OPINION | Kerala’s power crisis: Why lights are going out during peak hours

The most revealing image of Kerala’s current power crisis may be the viral AI-generated video of Chief Minister V.D. Satheesan dancing with Kerala State Electricity Board (KSEB) staff. Satire though it was, its 1.78 crore views before Meta restricted access in India reflected an uncomfortable reality: electricity scarcity had become a political and social fact. Satheesan said he had not sought its removal and even joked about his dancing. Behind the humour, however, lies a structural mismatch between when electricity is produced, when consumers need it, and how much the State can store.

September demand repeatedly crossed 5,000 MW while available supply at one point stood at roughly 4,200 MW, leaving an 800–900 MW deficit. On September 10, KSEB Chairman M.G. Rajamanickam said demand had remained at or above 5,000 MW until 1-1.30 am—an unprecedented pattern. Restrictions of 30 minutes to an hour followed during peak periods.

Kerala does not lack electricity uniformly throughout the day. It lacks enough precisely when demand rises fastest and important sources become least available.

Domestic consumers constitute about 75 per cent of electricity connections. Evening consumption now remains elevated late into the night as higher temperatures increase air-conditioner use and electric vehicles are charged after daytime travel. The traditional assumption of a short evening peak is becoming obsolete.

The consequences extend beyond darkened homes. Outages disrupt work, education, digital payments, banking, telemedicine, commerce and government services. Businesses lose transactions and working hours; hospitals depend upon reliable power for critical equipment. A power cut today is a disruption of economic and social life.

The deeper weakness lies in Kerala’s generation profile. The State produces only about a quarter of its annual electricity requirement domestically and depends heavily upon central generating stations, contracted supplies, banking and the power market. This September, assured supplies declined sharply, partly because monsoon-related problems, including high coal moisture, reduced thermal generation. There were periods when electricity was simply unavailable in the market despite KSEB’s willingness to buy.

April offers an instructive contrast. Kerala recorded its highest-ever daily consumption—118.262 million units—on April 27, yet managed without September’s sustained restrictions because assured and market supplies were more readily available. The crisis, therefore, is not simply about how much electricity Kerala consumes, but whether it is available when consumption peaks.

Solar power demonstrates the dilemma. By May 2026, Kerala had around 2,508 MW of solar capacity, including approximately 2,036 MW of rooftop solar. PM Surya Ghar alone accounted for about 2.96 lakh installations covering 3,03,531 households and roughly 1,150 MW. Yet, electricity generated at noon cannot by itself meet a shortage at midnight.

Storage is, therefore, indispensable. Batteries can move daytime surplus into post-sunset demand. But, rapid rooftop-solar expansion also creates transformer constraints and reverse power flows, requiring investment in substations, transmission, distribution automation and grids capable of managing two-way electricity.

Hydropower presents another paradox. It provides dispatchable electricity when solar cannot, but reservoirs are strategic reserves, not inexhaustible batteries. On September 10, reservoir storage stood at 63.75 per cent against 80.29 per cent a year earlier, while Idukki district had recorded a 47 per cent rainfall deficit. Usable water in Idukki could generate an estimated 1,384 million units, compared with roughly 1,680 million units a year earlier.

Using reservoir water aggressively today compromises tomorrow; buying electricity during scarcity can be extraordinarily expensive. KSEB spent approximately ₹1,190 crore on power purchases between April and August 2026. An NTPC offer of ₹30 per unit illustrated September’s extraordinary prices, although the government did not immediately accept it. By September 16, it had secured 150 MW through resale arrangements with other states and another 150 MW from the Nuclear Power Corporation of India at ₹4.65 per unit.

Emergency procurement is necessary. Repeated emergency procurement, however, reveals insufficient flexibility.

The Kerala State Electricity Regulatory Commission approved 346.42 million units of peak-hour electricity for ₹347.79 crore between October 2026 and May 15, 2027. KSEB had sought 835.50 million units from September to May at ₹749.72 crore. The Commission rejected additional September night-time off-peak and round-the-clock purchases, reasoning that they could create daytime surpluses without directly resolving peak shortages.

The lesson is fundamental: electricity is not merely measured in units. The hour at which a unit becomes available can matter almost as much as the unit itself. Kerala consequently needs generation, storage, transmission, procurement and demand management working together. The 125 MW/500 MWh battery project at Mylatti, Kasaragod, supported by ₹135 crore in central viability-gap funding, is expected around October 2026. Projects at Sreekandapuram, Mulleria, Areekode and Pothencode add another 125 MW/500 MWh, while a 250 MW/500 MWh project at Brahmapuram is expected around 2027.

Had sufficient storage existed this September, some daytime solar surplus could have been shifted into the evening rather than forcing Kerala into a strained national market.

Batteries, however, cannot be the entire answer. Pumped-storage hydropower offers longer-duration storage by using surplus electricity to pump water uphill and releasing it when demand rises. KSEB has identified projects associated with Kakkayam, Poringalkuthu, Muthirapuzha and Idukki; another proposal encompasses 13 projects totalling 6,155 MW.

The choice is not solar or hydropower, batteries or pumped storage, domestic generation or imports. Kerala needs an intelligently calibrated combination determined by cost, reliability, environmental constraints and peak demand. Nor can procurement substitute for capacity planning. The controversy surrounding 465 MW of long-term power purchase agreements signed under the previous UDF government illustrates the risks. The regulatory commission cancelled them in 2023 following objections over procurement; the present government is pursuing legal and other avenues to restore the power. It says the absence of this supply could impose an additional ₹12,570 crore liability—a claim belonging to an ongoing legal and policy dispute, not an adjudicated finding.

The larger lesson transcends that dispute. Electricity infrastructure operates in years and decades. Batteries cannot be conceived after shortages begin; pumped storage cannot materialise before the next peak; PPAs cannot be created overnight; transmission cannot expand at the speed of an emergency purchase. The crisis exposes a mismatch between electricity policy and electricity time.

CM Satheesan has said demand, presently in the 5,000–6,000 MW range, could reach 10,000 MW by 2030, driven by households and new industries, while the revised electricity policy will emphasise renewables backed by storage. That projection should be regarded less as a forecast than as a deadline.

Semiconductor manufacturing, artificial intelligence, digital services, electric mobility and new industries will make Kerala’s electricity system more demanding. The immediate task is to overcome the present shortage without prolonged restrictions or excessive procurement costs. The medium-term task is sufficient storage, transmission and flexible procurement to ensure that another weak monsoon, heat wave or national supply disruption does not become another emergency.

The long-term task is simpler to state, and harder to accomplish: Kerala must plan not merely for how much electricity it will need, but when it will need it. The state has a substantial renewable base, but generation without storage leaves evenings exposed; access to the national grid, but national scarcity can weaken that safety valve; hydropower, but rainfall makes water an uncertain reserve; and rapidly rising demand without sufficient flexibility.

This crisis is, therefore, not merely an isolated shortage but a stress test of Kerala’s electricity planning. The next time millions switch on their lights together, the answer should not depend upon finding an expensive unit of electricity at the last minute. It should depend upon whether Kerala planned, years in advance, for the hour when its people would need power most.

Amal Chandra is an author, policy analyst, and columnist. He serves as The Statement Fellow and Coordinator for South Asia at Students For Liberty.

The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not purport to reflect the opinions or views of THE WEEK.