Decoding the Moscow-Wagner Game of Chicken
Was it disastrously played? Or is it part of a broader strategy?
Was it disastrously played? Or is it part of a broader strategy?
Was it disastrously played? Or is it part of a broader strategy?
Was it disastrously played? Or is it part of a broader strategy?
Moscow's chickens came home to roost this week as the Wagner Group, which had been allowed to roam freely on the front lines of the war against Ukraine, brought home negative repercussions of the actions taken by Russian President Vladimir Putin against Kyiv.
The confrontational dynamics of a high-stakes game of chicken between Putin and Wagner chief Yevgeny Prigozhin remains shrouded in mystery but game theory can help us contextualise and understand it.
The game of chicken, in game theory terms, is a high-stakes strategic face-off where two parties confront potential catastrophe if neither yields. It involves a two-way bluff; the first to swerve is deemed the loser, revealing an inherent weakness.
If we analyse the unexplainable actions of Putin and Prigozhin that put the world on edge Friday and Saturday, we begin to see a familiar pattern.
Two sides take seemingly rational actions to maximise their outcome vis-a-vis the other, and find themselves on an investable, if disastrous, collision course. It happens so often in human interactions that it is an archetypal conflict.
As such, the choices, potential decisions, and strategies to come out on top have been extensively studied and analysed in the realm of game theory, a branch of mathematics that analyses strategic decision-making in confrontations.
Tensions with the Russian Ministry of Defense began to show as a sideline weeks ago with a series of Telegram criticisms by Prigozhin that seemed to ebb and flow in an irrational pattern. Then, last week he publicly criticised Putin's reasons for invading Ukraine and called for a halt to the "evil" actions of Russia's military leadership.
Fighting words that would embarrass Putin at home and abroad by undermining the public rationale for the war. Prigozhin as much said that the reasons for war were false.
At this point, Prigozhin and Putin began barreling against each other on a speeding collision course, their actions and opposing viewpoints propelling both toward a deadly clash with even more severe consequences for the country to follow.
Putin ignored Prigozhin's demands to replace the defense minister, and Prigozhin took his troops from Ukraine and into Russia, seizing the strategic city of Rostov-on-Don and the crucial military installations that run the war, all of it facing little or no military opposition.
He then demanded that military leaders meet him there. When he got no response from Putin, he threatened to move into Moscow. Putin was resolute in not yielding and steady on his path ignoring Prigozhin, who was left no face-saving choice other than to begin his move to Moscow.
At this stage, the classic game of chicken is on. Russia has the largest nuclear arsenal, its control is in question, and the world is on edge. Wagner troops are less than 300 kilometers from Moscow.
Now, that area, along Russia's M-4 highway that approaches Moscow, passes through expansive stretches of open terrain, allowing for good aerial visibility as it traverses a wide agricultural fields and flat lands.
It should be noted that Wagner has no aerial component and Putin has access to the 3,200 aircraft Russian air forces. With easy reconnaissance capability and the absence of significant natural obstacles such as mountains or dense forests, the Wagner forces could be sitting ducks to the air forces.
The Russian capital was under alert, with streets closed, military vehicles in many areas and sand-filled dump trucks blocking the roads. Putin could have easily wiped-out Wagner. Never mind that there are over a million Russian soldiers vs. some 50,000 paid Wagner fighters for a right for Moscow.
"Never show your weakness to your enemy" advises renowned Chinese military strategist, Sun Tsu, author of the "The Art of War," a handbook with wisdom on military tactics and strategy.
Looking and sounding distressed, Putin addressed the nation on television, raising the specter of a civil war, and making comparison to the existential moment of the Russian Revolution of 1917. He called the moves inside Russia by Prigozhin and the thousands of mercenaries he leads, a "betrayal from the inside."
The words seemed to cast the die by which Prigozhin would perish. Putin was holding steady ahead on a frightening, nuclear-laced game of chicken.
In the afternoon, Russia's showdown between the two men who had been raining destruction on Ukrainian towns seemed headed to a bloody crescendo when an announcement was made that Wagner retreated, thereby diffusing the anxiety-gripped tension in Moscow and around the world. The quick ending was as stunning as the day's earlier developments.
In this game of chicken that seemed poised to show who held the greatest strength, both sides swerved, exposing Putin's and Prigozhin's weaknesses and breaking all rules of strategic warfare; both sides lost, by agreement, confounding observers across the globe.
Putin, a man who had a Trump-like reputation of never negotiating, negotiated, presumably out of uncertainty his troops would follow his orders to defend against Wagner, and the expressed fear of a civil war. The weakness of the move most certainly raised questions about the close commitment emerging power China had made with Putin, and left domestic public opinion to sort the show of weakness.
Putin's initial strong rhetoric followed by a sudden change in stance may be seen as indecisiveness or a loss of control while the Wagner chief's ability to negotiate a retreat despite being significantly outnumbered could be seen as continuing leverage over Putin.
But Prigozhin showed his bluff and thus exposed the limits of his power, demystifying the legend built by his successes in the war, potentially a strategically devastating move. Presumably, the bile that had been building thorough the day was forgotten and the Wagner chief would trade his military fatigues and machine gun for an umbrella-topped cocktail and retirement on a Belarus poolside.
Many Russians don't buy that. For him, a move to Belarus may be akin to a sightseeing trip on the terrace of a very tall building.
Older Russians are jaded. Either because of denial or well-practiced cynicism, they believe what we have seen is the illusion Putin wants them and the world to see. They believe he is a master tactician.
"All warfare is based on deception," wrote Sun Tsu. "Hence, when we are able to attack, we must seem unable; when using our forces, we must appear inactive; when we are near, we must make the enemy believe we are far away; when far away, we must make him believe we are near. Hold out baits to entice the enemy. Feign disorder and crush him."
Could it be that it is all a well-crafted deception? Afterall Putin, Prigozhin, and Belarus' Lukashenko are aligned on the same side, and there could be collective motives and intentions at play.
Let's begin by considering the individual motives.
Of course, "Putin" is more than just the man. It should be understood that he is but the head of an enormous administration with opposing cadres in hardline camps and competing factions, all vying for influence and control.
The strategic deception could provide a way for Putin to purge the ranks of those close to him and allow him to run the war with greater freedom. It would also be useful in misleading Ukraine and the West, allowing for surprise offensives and concealing Russia's weaknesses.
To be noted is the face that it was Prigozhin's Internet Research Agency troll farm that is widely credited with influencing American public opinion to put Putin sympathizer Donald Trump in the U.S. presidency.
Prigozhin and Putin go back at least 30 years to St. Petersburg, when the former was rebuilding his life and Putin was deputy mayor of the city. Famously selling hot dogs on the street, Prigozhin's friendship with Putin garnered him government catering contracts.
When Putin made it to the Kremlin, Prigozhin had his confidence. In a country where fear of poisoning of leaders was a real concern, Prigozhin was at Putin's side and in charge of food operations and catering.
While others became oligarchs through lucrative oil and commodities contracts, Prigozhin got Russia's food contracts becoming an oligarch himself.
In 2014, as Putin wanted to duplicate the U.S. use of Blackwater mercenaries in Iraq and Afghanistan that provided a removed command structure and thus plausible deniability of unseemly acts, his friend Prigozhin established the Wagner group, receiving the right to recruit from prisons in exchange for a pardon for those who survive. He soon obtained a succession of lucrative contracts in Syria, Libya, and eventually Ukraine among other regions, helping multiply and project Russian power.
Let's take another look at the events now, in the context of game theory.
Both sides were engaged in a high-stakes situation, with the Wagner group advancing towards Moscow despite their smaller numbers, potentially a suicidal situation unless top military brass defected to the mercenary chief.
This move created a sense of urgency and concern for Putin, as the Wagner group's actions directly challenged his authority and could potentially destabilise his regime by allowing those competing factions within his administration to move to seize power.
Though Putin initially responded played strong by labeling the Wagner chief as a traitor and threatening punishment, as confrontation escalated and the Wagner group neared Moscow, he chose to de-escalate the situation, dropping all charges.
It could be feigned disorder and weakness, as part of another game theory model, the Signaling Game, also known as Coordinated Deception.
In the context of this game, all three parties, Putin, Prigozhin, and Lukashenko could be engaged in an elaborate strategic deceit by sending misleading signals to either purge internal opposition or entrap internal enemies on one side and Ukraine and the West on the other, with the goal to induce them into specific actions while concealing true intentions or capabilities.
The signaling game is a carefully and strategically crafted set of messages that manipulate by deception and potentially gain strategic advantages, such as diverting their attention or resources, lulling them into complacency, or setting up a trap.
Now, there is no indication today that what occurred is anything other than a poorly-played chicken game, yielding two losing sides, hurting the reputation and power of both.
One thing that cannot be easily manipulated, however, is the collective reaction of Russians to the events. The cheers and applause with which the Wagner troops were met as they left Rostov-on-Don cannot be of any comfort to Putin. The limited reaction, despite the applause, on the other hand, did not catch the levels of popular support Prigozhin would have needed for sustained success.
Both Russian parties appear inactive, in chaos, having lost their war strategy in the most elemental game of chicken. No one knows the direction things are going. Or perhaps that is the genius of a well-played Coordinated Deception Game set up.