Lethal embrace and frenemy doldrum: A lesson from Ukraine
There was a time when the US courted Ukraine, gave lollipops, then war started. Washington armed Ukraine, cheered its defiance and promised to stand by it as long as it takes. Now it is asking Kyiv to cede Donbas. A grim Cold War cliché has resurfaced, and New Delhi should pay attention
Recent diplomatic developments reveal that US support for Ukraine has shifted from an open-ended commitment to a transactional arrangement demanding territorial concessions, highlighting the inherent risks of relying entirely on superpower guarantees.
Recent diplomatic developments reveal that US support for Ukraine has shifted from an open-ended commitment to a transactional arrangement demanding territorial concessions, highlighting the inherent risks of relying entirely on superpower guarantees.
Recent diplomatic developments reveal that US support for Ukraine has shifted from an open-ended commitment to a transactional arrangement demanding territorial concessions, highlighting the inherent risks of relying entirely on superpower guarantees.
Ukraine was fighting for more than itself, as was reiterated time and again over nearly five years. It was the face of the free world, the living proof that borders could not be redrawn by force, the democracy which bled so that Europe was saved. Washington supplied the rhetoric, the HIMARS, the Javelins, alongside around $175 billion. Presidents, senators and secretaries made trips to Kyiv with photo-sessions showing solidarity. As long as it takes was the notion.
Yet, it suddenly changed last week. After US-mediated talks between Ukraine and Russia in Abu Dhabi, President Zelenskyy disclosed that, for the first time, US envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner stunned him with a question: if Ukraine joined NATO, would it withdraw from Donbas? Days earlier in Dublin, an exasperated Zelenskyy told the Americans that they believed that to end the war, Ukraine must leave its own territory. Russia, meanwhile, would not even accept a ceasefire on energy infrastructure.
Remove the sugar-coating, and the situation is grave. The victim is asked to pay the aggressor in land, including that which Russian forces have failed to capture despite their best efforts. The aggressor is asked for nothing of comparable weight. Now that the lollipops are consumed, the bill has arrived.
The phrase which outlived its creator
Over half a century ago, as Washington weighed how far it would stand by South Vietnam’s President Nguyen Van Thieu, Henry Kissinger is reported to have remarked that ‘To be an enemy of the USA is dangerous but to be a friend of the USA is lethal’. Saigon fell in 1975. The line has outlived its author because history is replete with numerous fresh examples.
The Shah of Iran found out in 1979 that decades of loyalty failed to buy him sanctuary. Hosni Mubarak learnt in 2011 how quickly an ally for thirty years became a liability. The Syrian Kurds, who did the real groundwork of defeating ISIS, woke up astonished to find American withdrawal in October 2019, which left them exposed to a Turkiye offensive. And in August 2021, the world watched the poor Afghans who worked alongside Americans for nearly two decades, clinging to the belly of aircraft flying from the Kabul airport.
It has been nostalgia for Ukraine. Under the Budapest Memorandum in 1994, it surrendered the third-largest global nuclear arsenal in exchange for assurances from the US, Britain and Russia that its territorial integrity would be respected. How empty these assurances were was proven when Russia tore those up in 2014 and repeated in 2022. Now one of the other assurers is advocating for Ukrainian territory as the price for peace.
From partner to payment
The Trump administration has never hidden its views that Ukraine is a ledger, not a cause. What heralded it was the widely publicised humiliation of Zelenskyy in the Oval Office in February 2025. The minerals deal that followed recast years of aid as a debt to be serviced by Ukraine. The 28-point peace plan of November 2025 asked Kyiv to cede territory, cap its army and forswear NATO. When told that Zelenskyy was unhappy, Trump responded that he would ‘have to like it’. The latest Donbas-for-NATO formula comes from the same book.
The case for Washington
An honest assessment, however, must give the other side due credit. Ukraine is there as a sovereign nation largely due to US weapons and intelligence. American voters never signed a blank cheque for an open-ended war, and no democracy can be ridiculed for questioning when the war ends. If the Donbas-for-NATO idea is genuine, it may offer Kyiv the one thing it has sought since 2008: an Article 5 guarantee. Realists argue that a frozen line backed by NATO beats an endless war of attrition Ukraine may never win, and Zelenskyy himself has said that a comprehensive deal with real security guarantees could be put to referendum in Ukraine.
These are serious arguments. But they do not address the main concern: who defines a friend’s interests; the friend or the patron? When the patron decides that the friend’s territorial integrity is negotiable, the friendship becomes a protectorate with an exit clause.
Why friendship turns lethal
America’s friendship is not lethal because Americans are treacherous. It is lethal because it is structurally contingent. A superpower protected by the two largest oceans can afford to recalibrate every four years; a client state sharing a large border with Russia cannot. US commitments are hostage to budget fights, electoral cycles and the temperament of the White House occupant. Nations have no permanent allies, only permanent interests, as said by Lord Palmerston. The tragedy begins when a smaller nation mistakes a superpower’s flirting for a commitment and its momentary interest for a permanent bond.
The lesson for India
India understood it very early. It remembers the US Seventh Fleet steaming into the Bay of Bengal in 1971, the sanctions after Pokhran-II in 1998 and more recently, the tariff war imposed off and on alongside a trade agreement that keeps slipping. Each episode reaffirmed the wisdom of strategic autonomy, not as a slogan, but as a survival doctrine.
The lesson is not to shun Washington. The United States remains indispensable to India’s technology, capital and Indo-Pacific security ambitions, and the partnership deserves to deepen. The lesson is to engage without dependence; achieve energy sovereignty, indigenise defence production, build semiconductor and critical-mineral capacity at home, and enhance outreach to every nook and corner of the globe. Atmanirbharta is not autarky; it is insurance. A nation that aspires to be Viksit by 2047 must first be sovereign in its choices so that no envoy can ever arrive in New Delhi with a map and a proposal.
Ukraine was promised a friend and is being handed an invoice. The whole globe watching, New Delhi included, should draw the obvious conclusion: befriend America, by all means, but never mistake its embrace for a guarantee.
In geopolitics, a superpower’s embrace is not a guarantee. It is a loan where the interest is bound to be paid in territory.
The author is the Vice Chairman, PanIIT Alumni, and Registrar, Indian Institute of Public Administration (IIPA).
The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not purport to reflect the opinions or views of THE WEEK.