What role do retired military and security officials play in Israeli politics?

The involvement of retired military and security officials in Israeli politics is well established, reflecting the close relationship between national security and public life. Former commanders have long drawn on their service records to seek political authority. Since the Hamas-led terror attacks of October 7, some have used those credentials to argue that Israel’s security depends on restoring political accountability and social cohesion. Their interventions renew a longstanding debate over who can credibly define and defend the national interest.

Historically, the transition from military command to political leadership has been a common path. Former Israel Defence Forces (IDF) Chiefs of Staff Yitzhak Rabin and Ehud Barak became Prime Ministers, while Moshe Dayan and Shaul Mofaz served as Defence Ministers. Their careers underscore the importance of security credentials in Israeli politics, though military experience alone does not guarantee electoral success or effective civilian leadership.

First, many former army chiefs have entered centrist or left-leaning parties. An analysis by the Israel Democracy Institute (IDI) in 2022 found that eleven of the fourteen chiefs of staff who had entered politics chose such parties. However, the broader group of retired senior officers has also included prominent right-wing figures, including Ariel Sharon and Rehavam Ze’evi. Military service does not produce a uniform political outlook, and one cannot assume a consistent relationship between military service and support for territorial compromise.

Secondly, public activism by retired security officials did not begin after October 7. In February 2023, more than 400 former senior security officials appealed to President Isaac Herzog regarding the government’s judicial overhaul. Their warning linked judicial independence and the rule of law to protecting soldiers and security personnel. This intervention challenges any simple distinction between an electoral role before 7 October and an activist role afterwards.

Thirdly, the post-7 October crisis provides an urgent context for these interventions. Benny Gantz and Gadi Eisenkot initially joined Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s emergency government as part of the National Unity alliance. However, they left the coalition on 9 June 2024, criticising the government’s wartime decision-making and the intrusion of political considerations into strategic planning. Their shift from participation to opposition shows how appeals to national responsibility can underpin competing judgments about whether security is best served from within a government or by challenging it.

Last week, Gantz explicitly articulated his position by calling for a “broad, moderate Zionist government” capable of governing without dependence on radical factions. He now presents political division and the outsized influence of extremist factions as obstacles to addressing Israel’s security and diplomatic challenges, inextricably linking the composition of a governing coalition to its capacity to pursue vital national priorities. This is a deliberate proposal to change fundamental coalition incentives and to structurally reduce the bargaining power of smaller parties.

Similarly, Eisenkot’s trajectory reflects this shift towards restructuring the political map. After his tenure in the emergency cabinet, he formally split from the National Unity alliance to found the centrist “Yashar!” party in 2025. In recent political manoeuvring, he explicitly excluded Gantz from a proposed leaders’ meeting, underscoring their political divergence. This shows that shared military backgrounds and appeals to national unity do not coalesce into a unified political movement. Instead, intense electoral competition remains central to their interventions.

This marks a significant evolution from the past. While historically military politicians often campaigned on their ability to lead existing political structures, the current cohort increasingly advocates restructuring coalition dynamics. The political intervention of these retired generals is therefore framed as a systemic corrective measure to restore a broad-based consensus they believe a decade of intense political struggle has eroded. This collective action is notable for its severity and its willingness to confront the government directly on internal security and policy implementation.

The actions and rhetoric of figures like Gantz and Eisenkot, along with warnings from former security chiefs, suggest a conviction that the current political framework is inadequate to address the nation’s existential challenges. Their interventions are no longer solely focused on securing leadership positions within the established system but on redefining the political centre, marginalising extreme factions, and restoring a sense of national consensus. The success or failure of these efforts will undoubtedly shape the future course of Israeli politics, determining whether the nation can forge a unified approach to its complex security and domestic imperatives.

The author is a Doctoral Candidate at the Centre for West Asian Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.