OPINION | India-China relations: Normalisation amid persistent border tensions

An Indian national, during a recent visit to China, shared a social media post highlighting the easing of visa regulations and the resumption of direct air services between India and China. The essence of the post was that bilateral relations are gradually normalising, with prospects for further positive developments in the period ahead.

However, the social media post overlooked several important issues developing in the background, which do not present an equally optimistic picture of the improving bilateral relationship.

In a significant development in India-China relations, India, on October 2, formally named a number of geographical features, including lakes and mountain peaks in Ladakh, extending to areas across the disputed Line of Actual Control (LAC) in Aksai Chin. This is the first instance of India assigning official nomenclature to features in Aksai Chin, a territory claimed by India but under Chinese control since the 1950s.

Many of the new names have Tibetan linguistic roots, while several historical place names linked to the erstwhile Kashgar region, now part of China’s Xinjiang, have been retained. While releasing a high-resolution map of Ladakh, the Union home ministry, released a list of 28 newly designated names and stated that the standard place and feature names have been incorporated into official Survey of India maps. It further stated that identifying them formally on the Survey of India map is aimed at facilitating their accurate recognition and better awareness among the public at large.

The release of 28 new location names by the home ministry marks the second such exercise undertaken this year. Earlier, in August, the ministry had issued the first set of 27 new location names covering Arunachal Pradesh and the adjoining Tibetan region.
As expected, the Chinese side came with a strong objection to the issue of renaming the 28 locations. Global Times, in a hard-hitting editorial, stated that by changing a few place names, creating some media hype, it projects a tough stance and creates the illusion that its territorial claims have been realized on the ground. Such petty scheming is, at its core, nothing more than psychological victory in the absence of real gains—a manifestation of the self-deluding "victory narrative" embraced by some in India, now projected onto the China-India boundary issue.

Interestingly, the editorial stated that “some people in India” are once again playing games with maps over the China-India border issue. As the new names were released by the MHA, there is little ambiguity regarding the intended target of these allegations.
The editorial also stated that the western sector of the China-India border has historically belonged to China, and China possesses sovereignty over the relevant areas, including the Aksai Chin region in Northwest China's Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, and has ample historical and legal grounds for its claims. India's claims stem from illegal boundary demarcations inherited from the colonial era, which successive Chinese governments have never recognised.

The Global Times editorial on the release of two sets of new names is very critical by stating that India has forcibly slapped an Indian label on 55 locations and that the status quo along the Ladakh sector of the boundary is not a blank sheet of paper that can be altered at will.

In a significant development, the Director General of the ITBP remarked on October 22  that face-offs with Chinese troops had taken place at several points along the border in Arunachal Pradesh and were still ongoing. He added that ITBP commandos continue to maintain an active presence in these border confrontations.

According to reports in sections of the media, citing government sources, India and China have been engaged in a standoff at Asaphila, near Taksing in Arunachal Pradesh, since late July. The reports indicate that PLA troops have established tented positions approximately 6-7 km within India's perceived Line of Actual Control (LAC), near Maja in the Upper Subansiri district.

The stand-off reportedly began during a routine patrol in July, when Indian and Chinese troops encountered each other near Maja. Following a brief confrontation, both sides withdrew from the area. However, the PLA subsequently returned with additional personnel and set up tents around 6-7 km inside India's perceived LAC, leading to the current impasse.

The director general's statement is being viewed by some sections in India as the first official acknowledgement of the extent of tensions along the northeastern border since July this year.

However, the ITBP DG did not identify the specific locations where the face-offs took place, stating only that they occurred along the India-China border. Media reports, on the other hand, linked the incident to the area near Maja. Significantly, neither the Director General's remarks nor the media reports explicitly stated that the confrontation/face-off occurred in an area under Indian control in Arunachal Pradesh or in a disputed area beyond it.

This distinction is important, given the fact that Longju and the surrounding areas have remained under Chinese control since 1959. Against this backdrop, the media's reference to the stand-off having occurred "within India's perceived Line of Actual Control (LAC)" near Maja in Upper Subansiri district appears carefully worded and may reflect the complexities of the ground situation in the sector.

In this context, face-offs along the border should not automatically be viewed as a major escalation unless they involve attempts by Chinese security forces to alter the status quo by advancing into areas under Indian control. This assessment should, however, be viewed alongside India's longstanding claims over territories that have been under Chinese control since the 1950s.

However, while the incident may seem relatively minor in isolation, it underscores that China has not relinquished its claims over Arunachal Pradesh, nor has it sidetracked the border question while pursuing engagement with India on other issues. 

(The author is a Senior Fellow at the Centre for Public Policy Research, Kochi.)

(The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not purport to reflect the opinions or views of THE WEEK.)