Saudi Arabia forms Multinational Maritime Defence Alliance to counter Houthi threats in Red Sea

On 30 July 2026, Saudi Arabia, along with 13 other countries (Bahrain, Bangladesh, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Pakistan, Qatar, Somalia, Sudan, Türkiye and Yemen), announced the formation of the Multinational Maritime Defence Alliance (MMDA) in Riyadh. The charter of the alliance defined it as a “defensive framework” for “enhancing maritime security, protecting freedom of navigation, securing international trade routes and energy supply lines, and safeguarding shared maritime interests in the Bab al-Mandab Strait, the Red Sea, and the Gulf of Aden.” The charter further noted that the alliance “will ultimately integrate with and contribute to broader international efforts to protect global peace and security in accordance with the provisions of international law.”

The formation of the MMDA is likely a response to the maritime blockade imposed on Saudi Arabia in the Bab al-Mandab by the Houthis on 20 July. Subsequently, the Houthis reportedly targeted two Saudi-linked ships passing through the Red Sea on 22 July and later claimed that several Saudi ships have been forced to return. Houthis have on several occasions since October 2023 targeted international and Israeli shipping passing through the Red Sea in solidarity with Hamas and as part of the Iran-backed ‘axis of resistance.’ However, the specific targeting of Saudi shipping came in the wake of the escalating tensions between the Saudi-backed Yemeni government and the Iran-backed Houthis since mid-July, threatening the four-year ceasefire between them.

The situation in Yemen started to unravel on July 13 when Saudi-backed forces prevented an Iranian airline bringing back Yemeni mourners from Tehran after attending Ali Khamenei’s funeral. The flight was forced to divert to Hodeidah, where it landed safely. The Houthis, in retaliation, targeted Abha airport in southern Saudi Arabia, which in turn targeted Houthi military and command centres in northern Yemen. Saudi-backed Yemeni forces also joined in attacking Houthi targets. They claimed that the Iranian airline was prevented from landing in Sana’a because it was carrying IRGC commanders and weapons for enabling the Houthis to enforce a Strait of Hormuz-like blockade in Bab al-Mandab.

The escalation in Yemen indicates an Iranian attempt to widen the war, which began when the US and Israel launched Operations Epic Fury and Roaring Lion, respectively, on 28 February this year and has since then continued except for a brief ceasefire between 17 June and 8 July. Reports suggest that Iran, which has thus far been able to withstand the US-Israel military onslaught, is seeking to widen the sphere of the war to increase the cost on the US and its Arab allies and prolong the conflict. Iranian security and strategic planning expect that eventually the Trump administration might try to undertake an on-ground combat operation in Iran to achieve the goal of regime change. Hence, it seeks to expand the war into areas under its influence and extend the Hormuz-style blockade to the Red Sea chokepoints.

The strategy includes activating the Iraq-based militias who have thus far refrained from directly joining the war against the US and Israel, as well as disrupting international shipping through the Suez Canal. The Egyptian Mediterranean port of Damietta close to the Suez Canal came under a drone attack on 29 July. Although no one took responsibility for the attack, it was suspected to have been perpetrated by Iran-backed groups in either Iraq or Yemen.

Moreover, the situation in Iraq is also becoming tense. On 30 July, the US and Saudi Arabia jointly targeted Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) bases and command centres in Iraq, killing several of its leaders and fighters. A CENTCOM release later announced that the US-Saudi joint military operation was targeted at “Iran-aligned terrorists that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) directed to attack US forces and Saudi energy infrastructure.” Several US bases and command centres across the region, including in Jordan, have come under attack by Iran and Iran-backed militias since the war started in February.

The continuation of the war with Iran and its likely widening scope not only threaten regional security and stability but also pose serious challenges for the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries. The biggest challenge remains energy and economic security, as well as navigation and the safety and security of civilian and commercial infrastructure. Although the GCC states were not in favour of a war against Iran and argued for diplomacy, after the US-Israel attacks on Iran have been split on how to respond to the situation. The UAE, Kuwait, and Bahrain have mostly become aligned with the US and have continued to facilitate and aid the war effort, while Qatar and Oman have worked with both sides to try and find a way to de-escalate.

The widening gulf within the GCC has put Saudi Arabia in a challenging position. It continues to remain reluctant to join the US-Israel war effort against Iran fully and yet has been continuously targeted by Iran and Iran-backed militias. Saudi Arabia's adoption of strategic restraint vis-à-vis Iran has been premised on the idea of keeping away from the conflict without necessarily opposing the US-led war. However, the evolving situation in the conflict is increasingly testing the Saudi resolve to stick to its risk aversion and strategic restraint, especially as its oil and economic security comes under threat.

The author is an Associate Professor of Middle East studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University.