Why India, rest of Asia are feeling the heat of Iran-US war more than China

In the ongoing conflict in the Middle East, China's role is being frequently scrutinised. Many experts argue that China is a crucial variable and the primary victim of the conflict, citing the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, the loss of Iranian oil, and the devaluation of Chinese investments as critical negative outcomes. Additionally, critics claim that China-supplied military hardware, specifically YLC-8 series air-defence radars, have spectacularly failed against US and Israeli strikes. However, this narrative is factually incorrect and miscalculates regional stakes. China, in reality, remains perhaps the least affected state by this conflict, with little skin in the game. In comparison, major Asian economies, namely India, South Korea, and Japan, are facing the substantial, direct burden of this conflict.

On weapon transfers, barring speculations and inferences, there is no concrete evidence that Beijing has supplied major air-defence radars, especially of the YLC-8 series, to Tehran. Claims that Chinese Y-20 airlifters carried those radars to Iran in January 2026 are conjecture. Platforms of this size are difficult to conceal; their existence and deployments would likely appear in satellite imagery, as evident during Operation Sindoor.

Historically, China was a major arms supplier to Tehran, but this relationship changed after the UN Security Council Resolution 1747 imposed sanctions on Iran in 2007, with China’s support. The overt arms trade between the two countries stopped, and the existing contracts’ delivery pipeline continued till 2015, closing completely thereafter.

Even on drones, 2022 investigations into captured Shahed drones in Ukraine revealed that Iran sourced almost 80 per cent of their components from Western manufacturers, including Texas Instruments, through illicit sources and industrial smuggling, with only engines and voltage converters coming from China. Instead, drone manufacturing in Iran is an indigenous industry that has benefited enormously from reverse engineering captured drones, namely the MIM Streaker, ScanEagle, and RQ-170. Furthermore, despite enormous pressure from Tehran, Beijing has not supplied any major fighter aircraft, keeping regional Arab sensitivities in consideration.

Instead, China has provided BeiDou-3 satellite support. A memorandum was signed in 2015 for ground-reference systems and space data-collection centres in Iran, later institutionalised in 2021 through the 25-year treaty, granting access to BeiDou’s encrypted, high-precision, military-grade signals. During the 12-Day War in June 2025, Tehran faced extensive GPS disruption and jamming nationwide. It paralysed nearly 1,000 civilian and military vessels, agricultural precision systems, and critical logistics infrastructure. Therefore, on June 23, last year, Iran completely transitioned to BeiDou space infrastructure, switching off GPS for both civilian and military applications.

The other Chinese assistance is visible through Mizarvision, a Beijing-based satellite intelligence company, which is publicly disseminating near-real-time maritime and aerial surveillance of US deployments in the Middle East via social media, detailing precise coordinates and imagery of US Navy vessels, refuelling aircraft, and missile-defence assets. On the day of the attack on Iran, this company released images of 11 F-22 fighters deployed on Ovda airbase in southern Israel.

This surveillance data can enable Iranian planners to fine-tune missile and drone targeting with operational accuracy, blunting US stealth and mobility. Though formally private, the firm operates in the grey zone, projecting China’s state-level ISR reach, from aircraft identification to air-defence mapping, while imposing constant visibility on US logistics. The result is a shift from the ‘fog of war’ to a ‘glass battlefield,’ where force movements are tracked, analysed, and exploited in near real-time.

In sum, Chinese footprints in the US-Iran War remain mostly in the information and sub-component domains. The discourse on Chinese major weapon platforms failing in Iran, therefore, is a farce.

Another widely circulated claim argues that the war will seriously undermine China’s energy security, weakening industrial growth and long-term economic prospects. The evidence, however, points to a more limited impact. China is the largest buyer, purchasing 80 per cent of Tehran’s oil through indirect or opaque routes. However, Iranian oil accounts for only about 12–15 per cent of China’s total crude imports.

Instead, Beijing has significantly diversified its energy imports to Russia, Angola, Brazil, Saudi Arabia, and other producers across Africa and Latin America. This diversification cushions the scope for disruption. Therefore, instability in the Middle East could affect prices and shipping routes but would not critically undermine China’s overall energy security.

The Middle East, as an energy supplier, labour and goods market, and investment destination, remains far more critical for major Asian economies, particularly for India, Japan, and South Korea, than for China. For India, annual remittances in 2025 are estimated at roughly US$130 billion, and around 40 per cent came only from the Gulf. Additionally, close to one crore Indian nationals live and work in the region, making even a large-scale evacuation during a worsening conflict a logistical nightmare.

Moreover, despite recent diversification, India’s energy imports are critically dependent on crude imports from the Gulf. After the Russian share has reduced, any disruption to shipments through the Strait of Hormuz, or a halt in exports from producers such as Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Qatar, and Kuwait, would impose severe economic strain. In addition, the sinking of the IRIS Dena underscores how rapidly the conflict is inching towards Indian shores and can expand in unexpected directions. In sum, major Asian economies, namely India and others, are facing the brunt of this conflict, not China.

Atul Kumar is a fellow-National Security and China Studies with the Strategic Studies Programme at Observer Research Foundation.