Unbound lame duck: How Trump plans to govern without Congress
Trump's lame duck presidency faces historic legislative deadlock following midterm losses, prompting the administration to govern aggressively through sweeping vetoes and unilateral executive actions
Donald Trump navigates a difficult lame-duck term following congressional losses, shifting his focus toward executive overreach, foreign policy ambitions, and managing upcoming investigations.
Donald Trump navigates a difficult lame-duck term following congressional losses, shifting his focus toward executive overreach, foreign policy ambitions, and managing upcoming investigations.
Donald Trump navigates a difficult lame-duck term following congressional losses, shifting his focus toward executive overreach, foreign policy ambitions, and managing upcoming investigations.
Donald Trump has a new nickname and, fittingly, a new hat. Commemorative red veto headwear is now part of the White House wardrobe, and the Mr Veto nickname shows that the president intends to meet defeat in defiance rather than in contrition.
Democrats have captured both chambers of Congress, and the consequences are plain. Trump is the first president in more than a century to serve non-consecutive terms. He now faces two full years as a lame duck, with no election ahead of him. Traditionally, a lame duck is a figure of fading influence, a president whose tenure is running out and whose allies are already looking elsewhere. Trump fits that description only partly. The conventional lame duck accepts his shrinking role and gradually prepares to leave. Trump shows no such inclination. Instead, he appears to be preparing for a siege, one that could have dangerous consequences for the US and the world.
Trump’s ability to push through signature legislation has effectively disappeared. Capitol Hill, until recently a rubber stamp for the White House, has become an adversary. His response is to threaten a veto of every Democratic bill that reaches his desk. Democrats lack the two-thirds majority needed to override him, making legislative paralysis likely. Trump sees the stalemate as leverage. He appears to believe that months of blanket obstruction will eventually wear down his opponents and force them into accepting limited bargains on his terms. Divided government has often produced compromise, with both sides making concessions to keep the machinery running. This time, however, deadlock seems more likely. When Congress cannot act, and the president refuses to compromise, the executive becomes the only branch capable of moving. A president who finds himself the only one moving may begin to believe he has the right to set the direction.
With the legislative route largely blocked, the administration is turning increasingly to executive power. Aides such as Stephen Miller and Russell Vought favour the Project 2025 strategy of flooding the zone. The White House has already issued hundreds of executive orders, memoranda and proclamations. It is now considering tighter immigration restrictions, emergency declarations to circumvent spending limits and tariffs imposed without congressional approval.
The danger extends beyond Trump’s remaining term. When emergency powers intended for exceptional circumstances become routine instruments of government, future presidents, regardless of party, can reach for the same tools. Meanwhile, the Democratic-controlled Senate can block cabinet and judicial nominees, forcing the administration to rely more heavily on acting officials without Senate confirmation. Such appointments invite legal challenges, turning each lawsuit into another test of the limits of executive discretion.
The change in committee leadership will also bring hearings, subpoenas and investigations. Incoming Democratic House leaders have advised administration officials to lawyer up, and some appear to have taken the warning seriously. The White House counsel’s office has brought in lawyers to defend the administration against congressional scrutiny. Aides are reportedly buying legal insurance, while some are looking at pre-emptive pardons. Border enforcement, foreign business dealings and cabinet members such as Pete Hegseth are among the likely targets.
Trump dismisses the prospect of a third impeachment, convinced that previous acquittals and voter fatigue have blunted the power of congressional oversight. But a West Wing preoccupied with legal defence has little time or energy left for policymaking. Officials who remain will increasingly think about their own exposure. A cornered inner circle can be a dangerous one. Those worried about legal jeopardy may put loyalty ahead of sound judgment, while a president who senses betrayal is unlikely to respond with restraint.
Foreign policy is the arena in which a president remains least constrained by Congress, and Trump may increasingly turn his attention there. He still covets a Nobel Peace Prize and a legacy to match. The ambitions are considerable: reviving talks with North Korea, holding summits with Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping over Ukraine, and pursuing a harder line in the Western Hemisphere under what some have called the Donroe Doctrine.
Each carries its own risks. A summit staged to secure a place in history could come at the expense of allies. A president freed from electoral pressure may be more willing to use coercion against weaker partners. Iran presents an even darker possibility. Stalled negotiations and the economic fallout could raise the prospect of fresh military strikes. A president with no election to worry about and diminishing room for manoeuvre at home may find the temptation difficult to resist.
The midterm results have also weakened Trump’s hold over the Republican Party. Many of his handpicked candidates lost, prompting lawmakers to reconsider whether he remains an electoral asset or has become a liability. The succession contest has already begun, largely out of public view. Vice President JD Vance and Secretary of State Marco Rubio appear to be the principal contenders. Trump is unlikely to anoint an heir, fearing that doing so would signal his own political irrelevance. But his silence comes at a cost. Public defections by former allies, factional disputes and the early manoeuvring for 2028 could gradually erode his grip on the party.
Republicans in Congress, once fearful of incurring his displeasure, are beginning to distance themselves. Yet a wounded leader who senses his party slipping away may lash out. A primary threat or a public purge remains is still possible, and the fear of it still shapes the calculations of many members.
There is also the question of how the president chooses to spend his time. Aides say he is happy to inspect the renovation of the Lincoln Memorial pool or show off plans for the White House ballroom. Meanwhile, his foreign business ties, cryptocurrency ventures and lucrative family arrangements continue largely undisturbed.
Critics see a pattern. Trump craves attention, and spectacle offers a convenient distraction from his diminished political standing. More troubling is the blurring of the boundaries between public office and private enterprise. A president with no future election to face has little electoral incentive to maintain that distinction. As his time in office runs down, the temptation to treat the presidency as a platform for private gain may only grow.
A weakened president is usually a cautious one. Trump, however, is weakened but unbound. He retains the full powers of the presidency even as the usual political restraints on his behaviour begin to disappear.