A bizarre adventure that went terribly wrong. The strategic benefits of the September 9 Israeli attack on Hamas leaders in Doha were minimal; although six people, including a Qatari security guard, were killed, key Hamas figures escaped unharmed. The political controversy overshadowed the technical proficiency Israel showed in executing the attack.
The strategic impact of the Doha attack emerged on Wednesday, when President Trump issued a firm security guarantee to Qatar against similar Israeli attacks. Through an executive order, President Trump stated that the US would see any armed attack against the Gulf emirate as “a threat to the peace and security of the United States.”
This came hours after President Trump cajoled Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to speak to his Qatari counterpart and apologise. According to the White House, Netanyahu “expressed his deep regret that, in targeting Hamas leaders during hostage negotiations, Israel violated Qatari sovereignty and affirmed that Israel will not conduct such an attack again in the future.” The US security guarantees came shortly after this assurance.
Since the Munich massacre of its athletes in 1972, Israel has targeted its enemies and removed several leaders of various militant groups. These attacks have been carried out in distant Arab and non-Arab countries, including some European nations. Such assassinations and targeted killings have occurred even in far-off places like Tunisia and hostile Iran. Dubai has also not been spared from military operations against suspected militant figures. For a long time, Israel primarily aimed at militant figures, but during the al-Aqsa intifada, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon expanded his targets to include political and non-militant individuals.
Although their long-term effects varied and remain debated, they showed Israel's military skill, technological know-how, and political resolve. As long as they were effective, most were quietly forgotten or overshadowed by other controversies or crises.
The willingness of regional countries to establish formal political ties with Israel or show support for normalisation should have prevented similar attacks on ‘friendly’ territories. Such attacks also risk jeopardising any chances of normalisation or undoing the process. Netanyahu thinks and acts differently.
On 25 September 1997, Israeli agents unsuccessfully sought to assassinate Hamas leader Khalid Mashal in Amman. It occurred amid King Hussein’s efforts to justify, explain, and expand formal relations with Israel following the 1994 peace treaty. Netanyahu did not bother about the sovereignty of a country that has a formal peace treaty with Israel. However, by threatening to execute the captured Israeli agents, Jordan secured the antidote and saved the Hamas leader, and the king also secured the release of Hamas founder Sheikh Ahmed Yassin from the Israeli prison. The failed attempt infuriated the Jordanian monarch, and despite best efforts, the Israeli-Jordanian relations never reverted to their pre-1997 bonhomie.
Netanyahu authorised a similar attack in Dubai in January 2010 against Hamas leader Mahmoud al-Mabhouh, at a time when the UAE was allowing Israeli passport holders to transit through the emirate and was signalling its friendship informally. The Doha attack is the third such attempt on the territory of a friendly nation.
Unlike previous instances, this one came at a higher cost. Qatar has been hosting several Israeli security and intelligence officials to negotiate a Gaza ceasefire deal. As of now, only Doha has some influence over Hamas and could persuade the militant group to accept any peace agreement. It is the sole connector between the militant Palestinian group and the international community. Most importantly, Hamas leaders moved to Doha shortly after Jordan cracked down on Hamas in August 1999, and this move was closely coordinated with Israel.
Violating Qatari sovereignty at this point is the most short-sighted decision an Israeli leader could consider. That is why a strong section of the Israeli intelligence community not only opposed the misadventure but was also ready to disassociate itself from it. Even countries like India, which remained silent on similar Israeli attacks on Iran, Lebanon, and Yemen, were forced to respond quickly and condemn Israel's violation of Qatari sovereignty.
The most significant fallout of the Doha attack is the iron-clad American guarantee against similar Israeli attacks. This paves the way for other U.S. allies to seek and secure similar agreements to prevent any future misadventures by Israel. Some may also pursue American protection against violations of their airspace for potential attacks on Iran. While strengthening Washington’s long-term ties with the Arab world, Netanyahu’s Doha misadventure restricts Israel’s strategic options. Violating the sovereign territory of a friend or, at the very least, a non-hostile country carries a heavy price.
Kumaraswamy teaches contemporary Middle East at the Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.
