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Iran vs US-Israel: Why Washington's support for Kurdish fighters opens risky new front against Tehran

Publicly, however, the White House has denied authorising any Kurdish insurgency, placing the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in a highly delicate position

[File] Kurdish-led fighters backed by the US escort suspected Islamic State militants in Hassakeh, Syria, on January 26, 2022 | AP

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As the United States and Israel intensify their bombing campaign against Iran, a potential new front is emerging, involving Iranian Kurdish opposition groups based in neighbouring Iraq.

Washington seems to be encouraging these exiled Kurdish militias to launch a ground incursion into northwestern Iran, in an attempt to destabilise the central government and stretch the country’s military resources.

Recent airstrikes have focused on Iran’s Kurdistan Province, a move analysts believe could be intended to weaken Tehran’s defensive capabilities ahead of any potential insurgency. More than 125 locations have been struck across urban centres including Sanandaj, Kermanshah and Marivan.

These strikes have targeted infrastructure linked to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), police installations, border guard posts and communications towers.

According to several reports, the CIA has been providing small arms to Iranian Kurdish fighters as part of a covert effort to intensify pressure on Tehran. The strategy is to weaken Iranian security forces along the border so that any Kurdish advance could force Iranian military units to deploy more openly, making them more vulnerable to aerial attack.

Meanwhile, Iranian Kurdish groups based in the mountainous regions of northern Iraq have begun openly discussing the possibility of military operations. Several factions recently announced the formation of the Coalition of Political Forces of Iranian Kurdistan, an alliance that brings together a broad spectrum of Kurdish political organisations.

Among the groups involved are the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI), the Kurdistan Freedom Party (PAK) and the Komala Party. Many of them have been waiting for such an opportunity since Iran’s 1979 Islamic Revolution.

However, Kurdish commanders realise that they possess only light weapons, such as Kalashnikov rifles, and without the heavy equipment required for sustained conventional warfare, they are unlikely to be effective against even a weakened Iranian army. As a result, Kurdish leaders have emphasised that they would need substantial external support before attempting any large-scale incursion. This would likely include the establishment of a no-fly zone over the region and the systematic destruction of Iranian weapons depots and military infrastructure.

Behind the scenes, diplomatic pressure appears to be intensifying. Reports indicate that US President Donald Trump has held telephone conversations with prominent Iraqi Kurdish leaders, including Masoud Barzani and Bafel Talabani, urging them to clarify their position and potentially allow Iranian Kurdish fighters to move across the border. Trump is also said to have spoken directly with Mustafa Hijri, the leader of the KDPI.

Publicly, however, the White House has denied authorising any Kurdish insurgency. The situation nevertheless places the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in a highly delicate position.

Kurdish authorities in Iraq are keen to avoid being drawn into a wider conflict, particularly after Iran reportedly launched retaliatory ballistic missile and drone strikes against Kurdish militant positions near Erbil and Sulaimaniyah.

Both the KRG and the Iraqi central government in Baghdad have formally instructed Iranian Kurdish militants not to cross the border into Iran. Maintaining neutrality is widely seen as essential for preventing further escalation and protecting the fragile stability of the autonomous Kurdish region.

A further source of Kurdish caution is the United States’ long and complicated history with Kurdish movements in the Middle East. The Kurds, an ethnic group numbering more than 30 million people and spread across Iran, Iraq, Syria and Turkey, have frequently cooperated with Washington during regional conflicts. Yet, many Kurdish leaders remain wary, citing past episodes in which American support proved temporary or unreliable.

The Kurds still remember what happened in Iraq back in 1975 after the US abandoned them to support negotiations between regional powers. Something similar happened in 1991 as well. Encouraged by the US, Kurdish fighters rose up against Saddam Hussain after the allied victory. However, Saddam’s forces suppressed them violently after  US forces declined to intervene directly. More recently, US policy shifts in Syria have fuelled concerns among Kurdish groups that geopolitical priorities could change rapidly.

Because of this history, some Kurdish analysts argue that placing full trust in American backing could be dangerous, particularly if Kurdish forces were to confront a determined Iranian military response without guaranteed long-term support.

Military analysts also question whether a Kurdish insurgency could realistically threaten the Iranian state.

Iran’s Kurdish population is estimated at between six and nine million people within a country of roughly 90 million. Without heavy weaponry, large-scale logistical support or broader nationwide backing, Kurdish forces are unlikely to possess the capacity to overthrow the government in Tehran.

More realistically, the strategic objective could be to create a security crisis along the Iranian border, forcing the army to divert resources away from major cities. This could offer greater space for domestic protests or civil unrest in Iran’s big cities.

However, any Kurdish rebellion will be viewed with deep suspicion by neighbouring states, particularly Turkey. Ankara, which has always opposed Kurdish separatist movements in the region, could respond forcefully to any Kurdish insurgency.