Pervez Musharraf was one Pakistani ruler whom India distrusted most and also trusted most. India distrusted him for the Kargil war in 1999, but trusted him when he promised in 2004 to try and stop the export of terror.
A military man inside out, Musharraf could hardly understand the dynamics of politics or the niceties of diplomacy. Like all field generals, he could think only in terms of territory. For him, the Kashmir issue was a territorial issue pure and simple - territory for militaries to manoeuvre, or territory for mining resources. Not a people's issue, nor a political issue. He launched the Kargil war for that.
Anyway, in Kargil Musharraf proved to be a brilliant tactician, but a poor strategist. He had not factored in the political and diplomatic heft that India commanded. As Vajpayee's diplomats launched a brilliant campaign across the world capitals highlighting India's cause, even Pakistan's friends in Washington and elsewhere came to be convinced that Pakistan, or its military led by Musharraf, was the nasty aggressor. To cut a long story short, he lost the Kargil war.
Musharraf lay low for a while, committing no mistakes - in word or deed. But by now, his prime minister Nawaz Sharif sought to put the blame for the Kargil misadventure on the army which would prove to be a costly mistake. As troop and officer morale began sagging, Musharraf undertook a whirlwind tour of military stations where he gave pep-talk to his soldiers, though he took care not to blame the political leadership. The rest is history - how Nawaz Sharif sacked Musharraf when the latter was away in Colombo, and how Musharraf's loyal staff officers and corps commanders quickly mounted a coup. In short, Musharraf didn't mount a coup. His men mounted a coup for him and made him the ruler.
Having captured political power, Musharraf tried diplomacy. He opened backchannel talks with India, which led to a summit at Agra. But across the conference table, the Indian delegation, used to good old diplomacy, was flabbergasted. Musharraf wanted to talk about just one issue - Kashmir. Everything else was secondary. Whereas the Indian side, used to old ways of step-by-step approach - wanted to have comprehensive dialogues over a host of other issues ranging from trade and Sir Creek to cultural tries and the Siachen standoff. The talks flopped.
Relations remained cold for the next few months, with all attention falling on the aftermath of the attack on the World Trade Centre, and the war on the Taliban.
Backchannel diplomacy started again, and by now India too decided that Musharraf was there for good, and it was better to do business with him. Indian diplomats haggled hard and finally made Musharraf agree to the famous 2004 Islamabad declaration by which Pakistan agreed not to allow its territory to be used for launching terror strikes against India.
Soon domestic issues distracted his attention. His handling of the judiciary - also in his commando-style - proved to be his undoing. He sacked chief justices, arrested lawyers and alienated the Pakistani elite who had been actually warming up to him, especially for his secular and modern outlook. The dictatorial streak in him bared itself now.
Finally, the forces of political democracy asserted. He was forced to let Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif return from their exile. Finally, when Benazir Bhutto was assassinated in a terrorist strike, the needle of suspicion turned against his regime.
The rest is history.
