Tightrope walking is an acquired skill demanding years of practice and India’s abilities in this regard, as it balances its strategic relationships with Russia and the United States, are being severely tested by the Ukraine conflict. As the conflict intensifies and is brought closer home with the unfortunate death of an Indian student and growing difficulties for thousands more, there is no certainty how long this tightrope may have to extend, or how our official stance may evolve.
To recapitulate, India has so far taken—in carefully-crafted statements at the UN Security Council—what appears to be a balanced and even-handed stand; our fortuitous presence at the horseshoe table as a non-permanent member results in both a greater prominence for and a closer examination of our position. While these statements have predictably called for diplomatic dialogue, de-escalation of violence and a settlement on the basis of the Minsk Agreements, they have been perceived to contain a nuanced tilt towards Russia. Expressed in diplomatic shorthand, this tilt lies in our refusal to name Russia as the aggressor, a repeated reference to “legitimate security interests” of all states and a reluctance to categorise the developments as anything beyond “violence and hostilities”. While these statements have grown sharper with the spiralling of the situation into a full-blown conflict, the tightrope has held in essence, culminating in India’s abstention on the crucial draft resolution tabled on February 26 that sought to deplore Russian aggression.
Despite the general references to the UN Charter, international law, and respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity of states contained in our explanation of vote, this abstention by India—even at the cost of standing in China’s dubious company—has been seen as support for Russia, both by Russia as well as the rest of the world. Russia, in fact, officially expressed appreciation of our stand and the US Ambassador in New York characterised an abstention as being “against the Charter”.
The reasons for India’s position so far are clear: Russia is seen as an old friend, a reliable partner and the dependable supplier of more than 60 per cent of our defence equipment. Besides the highly sophisticated S-400 missile system, this includes new deals in the pipeline for supply and production of naval frigates, fighter aircraft, assault rifles as well as spares and refurbishment of Soviet and Russian legacy weapon systems. Other crucial areas of strategic cooperation include space, energy and civil nuclear industry.
There is also the weight of history. Russia, notwithstanding the current Russia-China bonhomie and recent footsie with Pakistan (on both counts, India would need to have a serious conversation with a possibly attenuated Russia that emerges from the conflict), has been a dependable strategic supporter who can be trusted to wield its UNSC veto in our favour, should we need it. As the world rushes into an open east-west conflict, memories of 1971 and the lifeline offered by the Indo-Soviet Treaty get refreshed. There are also deeply embedded doubts about America and the west’s reliability to provide unconditional strategic support when push comes to shove. Not just 1971, but the recent indifference to our concerns over Afghanistan, the mollycoddling of Pakistan for its own uses by the US and the long wooing of China before the recent reversal of position have not been forgotten.
India’s stand so far has been dictated by a hard-nosed calculation of its self-interest. But the same sense of realism also tells us that there will be costs and we should be geared to counter them. Compared with the days of non-alignment, the world today is more multifaceted, interlinked and complex. The balance of power is neither clear nor settled. There is neither the comfort of an entire bloc to lean back on nor the comfort in numbers of the fellow non-aligned. Nor does the construct of strategic autonomy rest on a moral bedrock strengthened by recent freedom struggles and anti-colonial, anti-imperialism impulses; instead, it is seen as a military-security-economic construct, fair game for a transactional approach and less deserving of generous understanding.
Beyond the spinoff costs arising out of the crippling sanctions on Russia and rising oil prices, India would need to counter the fallout on the India-US relationship, which is arguably the strongest it has ever been. While the US administration may show more understanding for our position at least for now, the Congress—where the Republicans are regaining their hawkish attitude—is likely to prove more difficult, particularly on the CAATSA waiver against sanctions for purchase of the S-400. It will also be a challenge to maintain the present strong momentum in the defence relationship and access to hi-tech weaponry; US caution about leakage of high technology to Russia, alleviated to some extent by the conclusion of foundational agreements with India over the past five years, is certain to re-emerge.
Tactical move: The UN Security Council meeting on February 28 to discuss the Ukrainian crisis. India abstained from voting for a resolution condemning Russia | AP
Further, India would need to ensure that neither the shifting of US focus from China to Russia nor any disappointment with our stand, weakens the India-US strategic convergence on China. The Quad—which is just beginning to get some teeth towards providing an alternative political, economic and technological paradigm for the Indo-Pacific—would need to be firewalled from the Ukraine fallout, as we stand alone among its four members. Our policy bet is that by taking the position that we have, we do not lose Russia and we depend on our inherent strength as a strategic, economic and technological partner to repair any cracks that may appear in the India-US and India-Europe relationships. However, this bet should factor in the odds of China’s increased hold on Russia, hardened European and NATO positions and a possibly decreased western focus on the Indo-Pacific.
India’s position should continue to evolve in the coming days and weeks depending on the situation, the extent of the destruction, civilian losses, even the opposition within Russia and so on. In developing our stance further, we would need to be mindful of several key aspects: First, our support for the principles of international law, sovereignty and territorial integrity may need reiteration beyond our last mention of these in the UNSC. A cynical view could well be that no great power, east or west, really respects those principles; yet if we are seen to be weak on supporting these fundamentals, then we open ourselves to losing international support on exactly those grounds when we need it. Secondly, though some may consider this to be a small change, there is likely damage to India’s soft power: images of rolling tanks, cowering civilians and teeming refugees will progressively increase the pressure on countries that have not openly denounced Russian aggression. Extending humanitarian aid to Ukraine is a welcome move that can ameliorate, to some extent, any such setback to the image. Thirdly, the diplomatic dividend from our position has given us space to play a role and not just be a neutral observer. The prime minister’s conversations with Putin, Zelenskyy and other European leaders as well as the foreign minister’s conversations are proof of this point. The immediate focus of these conversations would naturally be to ensure the safe evacuation of Indian nationals, but India should not eschew any opportunity to play a broader role in facilitating dialogue. An early end to the conflict will also limit our costs; sitting on the horns of a dilemma for long is never a comfortable option. While this is not our war, we can endeavour to be part of the peace.
—The writer is a former high commissioner of India to the UK and ambassador to the US.