In recent weeks, the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) have escalated its military operations in southern Lebanon, executing frequent aerial surveillance and targeted strikes against infrastructure affiliated with Hezbollah. Reportedly, Israel’s military actions take place in response to Hezbollah’s concerted efforts to reconstitute its operational readiness, encompassing the resupply of munitions, the recruitment of additional personnel, and the restoration of damaged military installations.
This development highlights Hezbollah’s continued ability to adapt and maintain its effectiveness, reinforcing its role as the dominant non-state power in Lebanon. At the same time, it reveals the Lebanese government’s continuing weakness in exercising authority over Hezbollah’s armed operations or upholding its exclusive right to use force, a clear sign of deeper problems in the country’s sovereignty and territorial control.
The Lebanese Armed Forces' (LAF) disarmament plan, unveiled with much fanfare by state authorities in September, appears to be rapidly stalling. This lack of materialisation, however, is hardly a surprise. The Lebanese state has a well-worn history of failing to dismantle Hezbollah's operational capabilities, and the organisation itself has successfully rebuffed similar disarmament efforts in the past.
However, this time, there appears to be a fundamental shift in Hezbollah’s approach to sustain and bolster its resources, with much of it centred on logistical ingenuity and external supply lines. The first is the porous, mountainous Syria-Lebanon border, which remains a critical security vacuum. The collapse of the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria disrupted Hezbollah’s traditional overland supply routes but also compelled the organisation to adapt its logistical strategies. Following Bashar al-Assad’s ouster, evidence from multiple weapons interceptions in Syria between early 2025 and August 2025 indicates that Hezbollah’s procurement and supply networks continue to operate effectively despite these challenges. In early 2025, Syria’s new administration seized a shipment near Serghaya (in the countryside).
This was followed by heightened activity in rural Homs near al-Qusayr, a key mountainous border area where the Internal Security Directorate reported foiling multiple significant smuggling efforts. Specifically, Kornet guided missiles intended for Lebanon were intercepted on 5 June, and another operation involving advanced weapons and guided missiles was stopped on June 24. This consistent pattern culminated on 18 August, with the interception of a truck loaded with Grad rockets attempting to cross via an unofficial route.
Meanwhile, the transfer of munitions through coastal routes from Syria to Lebanon also remains a plausible logistical pathway. This renewed smuggling activity gains further context from a Syrian investigative committee report published in July of this year, which revealed external funding channelled to loyalist groups associated with the former regime. This ongoing financial and operational support strongly indicates the continued operation of supply corridors for Hezbollah extending through Syria. These events collectively demonstrate Hezbollah's persistent effort to reconstitute its operational readiness by securing high-value munitions, despite the changed Syrian political landscape and increased interception efforts. While the transitional authorities in Damascus have repeatedly vowed to sever Hezbollah’s reliance on Syria, little seems to be in action.
Hezbollah’s current operational quietude should not be misinterpreted as a sign of incapacity, but rather as a strategic effort to buy time for reconstitution. The group's operational capabilities can be inferred to be highly resilient and adaptable, a strength derived from deep Iranian sponsorship, a shift towards greater operational covertness, and the effective use of civilian infrastructure. A Special Report, “Hezbollah’s Rehabilitation Composite in Lebanon,” published on October 28 by Tal Beeri of the Alma Research and Education Centre, suggests that a core component of this rehabilitation is the accelerated development of indigenous weapons production and repair. This covers both the mass production of simple weapons and the specialised capability for advanced or precision munitions. The report further notes that the military and civilian rehabilitation efforts are intertwined, with civilian economic infrastructures serving as both the base and cover for military rearmament.
Mohammed Shoaib Raza
These dynamics underscore the futility of disarmament-only approaches. Instead of focusing on a repeatedly failing disarmament plan that Hezbollah has successfully rebuffed, the Lebanese authorities (LAF and relevant security agencies) could prioritise an indirect and structural approach aimed at cutting off Hezbollah's operational lifeline and reconstituting its capabilities. The Lebanese army might rapidly expand deployments along the uncontrolled sections of the border, prioritising patrols, checkpoints, and surveillance on both known and suspected transit corridors. Intelligence priorities must shift from broad disarmament campaigns to discreet collection and targeted action to locate, map, and dismantle local weapons production and repair sites, including small workshops, logistics hubs, and other hidden locations.
US Special Envoy for Syria, Tom Barrack, has warned that if Lebanon fails to take concrete steps towards Hezbollah’s disarmament, Israel may act unilaterally, which would carry grave consequences for the region. At this critical juncture, when Lebanon continues to grapple with political volatility, economic collapse, and increased emigration, it cannot afford to face further Israeli military responses over Hezbollah, which would obliterate any remaining hope of stability in the country because the real tragedy unfolding is not merely the prospect of war, but the structural destruction of the Lebanese Republic from within.
Mohammed Shoaib Raza is a doctoral candidate at the Centre for West Asian Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.
