The US exploded two nuclear weapons over the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki on August 6 and 9, 1945, during the final stages of World War II. The loss of lives is estimated as between 130,000 to 175,000 people, mostly civilian casualties. Injuries caused by burns, cancer and deformities at birth was estimated to run to over 900,000 casualties.
The emphasis is on the destructive capabilities of nuclear weapons. Importantly, it must be noted that most casualties were civilians. Let there be no doubt that the targets for nuclear weapons will always be large human habitats like large cities. That will cause the “shock and awe" effect, which will potentially subdue the adversary. Hopefully, after the two nuclear explosions of August 1945, there will be no more such attacks on the human race.
India has two hostile nuclear-armed neighbours. It is therefore prudent for the government to prepare for a worst case scenario. Although, nuclear weapons are only meant to have a deterrent effect, preparations to face the ultimate threat are mandatory. In this context, the government must have its contingency plans in place. This would need to be in the form of nuclear-hardened shelters and storage of food and medical facilities in the large cities. The public must be educated and informed of the actions to be taken in the case of a nuclear strike.
India’s first nuclear bomb test, codenamed “Smiling Buddha”, was conducted in May 1974.
Thereafter, it was only on May 11 and 13, 1998, that India conducted five more tests. Nuclear weapons are never meant to be used, but to only act as a deterrent against any misadventure by adversaries. After the capability-proving tests of May 1998, codenamed “Operation Shakti,” India has shown its commitment as a responsible and mature nuclear power. In that, it has declared a self-imposed moratorium on any further nuclear tests. Indian nuclear policy is structured around the following factors: credible minimum deterrence, no "first use" posture, retaliation to be punitive and designed to "inflict unacceptable damage," authority to be vested with the civil political leadership, non-use versus non-nuclear states and nuclear retaliation even for chemical/biological attacks.
Principles central to the Indian nuclear deterrent are credibility, effectiveness and survivability. India has successfully weaponised its fissile material. The mating of the bomb to the delivery system is tested and proven. The reliability and efficiency of the detonating device is well proven. The weapons will be made to explode a couple of hundred meters above the target for maximum blast effect to cause maximum damage and casualties. India's command and control sequence is well defined, with layered security overlays. The decision to use nuclear weapons is totally with the civilian political leadership, with the prime minister at the apex.
The decision-making process is supported by the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS), which receives inputs from the National Command Authority (NCA). The challenge is to ensure that there are no delays in the process. It is crucial that the retaliation to a nuclear attack on our soil must be immediate and with sufficient force. The custodian of all nuclear weapons in India is the Strategic Force Command (SFC). This is manned by inter-service officers of the armed forces. Direction to operationalise is conveyed by the NCA to the SFC. The SFC initiates nuclear strikes through a triad of delivery platforms: land-based ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads deployed through mobile launchers, submarine-based nuclear-tipped missiles and aircraft-launched bombs. The offensive capability for credible retaliation is assured through all three dimensions—land, sea and air. This also assures ample redundancies. The “operational policy,” which is the execution direction given by the political leadership to the SFC and NCA is coherent and unambiguous. It clearly stipulates the escalation ladder and launch commands. In this manner, the possibility of failure or accidents is eliminated.
India's nuclear assets are well dispersed. Fissile material is stored separately. This is transported with due security to different secure locations for mating with the delivery vehicles. In a semi-mated condition, the bombs are transported to launch sites. These are located on land-based mobile launchers, submarines at sea and air-launched weapons, which are located at safe and secure bases. These are operationalised within minutes and ready for delivery on specific commands.
India's armed forces through the SFC are very well prepared to face a nuclear threat and retaliate appropriately. The weapons are safe and secure and not accessible to fundamentalists, insurgents and other such rogue elements.
Having secured a nuclear retaliatory strike capability, it would be necessary to have in place a defensive capability to neutralise a nuclear attack.
Protection of Indian airspace is the responsibility of the Indian Air Force. Through a series of high-, medium- and low-level radar networks; secure communications and air defence aircraft and missiles, a ballistic missile defence capability is operational. However, in the future, with the induction of the Israeli Barak surface-to-air missiles, Russian S400 Triumf system and secure real-time communication and operational data links,the protection from nuclear attacks would be effectively 'complete'.
In our neighbourhood, China is an established nuclear power with hundreds of nuclear bombs and intercontinental range ballistic missile capability (ICBMs). Notwithstanding Beijing's commitment to a no 'first use' policy, the same is not applicable over Chinese territory. Therefore, technically Arunachal and Sikkim, the accession of which to India is contended, could fall into that category.
Pakistan has a declared ‘first use’ policy. This is mainly to counter Indian conventional military superiority. As an instrument of blackmail, Pakistan has committed to use ‘battlefield nukes’ to neutralise Indian forces in Pakistani territory as a direct response to the ‘Cold Start’ doctrine of the Indian Army. There is no other country that advocates the use of battlefield nukes. The efficacy of sub-kiloton bombs, within its own territory for targeting a thinly spread armour offensive, is questionable.
What is certain is that this misadventure would draw punitive retaliation from India.
The UN Charter authorises the right to self defence to protect the integrity and sovereignty of any independent country. India's strategic interests must be to ensure adequate defence against any nuclear strikes. This would require effective, credible nuclear deterrence and adequate retaliatory capability in case deterrence fails.
Deterrence could be assured through a functional operational policy, confirmation of political will, adequate nuclear weapons, long-range delivery platforms and a robust command and control system to ensure fail-safe retaliation. Credible deterrence must necessarily include survivability of own systems and punitive retaliation for any attack on the sovereign state of India or its armed forces.
The BJP's election manifesto had announced plans to “to study in detail India’s nuclear doctrine and revise and update it to make it more relevant to challenges of current times.” There has been no forward movement for any revision. As they say, “If it ain't broke, don't fix it!”
Retired air marshal P.S. Ahluwalia was the former chief of the Western and Southern Air Commands of the Indian Air Force.
This article is part of a series from THE WEEK on the 20th anniversary of the Pokhran-2 nuclear tests undertaken by the government of Atal Behari Vajpayee. The Pokhran-2 tests—which saw India test 5 nuclear weapons at Pokhran, Rajasthan on May 11 and 13, 1988—led to India declaring itself as a nuclear weapons state. This series covers archival materials on how THE WEEK covered the Pokhran tests in 1998, the preparedness of India's military in a nuclear age and the threat of terrorists getting their hands on 'dirty bombs'.