OPINION | The new geopolitics of critical technology

The next contest for global power will not be decided by military strength or economic size alone. It will also depend on who controls the technologies, materials and industrial capabilities that sustain both. Semiconductors power modern economies and defence systems; artificial intelligence is changing business, governance and warfare; and critical minerals are essential to advanced manufacturing and the energy transition. The real source of power, however, lies not simply in possessing these technologies, but in controlling the supply chains and expertise needed to produce and improve them.

For decades, globalisation rested on the belief that economic interdependence encouraged cooperation. Production crossed borders, and countries relied on one another for goods, investment and technology. The COVID-19 pandemic exposed the risks of concentrated supply chains, while Russia's invasion of Ukraine demonstrated how economic dependencies could become instruments of political pressure. US-China competition has further brought technology into the centre of national security. Globalisation is not disappearing, but countries are becoming more selective about the dependencies they are willing to accept.

When interdependence becomes leverage

The semiconductor industry illustrates this shift. Advanced chip production depends on an international network involving American design software, specialised equipment from the Netherlands and Japan, fabrication facilities concentrated in Taiwan and South Korea, and materials sourced from several countries. No single country controls the entire process. Yet control over a few indispensable technologies can determine who has access to the most advanced chips.

Washington's restrictions on semiconductor exports to China demonstrate how trade policy has become an instrument of strategic competition. In December 2024, the US expanded controls to include semiconductor manufacturing equipment, software tools, and high-bandwidth memory, seeking to restrict China's access to technologies with potential military applications. In January 2026, it revised its licensing approach for certain advanced Nvidia and AMD chips, allowing case-by-case consideration subject to security conditions. The changing policy illustrates how technology restrictions also serve commercial and diplomatic calculations.

China has demonstrated similar leverage through critical minerals. Its restrictions on selected rare earth exports in 2025 exposed the dependence of global automotive, electronics and defence industries on Chinese processing. Although Beijing extended the suspension of several expanded restrictions until January 2027, other export controls remain in place. The episode showed how decisions affecting relatively small parts of a supply chain can disrupt industries across the world.

The lesson is straightforward: international trade creates opportunities, but dependence without alternatives can become a strategic weakness.

The power hidden in supply chains

Lithium, cobalt, graphite, copper and rare earth elements are essential to batteries, electric vehicles, renewable energy and defence technologies. Yet mineral reserves alone do not determine industrial power. Processing, refining, manufacturing and recycling are equally important.

The International Energy Agency's Global Critical Minerals Outlook 2026 highlights the concentration of refining capacity. Between 2023 and 2025, Indonesia and China accounted for more than three-quarters of global growth in refined mineral supply. China remains particularly influential in graphite and rare earth processing. Such concentration leaves manufacturers vulnerable to export restrictions, political disputes and disruptions in production.

The implications extend beyond electric vehicles. Gallium, germanium and tungsten, among other specialised materials, are important to semiconductors, telecommunications, aerospace and defence. A shortage of one material can affect industries far larger than the market for that material itself.

Diversification therefore requires more than opening new mines. Countries need investment in processing facilities, research, technical skills and recycling. Those able to develop these capabilities will capture more value and be better prepared for supply disruptions.

AI and the infrastructure of power

Artificial intelligence adds another dimension to this competition. Its strategic importance depends not only on who develops advanced models, but also on access to computing power, specialised processors, data, electricity and research expertise.
The expansion of data centres has made energy security an increasingly important part of AI policy. India's installed data-centre capacity reached approximately 1.575 GW by August 2026, according to the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology. This growth reflects rising demand for digital services and computing infrastructure. It also raises questions about electricity supply, cooling, water consumption, and environmental sustainability.

AI can improve healthcare, agriculture, logistics, scientific research, and intelligence capabilities. But access to computing infrastructure does not automatically translate into technological leadership. India needs stronger domestic research, skilled professionals, secure data systems, and the ability to independently assess the reliability of AI applications. Systems that produce inaccurate or biased results can create serious consequences, particularly when used in public administration, security, or essential services.

The question is not simply whether India can use AI, but whether it can develop, adapt and govern the technologies on which its future capabilities depend.

India's opportunity—and the test of execution

India has taken important steps towards building its semiconductor ecosystem. The India Semiconductor Mission, launched in 2021, began with an initial outlay of ₹76,000 crore to support fabrication, packaging, testing and design. On 15 July 2026, the Union Cabinet approved Semicon 2.0 with an outlay of ₹1,27,500 crore, extending support to research, equipment, materials, advanced packaging and talent development. By October 2026, five of the twelve approved manufacturing projects had commenced commercial production.

These are significant developments, but investment announcements should not be confused with technological capability. Semiconductor manufacturing requires reliable electricity and water, specialised suppliers, skilled engineers and sustained research. India must move beyond hosting manufacturing facilities towards developing its own intellectual property, commercially competitive products and technical expertise. The real test is how much knowledge and industrial capacity remain within the country.

The IndiaAI Mission, approved in March 2024 with an allocation of ₹10,372 crore, complements this effort. More than 38,000 GPUs have been onboarded for its common computing facility, extending access to startups, researchers and academic institutions. The challenge now is to turn this infrastructure into original research, competitive applications and stronger domestic capabilities. Reliable and affordable energy must remain part of that investment.

Mineral security requires similar attention. The National Critical Mineral Mission, approved in January 2025 with an expenditure of ₹16,300 crore, seeks to strengthen exploration, mining, processing and recycling. India's efforts to secure overseas mineral supplies, including its agreement concerning lithium exploration in Argentina, are important. But international sourcing must go hand in hand with domestic processing and recycling capacity.

Partnerships will remain essential. The US-India TRUST initiative, announced in February 2025, provides a framework for cooperation in AI, semiconductors, quantum technologies, biotechnology, energy and critical minerals. India's participation in the Pax Silica coalition in February 2026 offers another avenue for cooperation on semiconductor and AI supply chains. Such partnerships should be judged by what they deliver in technology transfer, research, skills and industrial participation, rather than the announcements accompanying them.

Strategic autonomy without isolation

India should not confuse technological sovereignty with producing everything at home. Even the most advanced economies depend on international networks of knowledge, investment, components and expertise. Attempting to reproduce every stage of production domestically would be expensive and could limit innovation.

Strategic autonomy means having enough domestic capacity and alternative sources to prevent external dependencies from dictating national choices. India must identify the technologies and materials whose disruption would carry serious economic or security consequences, invest in domestic strengths where justified, and diversify partnerships where self-reliance is impractical. Universities, research institutions, technical education, and cybersecurity must form part of this.

The geopolitics of critical technology will favour countries that can turn investment into lasting expertise and competitive industries. For India, the opportunity is considerable, but so is the cost of delayed execution. Technological power will not be measured by the number of factories announced or partnerships signed. It will depend on whether the country can continue to innovate, manufacture, and make independent decisions when access to global technologies and resources becomes uncertain.

About the authors:

Amal Chandra is an Indian author, public policy analyst, and columnist. He currently serves as the Founder, President, and CEO of the Centre for Research on Governance and Development (CRGD), and as The Statement Fellow and Coordinator, South Asia, at Students For Liberty. His debut book, The Essential, which features a foreword by former Union External Affairs Minister of India, Adv. Salman Khurshid, and was launched by Dr. Shashi Tharoor, with whom he works on public affairs, alongside Adv. V.D. Satheesan, the current Chief Minister of Keralam. Follow him on X: @ens_socialis.

Tushita Bhandari is a researcher, public policy analyst, and doctoral scholar at the Nelson Mandela Centre for Peace and Conflict Resolution, Jamia Millia Islamia, New Delhi. She has previously worked with the Observer Research Foundation (ORF). Her work engages with the intersections of technology, geopolitics, public policy, and international security.