OPINION | The rise of bipolar coalitions and the struggle to preserve diverse representation

 ​India’s democracy is changing—not collapsing, not becoming conventionally two-party, but becoming more concentrated. Since 2014, the BJP has become the central pole of national politics. Congress, though diminished, remains the only other major party with a broad pan-Indian footprint. The Left, the BSP and several regional parties have weakened. The emerging order looks less like an American two-party system than a two-pole system: a BJP-led NDA on one side and a Congress-centred opposition on the other.

The 2024 Lok Sabha verdict captures both concentration and resilience. The BJP won 240 seats and Congress 99, but parties recognised as state parties won 179 seats—33 per cent of the House—and 41 parties secured representation. Regional politics is not disappearing. What may be shrinking is the ability of some regional parties to remain independent bargaining centres, as many did from 1989 to 2014.

A quieter force has reinforced this shift: political migration. An Association for Democratic Reforms analysis of defections between 2014 and 2021 found the BJP to be the largest beneficiary: 253 re-contesting candidates and 173 MPs and MLAs who switched parties joined it; Congress suffered the largest outflow. An established politician may bring local organisation, caste and community networks and electability, while the smaller party loses resources it needs to survive. Repeated movement towards larger parties can therefore create a centripetal effect.

None of this proves a deliberate project to create a BJP-versus-Congress system, nor is there credible public evidence of an RSS or BJP strategy to preserve Congress as a preferred opposition. Structural forces can produce concentration without a master plan. The more defensible conclusion is that India may be moving from multiparty fragmentation, through BJP dominance, towards bipolar coalition politics in which regional parties survive but increasingly operate within two larger camps.

'One Nation, One Election' could reinforce that trend. The Constitution (129th Amendment) Bill remains before a Joint Parliamentary Committee, which continues to examine the proposal as of August 24, 2026. Fewer election cycles could reduce administrative disruption. But electoral design is not politically neutral.

A 2025 peer-reviewed study in the Journal of Comparative Economics found that synchronised national and state elections increased party salience and straight-ticket voting and were associated with a 21 per cent higher probability of the same party winning at both levels. This does not mean regional parties would disappear. It suggests that national leadership, national narratives, media visibility and large campaign organisations could weigh more heavily in state contests. In a federation as diverse as India, efficiency must not become political homogenisation.

The deeper question is whether political concentration improves governability or weakens democracy. Strong governments are not inherently authoritarian; India has experienced dominant-party eras before. Decisive leadership and national confidence can coexist with democracy. The danger begins when strength ceases to accept restraint. In the 17th Lok Sabha, only 16 per cent of Bills were referred to parliamentary committees, compared with 71 per cent in the 15th. Yet counterweights remain. The Supreme Court’s electoral-bonds judgment demonstrated institutional scrutiny; voters supplied another check by reducing the BJP to 240 seats in 2024 and making a coalition government necessary.

Economic concentration poses a different challenge. A 2026 study in The World Bank Economic Review estimates that by 2022–23 the top one per cent received 23.3 per cent of national income and owned 40.1 per cent of wealth. The trend predates 2014, rising from the 1980s and accelerating from the early 2000s, so attributing it simply to the present government would be misleading. The democratic concern is whether concentrated economic power acquires disproportionate influence over politics, media, and public policy while mobility below becomes harder.

Here the argument must move from institutions to people. Democracy is also about who is heard, represented and enabled to advance. The poor, Dalits, Adivasis, OBCs, minorities, informal workers and disadvantaged groups are not peripheral beneficiaries of welfare; their access to education, employment, dignity and voice is part of democracy’s substance. Reservation remains one constitutional instrument for addressing entrenched exclusion, even as anti-reservation mobilisation reveals continuing tensions around merit, representation and fairness. Such debate is legitimate, but it cannot erase the inequalities that made affirmative action necessary.

Women reveal both progress and unfinished business. Only 74 members—14 per cent—of the 18th Lok Sabha are women. Parliament has enacted the Constitution (106th Amendment) Act, providing one-third reservation for women in the Lok Sabha and State Assemblies, including within SC/ST reserved seats. Yet implementation remains tied to census and delimitation. An April 2026 attempt to alter that framework and facilitate earlier implementation failed to secure the required special majority. India has accepted greater female representation; its translation into legislative power remains deferred. The democratic question is not only who governs, but who gets a seat at the table.

Then comes Gen Z. PLFS 2025, on the usual status measure, put unemployment among 15–29-year-olds at 9.9 per cent nationally and 13.6 per cent in urban India. Mobilisations around recruitment, examinations and reservation point to a younger electorate impatient with systems perceived as opaque, unfair or unable to provide mobility. Gen Z should not be reduced to one ideology. Its message is broader: credible rules, opportunity, transparency and responsiveness.

India, therefore, is not moving neatly towards either a two-party democracy or authoritarian rule. It is moving towards a more concentrated democratic order: two national poles, stronger central leadership, larger political organisations and considerable economic concentration, alongside regional identities, competitive elections, courts, federal institutions and an assertive younger generation.

But the quality of that democracy will ultimately be judged by how widely power and opportunity are shared—across regions, classes, castes, communities and gender. The challenge is not merely to ensure that consolidation does not become conformity, but that political and economic concentration does not deepen social exclusion.

India needs strong governments. But strength must accept restraint; nationalism must leave room for disagreement; markets must widen opportunity; electoral reform must preserve federal diversity; and national parties must coexist with regional and social voices. A democracy cannot be judged only by how efficiently majorities govern, but also by how securely minorities, disadvantaged communities and those without organised power can participate, progress and be heard.

India may become more nationally organised. It must remain many-voiced—strong enough to accommodate disagreement, and democratic enough to ensure that every legitimate voice is heard.

The author is a former senior civil servant of the Punjab cadre (IAS, 1983batch), and served in senior positions in the Government of Punjab, including as Additional Chief Secretary and Chief Principal Secretary to the Chief Minister.

 

The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not purport to reflect the opinions or views of THE WEEK.