Lessons from the India-China war

On completion of my pre-commission and flying training at the academy, I had my first posting as a pilot officer in a Hunter Squadron in June 1962. I arrived by a late evening train at Ambala. The lights at the station were like hurricane lamps; the roads were poorly lit. I hired a cycle rikshaw, which strained its way with me, my bedding and bags, to the officers’ mess about 45 minutes away.

My conversion training on the Hunters came to an abrupt halt in September when China attacked en masse in Ladakh and Arunachal Pradesh. I was sent along with seven or eight other junior pilots for forward air controller duties. I was assigned to a Jat infantry battalion in Tangtse, Ladakh, in my flight overall and flying boots! It was rough adjusting to the climate. The battalion headquarters was on the bank of a stream that moved gently by day but swelled with melting ice early morning. I joined lieutenant Mavi, the battalion quartermaster, as his tent-mate. We used to play throwing knives on sandbags for fun, and, sometimes, I climbed hills along with the troops to get a feel of the terrain. At break with the troops, we had rum with water in sawed-off bottles (local cut-glass!), that was a part of the standard tableware at functions with troops. Rum was indispensable to beat off the cold. At 13,000 feet, the capacity to withstand liquor drastically reduced.

Life was rough. I even got a frost bite that required a minor surgery in a tented hospital. Anyway, the Chinese abruptly declared ceasefire just as the winter was setting in. All the same, prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru sought help from US president John Kennedy and British prime minister Harold Macmillan to gear up the Air Force. It was a black day in India’s history when India sought systems to cover the entire spectrum of air operations that included radars, communication network, F-104 interceptors and bombers that can reach into Tibet; in short, creation of a full-spectrum Air Force.

In response, the US proposed a joint exercise, ‘Shiksha’, in India, with air forces of the US, the UK and Australia along with the IAF, in order to identify weak areas and to strengthen IAF skill-sets. The US agreed to send a few transportable radars for the exercise (that could subsequently be retained, if feasible), which could cover the air exercise area. The USAF also sent 18 F-100 Super-Sabres, the RAF 12 Javelin all-weather interceptors and the RAAF three Canberra bombers to participate in the exercise in November 1963.

The F-100s carried out high-speed interceptions against Canberra that were employed as raiders at high altitudes terminating in simulated missile attacks down to 4-5km range from the target. Indian Gnats and Hunters proved swift to get off the ground when scrambled but interceptions at low levels did not work too well due to poor radar detection. RAF Javelins faced some operational difficulties. One crashed on take-off at night. The crew were safe. Another Javelin ferrying through India was lost over the Sundarbans; the pilot was lost but the navigator ejected safely.

‘Shiksha’ highlighted weaknesses of the IAF. Till then, India had not pursued having a potent air force as a necessary investment. The US’s offer for a few operational training capsules that could strengthen the operational standards, new radars and communication systems was welcome. India’s request for the F-104 was denied, probably because Pakistan had already started receiving these in 1961. The Soviets then came forward offering MIG-21 interceptors, SAMs and air-weapons.

Pakistan was watching. It felt that the moment was right to attack India and grab Kashmir. In less than two years, Pakistan infiltrated ‘raiders’ in Kashmir and called it a local upraising. That act blew up into Indo-Pakistan war.

The writer served as the 19th Chief of the Air Staff.