationship, largely involving people. These do not need to wait for a summit-level meeting, although such a meeting is essential. Both sides would need to take confidence-building measures. In the interest of sustainability, the temptation to project any single issue as make-or-break is best avoided. Quiet diplomacy rather than grandstanding would serve better. The issues in the relationship, particularly Bangladesh’s grievances, are well known.

In this context, two examples illustrate how even the most intractable issues can be resolved when there is alignment of political forces on both sides. One is the 1996 Ganges Water Treaty, which expires this year and which, despite years of negotiations, could only be concluded when the stars aligned between Delhi, Kolkata and Dhaka. The second, more recent case is the Land Boundary Agreement of 2015, which had to wait decades for the arrival of a government with an absolute majority in Delhi and a willing partner in Dhaka. It is worth noting that both have survived the test of time.

It is time to move ahead with the hard work, notwithstanding the known knowns and the known unknowns.

The author is a former deputy national security adviser who earlier served as high commissioner to Bangladesh.