There are many reasons why the proposed second parleys between the US and Iran may be a non-starter. As it stands, it is a negotiation process that is dead on arrival with US President Donald Trump announcing on Sunday (April 19) that the US-Iran talks will be held in Pakistan on Monday—two days before the April 22 ceasefire deadline expires—while Iran has vowed retaliation for the US capture of an Iranian-flagged container ship near the Strait of Hormuz.
The US demands placed on the negotiating table include Iran opening up the Strait of Hormuz or effectively giving up its control of the narrow waterway that is vital not just for the energy trade but also for critical goods like fertilisers, and chemicals like sulphuric acid. Another key demand that the US has raised is for Iran to give up its stockpile of Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU). This is against the backdrop of the fact that the Americans have imposed a blockade on the Strait.
On April 18, following Iran’s declaration that it will close down the Hormuz, Hussein al-Ezzi, a leader of Ansarullah in Yemen, also called the Houthis, announced that “If this movement decides to close Bab-el-Mandeb, the enemy will be completely unable to open it.” Connecting the Red Sea to the Arabian Sea, the Bab-el-Mandeb is the key route that connects the oil-rich Gulf countries with the markets of Asia and Europe.
Now these are demands that the US had aimed to force through a military campaign along with Israel that began on February 28. But having failed to achieve these aims militarily, the US is trying to negotiate on these. It would therefore appear very clumsy on the part of Iran to accept these terms, which would technically amount to a ‘surrender’ and a suicide for the current dispensation.
However, having already lost at least about 4,000 lives in the ongoing conflict, which includes both civilians and combatants, widespread destruction of military and civilian infrastructure and networks, and tremendous economic losses of more than $150 billion, it is quite unlikely that Iran would concede, particularly taking the public mood in Iran into account.
Importantly, Iran realises that the costs would be enormous for the US if the war is a protracted one. Strategically, it would favour Iran if the war lasts long and more so if the US forces launch a ground invasion because the Iranian geography has strategic depth and a terrain that is favourable to fighting a decentralised war based on a guerrilla warfare strategy, something that Iran’s prevailing ‘mosaic strategy’ is primed for.
It is important to note that Iran has been following a military policy of preserving its weapons arsenal and careful use of its assets in the form of the Houthis and the Hezbollah.
Moreover, if the war lasts till another month or so, President Trump’s prospects for the US mid-term poll will dim as US forces will suffer losses in the course of time that will not find much favour in Trump’s domestic constituency. Already, the US year-on-year inflation is at record highs and is expected to only move north with the onset of summer when the demand for gas increases.