Pakistan’s dilemma: Balancing Mecca Joint Defence Pact commitments with domestic reality

The geopolitical bet Pakistan placed by signing the Mecca Joint Defence Pact (MJDA) is facing its first major crucible barely three months after its inception. As the Houthi threat hovers over Saudi Arabia, Pakistan faces the daunting challenge of balancing its collective-security commitments under the pact against the stark reality of its own domestic and structural constraints.

The Houthis have intensified their attacks on Saudi Arabia, vowing to continue targeting the Kingdom’s strategic assets. The attacks peaked in October when a strike on King Khalid International Airport in Riyadh killed 13 people and injured more than 300, forcing flight suspensions. On October 14, a projectile struck Saudi Aramco’s executive offices in Dhahran, causing a limited fire, while Saudi air defences intercepted several missiles and drones elsewhere; falling debris injured four people in Riyadh.

By early November, Saudi Arabia issued emergency warnings around Yanbu, a major Red Sea oil-export hub, while reporting the interception of a missile directed toward Medina. The expansion of the conflict from Yemen’s border areas toward Saudi Arabia’s economic and religious heartland has made the threat far more consequential for Riyadh.

Inked on August 7, 2026, alongside Saudi Arabia and Türkiye, the MJDA features a NATO-like mandate declaring that “an armed attack on one is an attack on all.” For Islamabad’s strategic establishment, joining this alliance marked a profound shift in its regional security outlook. It was a calculated bid to project Pakistan as an indispensable security actor in the Gulf, expand its defence-industrial role, and gain leverage in a region where the traditional U.S.-led security umbrella has become less dependable.

For Islamabad, threats to Riyadh are never a distant Middle Eastern concern, and its security has long been treated as a “red line” in Islamabad’s strategic matrix. As the custodian of Islam’s two holiest sites, safeguarding the Kingdom is an absolute article of faith for Pakistan. Additionally, Saudi Arabia is deeply embedded in Pakistan’s economic life. Millions of Pakistanis work in Saudi Arabia and send home billions of dollars in remittances each year, supporting household consumption and bolstering Pakistan’s fragile foreign-exchange reserves. Riyadh has also repeatedly provided financial assistance to Islamabad, and the Kingdom is emerging as an important market for Pakistani technology companies and investors. This makes Saudi stability more than a foreign-policy concern for Pakistan.

Yet, on the ground, reality tells a different story. Pakistan’s response has remained measured: condemnation of the attacks, expressions of solidarity with Saudi Arabia, calls for de-escalation, and support for a negotiated political settlement in Yemen. Despite successive high-level trilateral meetings in Riyadh—where Pakistani officials reaffirmed their commitment to defending Saudi sovereignty—and during the October 5 gathering of the pact’s Strategic Political and Defence Committee, where all parties agreed to trigger collective deterrence measures against Houthi attacks and operationalise forces, the nature, specific timelines, and tactical strategies for any active Pakistani intervention remain unknown.

Crucially, Pakistan’s 8,000 troops and JF-17 squadron stationed at King Abdulaziz Air Base since April remain strictly restricted to a non-combat, defensive posture, with no indication that they will be involved in active conflict. This defensive limitation was further underscored by the Pakistani defence minister, who clarified that Islamabad’s role is strictly limited to a supportive capacity.

This cautious, defensive posturing is driven by an unyielding reality: Pakistan’s severe domestic resource limitations. A sustained overseas military campaign would require major spending on logistics, fuel, ammunition, maintenance, personnel rotations, and replacement equipment. For a state that is still navigating a fragile economic stabilization process marked by heavy external debt, fiscal deficits, and strict budgetary controls, such costs would be difficult to justify domestically.

Simultaneously, Pakistan’s domestic security burden has grown more complex. Its security apparatus is heavily pinned down at home as militant groups are adapting faster than the state’s counterinsurgency response. In Balochistan, insurgent groups are becoming more coordinated and are expanding operations across a wider region, while in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, jihadist factions have consolidated under the Ittehad-ul-Mujahideen and are employing more sophisticated asymmetric tactics. The Frontier Corps, police, and local security forces are already heavily occupied with guarding roads, checkpoints, and installations across these territories. Islamabad has even discussed emergency measures in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa as the security situation deteriorates.

Furthermore, safeguarding infrastructure and personnel linked to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor—which has seen a surge in targeted attacks in recent years—demands massive, continuous allocation of domestic security forces. Reassigning specialised personnel, air-defence assets, or offensive military capability abroad would risk hollowing out its capacity to maintain internal stability.

Iran presents another trapdoor. Islamabad shares a 900-kilometre border with Iran. While the two countries de-escalated tensions after cross-border military strikes in 2024, their relationship has since sought to deepen bilateral cooperation through trade, border markets, and energy links.

Active military intervention would instantly jeopardise this renewed momentum. Deeper military involvement against the Houthis—who are a key component of Tehran’s “Axis of Resistance”—could be interpreted in Tehran as Islamabad aligning itself with a Saudi-led confrontation. That perception could complicate border management, disrupt bilateral cooperation, and weaken Pakistan’s ability to maintain a balanced diplomatic posture toward its western neighbour.

This balancing act was visible on October 20, when Chief of Defence Forces Field Marshal Asim Munir visited Tehran. He met Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, President Masoud Pezeshkian, Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, and Supreme National Security Council Secretary Mohsen Rezaei, describing the visit as focused on bilateral relations, regional developments, diplomatic processes, and international issues. Munir’s trip was his fifth to Iran since the June agreement, underscoring the importance Islamabad attaches to preserving diplomatic channels with Tehran. Adding to this, Pakistan holds a long-held ambition to act as a neutral diplomatic interlocutor between Iran and the U.S. Pakistani officials have previously engaged with both Iranian leaders and U.S. interlocutors, and Munir’s presence in Tehran signalled that Islamabad wants to remain a potential bridge between Iran and the United States. Any potential Pakistani military action against the Houthis could undermine precisely this diplomatic positioning.

There are also acute internal political sensitivities. Pakistan is home to one of the world’s largest Shia Muslim populations outside Iran. Parts of Pakistani society harbour symbolic sympathy for Iran and, in some cases, for the Houthis because of their open defiance of Israel and the United States. While these sentiments are not uniform, an open-ended military campaign against a group perceived by some as part of an anti-Israel, anti-U.S. resistance axis could inflame sectarian and ideological tensions. For Islamabad, which is already managing economic hardship, political instability, and security pressures, such domestic polarisation would be a serious risk.

Ultimately, Pakistan’s dilemma lies in reconciling its strategic ambitions with its structural limitations. The cautious, defensive posture that Islamabad currently relies on may become harder to sustain if the Gulf conflict intensifies and Saudi Arabia seeks a more active military contribution to keep the pact credible.

This puts Pakistan in a tight spot. A larger role in the Kingdom’s defence could strengthen Pakistan’s strategic standing and reinforce a vital partnership with Riyadh. At the same time, the state is wary of extending active military involvement, given the potential for wider regional escalation, added economic pressure, domestic security demands, and possible implications for its relationship with Iran.

As Houthi attacks continue to widen across Saudi territory, an underlying question emerges for Islamabad: how can it demonstrate its commitment to Riyadh, which could also carry high economic, security, and diplomatic costs?

Mahesh Ganguly is a teaching assistant based in Mumbai and a Junior research fellow in policy and international affairs at Jamia Millia Islamia, New Delhi. 
Soumi Ganguly is a research assistant at IDS, Kolkata.