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In December 2021, ahead of US President Joe Biden’s Summit for Democracy, Beijing embarked on a wide-spectrum propaganda blitz. Chinese state and state-adjacent media outlets released catchy songs about the definition of democracy not being one-size-fits-all, compared the US ruling system to the evil Lord Voldemort in the Harry Potter series of books, and insulted Biden as having consumed too much KFC and McDonald’s fast food. At the same time, Beijing released scholarly theses extolling the Chinese system as a “democracy that works”, and published acerbic op-eds highlighting Trump’s victory by “pandering to the xenophobic ideas of less-educated voters in backward regions” as an example of the failure of Western governance ideals. A deceptively entertaining, subversive, and at times illuminating, roller-coaster ride.
A new Cold War, a renewed global power struggle, is looming, in the background of an existing international liberal order inexorably weakened by a plethora of factors—not the least of which is the coronavirus pandemic. And while it might be comforting to relapse into the saintly wisdom of the Alphonse Karr adage ‘the more things change, the more they stay the same’, the truth remains that the theatres of the oft-familiar conflicts have irreversibly altered. It is this nature and paradigm of the shifting geopolitical sands, in an era of radical redefinitions and realignments, that Bruno Macaes, former Europe minister of Portugal, eloquently dissects in his most recent book Geopolitics for the End Time.
All throughout history, great wars have dislodged incumbents on the global stage, and challengers have risen to the throne. In this nuclear age, a great war is all but impossible. Take the case of China. At a time when it is abundantly clear that it cannot continue to grow and operate beyond a level under the present global system, how can it dislodge the US? That certainly won’t happen in the familiar terrains of the existing system. As Macaes writes, the US has allies, unlimited access to the world’s reserve currency, control over core tech like semiconductors and military advantage (albeit receding). However, the churns caused by the pandemic, and evolving natural phenomena like climate change, are testing the resilience of the already embattled global order; Beijing views this, the author posits, as the equivalent of a transformational great war. The pandemic upset expectations and exposed weaknesses. It forced America to compete with China on neutral grounds.
Macaes cites China’s response to COVID—Beijing viewed it more as a national security crisis than a health crisis, with a government white paper calling it a “grand battle, a people’s war under Xi Jinping’s command, that showcased the strengths and advantages of the Chinese system”, and nationalist commentators celebrating the moment as one where “China could finally beat the US in a fair game: the virus game”. He identifies three main levers that China can use to turn the pandemic into an opportunity to upturn existing global order: The first is direct comparison between China’s response and other nations’, especially the “chaos” in US cities and hospitals. The second was the industrial value chains (the author urges the West to take greater notice of the Chinese policy of ‘dual circulation’), over which China consolidated growing dominance after the pandemic. And third, in an extreme scenario where the pandemic-induced economic crashes could lead to political and social collapse, China could step in to provide aid and refashion countries in its image.
The battle is far from settled, though. Ultimately, the victors will be those who master technology and acquire a higher level of control over natural forces, he writes.
In the book, Macaes writes about a common thread that arose from his visits to both China and India—the concept of a ‘civilisation state’. He writes about Chinese diplomats telling him: “Always remember China is a civilisation and not nation state”. He quotes India’s ruling BJP’s influential leader Ram Madhav: “From now on Asia will rule the world, and that changes everything because in Asia we have civilisations and not nation states”. While the book explores in some detail the crisis of capitalism post-pandemic and the fundamental need to redefine globalism going forward, the concept of civilisation states is the most illustrative example of what the author refers to as an approaching realignment. As Macaes writes, this was repudiation on a granular level of the global liberal philosophy, which was taken seriously everywhere and subscribed to even by the independence movements in the so-called Third World countries. “Defenders of civilisation state say that the search for universality is over, and all of us must accept that we speak only for ourselves and our society,” he writes.
The old equations are done with. As Macaes says, the simple reductionism of ‘Western liberalism vs Eastern authoritarianism’ holds no longer (India being a prime example), and, as the pandemic showed, even ‘autocracy vs democracy’ was a flawed lens through which to view the world. “When I look which countries performed best [amid the pandemic], I don't think autocracies did better than democracies, or democracies did better than autocracies. What we saw was that countries that were better at technology [deployment], and which had recent modernisation processes, performed better. Like Singapore, UAE, Israel, and China,” he says.
In an interview with THE WEEK, Macaes delves into the big power games, the challenges facing globalisation, the future that awaits Europe, and India’s role in this changing geopolitical scenario.
Edited excerpts:
1. Considering all its recent aggressiveness and economic gambits, Beijing looks like it is making a renewed push to shift the Overton window and flip over the [now weakened] liberal international order. What do you see as China's role in shaping the world ahead?
That is one of the questions of the pandemic: Who will come out on top? The outcome is still relatively ambiguous. The first point I make in the book is that we can look at the pandemic and climate crisis as those rare moments when the entire global order is shaken, giving opportunities for others to rise to the top. Historically, it happened through great wars [which shook the incumbent power structures]. I am sure there are people in Beijing who look at the climate crisis and the pandemic as sort of equivalents of a great transformation, where the global hierarchy can be changed and transformed in ways that are very difficult during normal times. So, how can that happen? In a soft power sense, both [the US and China] have been negatively impacted, and it hasn't worked out very well for either. China has been efficient at fighting the pandemic, but has been blamed for the whole thing, and the US has continued to give signals that it doesn't know how to deal with it. Economically, China has been focused on preserving its place in the global value chains—a vulnerable position even before the pandemic. I think they reacted quickly and very well to that. What they now suffer from is excessive isolation from the rest of the world. The US is struggling with problems of its own, like the inflationary consequences of [economic] stimulus. [In a nutshell] It is difficult to say that one has benefited more obviously than the other. But, what we do see is that the world order, as it existed, is very fragile, eroding in many parts, and collapsing in some. You already see hints of a world to come, but we are yet to see what shape it takes. I don't think it will be a China-dominated world. Rather, it will be a much more complicated world of divided powers, with different poles and regional orders.
2. You mentioned divided powers. Along what verticalities could this division happen?
In my first book [Dawn of Eurasia], I spoke about Eurasia as the big, decisive space. Now, we clearly see the ongoing game about the future shape of Eurasia. The main [questions] are Russia and Europe, and the kind of balance they will establish. One of the most important questions now, and we will see it in the coming months, is what happens in the case of Ukraine. Then, there is the question of China and India, still moving and very competitive. There is the question of China and Russia, who are getting closer together. Eurasia is now a fully integrated space, no longer fragmented and divided. It is a space where flows of trade, culture and political influence happen all the time. What shape will it take? It is too early to say. There are some possibilities. We do seem to be moving closer to a China-Russia alliance, and we do seem to be moving to a Eurasian order where India will try to remain a sovereign, independent power [not strictly aligned], and working with the US and Russia whenever necessary. We see Europe in a moment of crisis, with threats to sovereignty and prosperity if it doesn't play its cards well. It is a critical moment where relationships are being redefined, and with the United States now no more than a balancer. It is a player outside the main Eurasian chessboard. It can play a role in the sense that it can balance different forces, but it is no longer a hegemonic power. That was the lesson of Afghanistan.
3. Coming to what you just said about the US. Compared to his predecessors, Trump threw the rule-book out of the window. Biden came to power on the promise of stability and a return to mean. But, there has been element of continuity between them, and, on issues like Afghanistan, close allies expressed public dismay. Has an element of trust been eroded, and are we witnessing an unravelling in real-time?
I have a slightly different view here. Many look at United States as having betrayed the trust of world. I don't see it in those terms. It is a structural transformation. That means the US is no longer able to dictate the rules and processes of global politics. They now happen in a much more chaotic environment, with different powers [all vying against each other]. All the US can do is to balance the powers, and try to contain and restrain China. Which is, no doubt, a valuable goal for their foreign policy. But, the old goals of transforming the world in their image, creating small Americas everywhere, is a futile project. The question is how anyone could have ever believed in this. Afghanistan was the big lesson where we saw very clearly the limitations of US power. If the US can't shape Afghanistan in its image, how can it ever shape Russia, China or India? It is a moment of transformation. Whether the president is Trump or Biden doesn't matter, as what we see is a huge continuity on these issues as opposed to what the superficial rhetoric might claim.
4. You speak about realignment in this book. What do you see as the future for Europe?
What we see now [in the case of Europe] is a fragmented civilisation that can only survive if it comes together in the face of threats by outside actors and develop a centralised power structure [which can take different forms]. But, if it remains the way it is, divided into different nation states, with complete sovereignty for the members on issues like foreign policy and defence, it is inevitable that large parts of Europe will come under the direct control of actors like US, Russia or China. Other parts will become entirely marginal. It will be a very, very fragmented Europe. I think people are slowly coming to this realisation, and the question is how quickly they will act on it.
5. In the aftermath of the pandemic, with supply chain disruptions the norm, some have predicted the resurgence of protectionism, while others have advocated for renewed regionalism in international trade [US-Mexico-Canada in North America, or ASEAN in Asia]. But, in the book, you speak about globalisation coming back stronger than ever. How do you see the trends aligning in the future?
We continue to see global trade that is very strong and growing. We see a global public space that is more integrated than ever. I don't see the disappearance of globalisation, but what I do see is a different understanding of the concept. It is no longer a kind of self-regulating machine, but a system where the [agent] states are powerful and can shape outcomes. Its fragilities have also been exposed by natural forces like the pandemic. So, this neoliberal idea of globalisation as rules that work by themselves, that don't need to be applied and implemented by nation states, is coming to an end. As we saw with the supply chains, a small shock sends the entire system into failure. And, COVID-19 was a relatively small shock, if we compare it to threats like climate change. Just imagine the impact [the latter] could have on ports. Major ports could become flooded, and it could take years to recover. That is a much larger shock because the impact is physical, on our physical infrastructure. The supply chain shock could be larger by several orders of magnitude [compared to the coronavirus]. We are not prepared for that. Some of the ways to hedge that is through globalisation, and diversifying suppliers. I don't see a disappearance of globalisation in the sense that countries will start retreating behind borders. I see a disappearance of globalisation in the sense that it is understood as a system of automatic rules. That intellectual theory of globalisation is under crisis, yes.
7. The concept of 'civilisation states' that you refer to is interesting. Can we construe it as a concept adjacent to [multi-polar] Non-Aligned Movements (NAM) seeing a resurgence?
It is better than NAM. It is more profound, and probably going to be more productive. When I talk about a post-Western order, I don't just mean it merely in economic or political terms. I mean it in a cultural and civilisational sense. We are moving to a different paradigm, where it is not going to be that simple contrast between Western liberalism and Eastern authoritarianism. What India brings into this debate [when compared to Chinese, Russian autocracies] is an alternative, a break in the paradigm. You can't reduce it to Western liberalism and Eastern autocracy. It is neither. What India brings to the table is the resources of its own tradition, and a shift to a completely new debate.
8. What would your advice be to the Indian foreign policy establishment going forward, given the massive churns in the neighbourhood?
The north star for Indian foreign policy has to be a strong idea of sovereignty and independence. It has to be uncompromising on this. India is large enough, powerful enough, and represents a civilisation old enough to no longer have any illusions about being a junior partner to this or that major power. Focus on soft power at a time when the world has an appetite for new ideas and new visions. The world is tired of this obsessive-compulsive Cold War being played out, and we want to move to a new age where new things can be done and discussed.
