OPINION | Hydro-politics of the Jordan River

This past week, the Israeli government refused to renew an agreement with the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, reigniting concerns that water is once again being weaponised in the Middle East. While these concerns may be understandable, they risk oversimplifying what is essentially a political dispute unfolding through the language of water diplomacy.

Using water for strategic and political reasons is common in the Middle East. One of the world’s earliest recorded water conflicts occurred over an irrigation canal in the Tigris and Euphrates basin between 2500 and 2450 BCE, involving the city-states of Umma and Lagash. Ironically, the world’s oldest known agreement followed this conflict and culminated in the Treaty of Mesilim around 2550 BCE. 

Another famous instance comes from 680 CE, the Battle of Karbala, when Yazid’s army blocked access to the Euphrates River, preventing Hussein ibn Ali’s forces from reaching it. In recent history, Saddam Hussein flooded the marshlands to punish rebellious Arab tribes. Türkiye’s control over river water through its massive GAP project, which floods and dries Kurdish lands of Iraq, is another example. 

Contrary to headlines, Israel neither suspended water supply to Jordan nor withdrew from any treaty obligations. The controversy centres on an additional agreement the two countries signed in 2021. Understanding this requires first understanding where Israel and Jordan stand on water cooperation. 

Israel and Jordan, ranking ninth and 15th, respectively, in the baseline water stress index, are among the water-scarce countries in the region. Water cooperation between the two countries is not merely a matter of goodwill but a strategic necessity. In this context, one must revisit the 1994 Peace Treaty, under which the two countries agreed to a water-sharing arrangement whereby Israel agreed to supply Jordan with 50 MCM of water annually and grant Jordan 75 percent ownership of the flow of the Yarmouk River. The treaty also includes provisions for cooperation during drought and for the establishment of the Joint Water Committee, which monitors water quality and collaborates on other aspects of water sharing. Nearly three decades later, cooperation under the treaty remains one of the best examples of durable transboundary water governance.

Equally important was the treaty's value afterward, as it laid the foundation for the two countries to collaborate on other issues by promoting environmental management and the preservation of the Jordan River. This cooperation later expanded into the energy domain through a trilateral agreement among Israel, Jordan, and the UAE, under which the Emirati renewable energy company Masdar agreed to establish a larger solar power plant in Jordan.

There have also been plans (though not materialised) for cooperation and exchange on renewable electricity. In November 2021, an agreement on a solar project was reached through trilateral cooperation among Israel, Jordan, and the UAE, under which the Emirate's renewable energy company, Masdar, would build a large solar farm in Jordan. The agreement provides that the electricity produced be sold to Israel in return for the water supply from the Red Sea-Dead Sea Water Conveyance project, with Jordan and Masdar sharing the profits from the electricity sales. Likewise, in 2016, Jordan signed a 15-year agreement to import natural gas from Israel’s offshore Leviathan gas field in the Mediterranean, which began operations in 2020. Thesesuggest that cooperation over water gradually extends to other areas, such as energy, infrastructure, and environmental governance.

It is in this context that the 2021 agreement under the Bennett government was concluded, in which Israel committed to doubling the annual water supply from 50 mcm (as agreed in the 1994 treaty) to 100 MCM. Notably, the 2021 agreement supplemented the 1994 treaty without superseding it. Signed for five years, the agreement was intended to be renewed based on mutual political understanding. 

Here, the larger political and geopolitical changes in the region after 7 October are critical. Jordan recalled its ambassador from Israel and adopted an increasingly critical position regarding Israel's war in Gaza, even though it has cooperated with Israel by shooting down missiles fired by Iran. Nonetheless, Israel argues that renewal of the agreement for additional water supply cannot be divorced from broader bilateral relations, and that any extension is contingent upon Jordan moderating its rhetoric and criticism of Israeli policies. There is also a domestic challenge, as Israel has endured its worst year in a century. So, there is clear logic to prioritise domestic water needs.

From a Jordanian perspective, the choices are less obvious. Water scarcity and rising demand are domestic pressures that drive the need for renewal. However, cooperation with Israel also entails domestic opposition and fear that it would grant Israel legitimacy for its policies in the Gaza Strip. For now, the latter consideration is more desirable for Jordan, as it still believes renewal can occur without compromising its broader political position against Israel. Meanwhile, Jordan seeks to enhance its water security through a large-scale desalination and water treatment project near Aqaba on the Red Sea. 

As such, viewing this episode as an irreversible breakdown of cooperation would be premature and would ignore nuanced realities. But on a broader level, the episode reinforces a larger lesson about international politics, in which non-traditional security issues like water cannot remain isolated when traditional security concerns remain sensitive. Even carefully designed institutional arrangements rely heavily on political trust and good faith. Their absence may not automatically mean the collapse of cooperation, but it does make cooperation conditional and negotiated. The hydro-politics of the Jordan River is therefore not a matter of hydrology but a negotiating tool that relies on restoring political trust.

The author is a Non-Resident Researcher with MEI@ND working on sustainable development issues.

The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not purport to reflect the opinions or views of THE WEEK.