India-Bangladesh relations have entered a tense phase marked by border friction, security anxieties, militant reorganisation concerns, and evolving strategic partnerships near sensitive frontiers

India-Bangladesh relations have entered a tense phase marked by border friction, security anxieties, militant reorganisation concerns, and evolving strategic partnerships near sensitive frontiers

India-Bangladesh relations have entered a tense phase marked by border friction, security anxieties, militant reorganisation concerns, and evolving strategic partnerships near sensitive frontiers

Since the political upheaval in Bangladesh and the departure of Sheikh Hasina from power, India-Bangladesh relations have entered a more uncertain phase. Although both sides continue to speak the language of cooperation and normalisation, a steady accumulation of concerns along the border is creating unease in New Delhi. Unlike the Sheikh Hasina era, when bilateral engagement was largely defined by trade, connectivity, and economic integration, the relationship is once again being shaped by concerns over illegal migration, border security, Islamist mobilisation, weapons proliferation, and questions about Dhaka's future strategic direction, echoing many of the anxieties that marked periods of BNP rule.

Vaishali Basu Sharma

Immediate concerns stem from developments along the India-Bangladesh border itself. Intensified Indian efforts to identify and deport illegal Bangladeshi migrants residing across various states, including Jammu and Kashmir and allegations by Bangladeshi authorities of repeated "push-in" attempts by India's Border Security Force have generated friction at several border sectors. Such incidents reinforce mutual suspicion and contribute to a narrative of deteriorating trust between the two countries.

The border has increasingly become a site where security concerns, demographic anxieties, and political narratives intersect. For India, illegal migration remains a long-standing domestic political and security issue. For Bangladesh, alleged pushback operations raise questions about sovereignty and adherence to established repatriation procedures. While border coordination mechanisms between the BSF and Border Guard Bangladesh (BGB) continue to function, recurring incidents risk transforming local disputes into larger diplomatic irritants.

A more serious source of concern involves the resurgence of militancy-related narratives in the border areas. Reports from Chapainawabganj and other districts have highlighted repeated recoveries of crude bombs, explosives, and suspected bomb-making facilities. The discovery of large quantities of improvised explosive devices in border districts has naturally drawn the attention of security agencies on both sides. Given the history of militant infiltration networks operating across porous sections of the frontier, such incidents acquire significance beyond local criminality.

The Chapainawabganj explosion, in particular, has fuelled competing political narratives. The recovery of explosives, allegations of links to local political actors, and the subsequent disappearance of individuals connected to the incident have intensified speculation regarding the purpose of these stockpiles. Whether these explosives were intended for local political violence, criminal activities, election-related intimidation, or something more sinister remains unclear. Nevertheless, the presence of such stockpiles near a sensitive international border inevitably raises concerns about broader security implications.

These developments gain greater significance when viewed alongside India's intensified focus on the activities of Islamist organisations, particularly those with histories of cross-border operations. Indian security agencies have long expressed concerns regarding the presence of Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) networks and associated sleeper cells operating across Bangladesh, West Bengal, and parts of northeast India. Recent operations by India's National Investigation Agency (NIA) in border areas have further reinforced the perception within Indian security circles that dormant militant ecosystems may be attempting to reorganise.

This concern merges with another politically sensitive issue: the evolving role of Jamaat-e-Islami within Bangladesh's changing political landscape. Various reports and political claims have alleged growing tensions between the BNP-led establishment and sections of the Islamist camp. According to these allegations, influential Islamist actors and their supporters are dissatisfied with the pace of political and constitutional reforms following the political transition in Dhaka.

Within this context, claims have emerged regarding what some commentators describe as an "Operation Daman" (Suppression) and "Operation Dokhol" (Takeover) strategy. These allegations suggest that segments of the Islamist ecosystem may seek first to marginalise the Awami League remnants and subsequently undermine the BNP government itself. Assertions linking such plans to foreign actors, including Pakistan and Turkey, remain unverified, but their circulation reflects the deepening atmosphere of mistrust within Bangladesh's political sphere.

For India, the significance of these narratives extends beyond Bangladesh's domestic politics. New Delhi's primary concern is that prolonged instability could create opportunities for extremist organisations to expand their influence. Historically, Indian security planners have viewed political instability in Bangladesh through the prism of spillover effects, including radicalisation, illegal migration, arms trafficking, and cross-border militancy.

The persistent rumours regarding large-scale weapons inflows into Bangladesh feed directly into these anxieties. Claims about thousands of assault rifles entering the country have generated sensational headlines and vigorous debate. However, to date, independent official confirmation of such claims remains unavailable. Nevertheless, their prominence in public discourse reflects broader concerns about weaponisation, political unrest, and the possibility of organised violence.

From India's standpoint, even unverified reports of significant arms movements near its eastern frontier demand attention. Combined with reports of bomb recoveries, militant activity, and political polarisation, such claims contribute to an increasingly securitised perception of developments inside Bangladesh.

At the strategic level, India's concerns increasingly extend beyond the border and toward Bangladesh's evolving external partnerships. Reports regarding a possible Turkish-assisted drone manufacturing facility in Bogura have attracted considerable attention. What makes the Bogura proposal particularly sensitive is its proximity to the Siliguri Corridor, which is considered India’s vulnerable India's ‘Chicken's Neck’ corridor. To be clear, a drone factory does not automatically constitute a military threat. And yet geography often shapes perceptions more than intentions. From India's perspective, any defence-related technological infrastructure located relatively close to the Siliguri Corridor inevitably attracts scrutiny.

India-Bangladesh relationship remains too important to be defined solely by border disputes, migration controversies, or security anxieties. India's concerns stem from the convergence of several simultaneous developments: heightened Islamist activism, recurring border tensions, allegations of arms trafficking, reports of militant reorganisation, growing engagement with Turkey, and political volatility ahead of Sheikh Hasina's anticipated political re-entry into the national debate. The coming months will reveal whether these developments represent temporary turbulence or the early signs of a deeper strategic drift. For now, the picture that emerges is not one of imminent conflict but of growing mistrust, where borders have become the focal point of larger geopolitical, ideological, and security contests shaping the future of India-Bangladesh relations.

The author is a security and economic affairs analyst.

The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not purport to reflect the opinions or views of THE WEEK.