Xi Jinping and Kim Jong-un summit: A pivotal moment for East Asian security

Chinese President Xi Jinping is due to make a state visit to Pyongyang on June 8 and 9 and hold talks with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un. It will be Xi's first trip to North Korea since June 2019, arriving at a pivotal moment in the relationship between the two neighbours. It is also notable for a more personal reason: Xi has sharply curtailed his overseas travel since the Covid-19 pandemic. At a time when most world leaders make the journey to Beijing to meet him, his decision to go to Pyongyang signals how seriously China views both North Korea and the broader security environment along its borders.

The summit arrives against a rapidly shifting geopolitical backdrop. Xi's visit follows closely on the heels of his meetings in Beijing with US President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin. Although China is North Korea’s indispensable trade partner, Pyongyang's leverage in the bilateral partnership has grown significantly after the Ukraine war. North Korea has emerged as a crucial backer of Moscow's war effort, reportedly supplying troops, artillery shells, conventional weapons and ballistic missiles. In return, Pyongyang is believed to have received compensation worth as much as $14.4 billion, much of it thought to have come in the form of advanced military technology—the kind that makes it difficult for outside observers to gauge its full extent.

Beijing has watched the growing Kim-Putin partnership with quiet unease. China shares a 1,400km border with North Korea and remains bound to it by a mutual defence treaty signed in 1961, which marks its 65th anniversary this year. Yet Beijing has traditionally been reluctant to furnish extensive military support, and is not necessarily comfortable with a North Korea emboldened by Russian technology. Chinese policymakers worry that a more capable and assertive Pyongyang could destabilise the fragile balance of power on the Korean Peninsula. Against this backdrop, Xi's visit is widely read as an effort to reassert Chinese influence, protect Beijing's strategic interests and ensure that North Korea's deepening ties with Moscow do not erode China's own role in the relationship.

North Korea's expanding nuclear arsenal is expected to feature prominently in the talks. Kim has recently made a point of showcasing the country's military capabilities, including a visit to a new facility producing weapons-grade nuclear materials. He has also pledged to grow North Korea's nuclear forces at what he described as an "exponential rate".

Many analysts believe Kim will use Xi's visit to press North Korea's claim to permanent nuclear weapons status. In Pyongyang's view, international recognition of that status would strengthen its case for the removal of sanctions and a measure of diplomatic rehabilitation.

President Trump has repeatedly expressed interest in reviving negotiations with North Korea, but Kim has shown little appetite for returning to talks unless Washington drops its longstanding demand for denuclearisation. Some observers have speculated that Xi could play an intermediary role and help kickstart US-North Korea diplomacy, particularly after the White House reiterated that denuclearisation remains a shared objective of Washington and Beijing. Most experts, however, are sceptical. China has quietly softened its public rhetoric on Korean denuclearisation in recent years, retreating into broad statements about consistency rather than pressing Pyongyang on the matter. Xi is therefore unlikely to spend significant political capital coaxing Kim back to the negotiating table, particularly when the North Korean leader appears firmly set on retaining and expanding his nuclear arsenal.

For Kim, Xi's visit carries real symbolic and practical value. Having largely severed ties with both South Korea and the United States, he is keen to show that North Korea can survive and prosper without making concessions to either country. Many observers expect him to push for greater cross-border trade and an increase in Chinese tourism to support North Korea's struggling civilian economy and its newly developed resort projects.

Relations between the two Koreas remain deeply strained. After formally abandoning reunification as a national objective in late 2024, Kim declared South Korea a "sworn enemy" and cut off all channels of communication. The depth of that hostility was evident last month when North Korea's women's football team reportedly showed open antagonism towards their South Korean hosts during a tournament. South Korean officials hope Xi might encourage Pyongyang to reopen dialogue, but Kim currently has little incentive to do so. Backed by both Russia and China, he faces far less pressure than in previous years to engage with Seoul or Washington.

In the end, Xi's visit serves several strategic objectives in an increasingly polarised world. For Beijing, it is an opportunity to reaffirm its influence in the wider East Asian security architecture and pose a challenge to the US. For Kim, it is a diplomatic coup. It validates his strategy of balancing relations with Beijing and Moscow rather than depending on either, expands North Korea's room for manoeuvre, and strengthens his hand to pursue his economic and security goals on his own terms. Most importantly, he appears increasingly confident that he can press ahead with his nuclear programme without facing meaningful pressure from either of his two most important partners.