The Trump-Xi summit prompts India to focus on building its national power for strategic autonomy amidst potential US-China transactional alliances. India must leverage its unique strengths to ensure its geopolitical choices are not dictated by the world's two great powers, ultimately aiming to shape its own destiny independently.

The Trump-Xi summit prompts India to focus on building its national power for strategic autonomy amidst potential US-China transactional alliances. India must leverage its unique strengths to ensure its geopolitical choices are not dictated by the world's two great powers, ultimately aiming to shape its own destiny independently.

The Trump-Xi summit prompts India to focus on building its national power for strategic autonomy amidst potential US-China transactional alliances. India must leverage its unique strengths to ensure its geopolitical choices are not dictated by the world's two great powers, ultimately aiming to shape its own destiny independently.

The Trump–Xi summit has triggered an uncomfortable question in India. Can the United States and China bridge differences, align their interests where convenient and, in doing so, make decisions that leave the rest of the world, and particularly India, adjusting to an order it did not help shape?

The concern is not that Washington and Beijing will suddenly become allies. Their strategic rivalry is too deep for that. The greater possibility is more subtle, and that is a transactional understanding between the world’s two largest powers whenever their interests converge, even while they continue competing elsewhere.

Trade and tariffs, market access, agriculture, artificial intelligence, advanced chips, rare earths, technology, Taiwan, the Indo-Pacific, Iran and Russia contain both areas of conflict and potential accommodation. It is therefore premature to call this a G2 world. But it is already a world in which two great powers can negotiate with each other while the consequences are experienced by everyone else.

For India, the more useful question is not whether it has “lost out”. The question for policymakers and the politicians should be: what must India build so that no combination of decisions by Washington and Beijing can determine India's strategic choices? That should be the real strategic question.

Two powers, two models

The Eagle and the Dragon represent very different political and economic trajectories. The United States has historically projected individual freedom, political competition, enterprise and opportunity. Its internal contradictions and political divisions are real, but its attractiveness as a destination for education, enterprise, immigration and opportunity remains considerable. China followed a different path. It moved from Maoist communism towards a market-oriented economy without adopting Western democratic norms. It combined state direction, political control, long-term planning and extraordinary resource mobilisation with capitalism and global trade.

China’s transformation has undeniably altered the balance of global power. Its manufacturing scale, infrastructure, technological advancement, export capacity and control over important industrial and critical-mineral ecosystems provide Beijing with considerable leverage. Its large trade surplus has remained resilient despite significant trade friction with the United States. Yet economic dependence should not be confused with political attraction. A country may depend on Chinese manufacturing without wanting to adopt the Chinese political model.

America, meanwhile, is no longer the uncontested power of the immediate post-Cold War period. China has narrowed parts of the gap, while Washington faces fiscal pressures, political polarisation and strategic competition across several theatres. Yet the United States continues to possess enormous economic, technological, military, financial and diplomatic capabilities.

The contest, therefore, is not between a defeated America and a victorious China. It is between two extraordinarily powerful states whose relative strengths are changing.

Cooperation without trust: Can the Eagle and the Dragon really dance together?

The summit demonstrated that they can negotiate without substantial outcomes. Trump can roll out the red carpet and receive Xi at the airport; that does not mean that they can permanently or even temporarily align.

Their disagreements over trade, tariffs and market access remain substantial. China possesses leverage through rare earths, critical minerals and manufacturing ecosystems; America retains leverage through finance, technology and access to its economic system.

Technology has become an increasingly important arena of strategic competition. Artificial intelligence, advanced chips, semiconductor equipment and technological standards are no longer merely commercial issues; they are instruments of national power. Both countries seek to protect their advantages while reducing their vulnerabilities. And therein lies the catch. Lowering the guard on one issue strengthens the other, an outcome neither desires.

Security creates still deeper fault lines. Taiwan remains fundamental. Iran and Russia complicate the relationship, while the Indo-Pacific remains an arena of military competition.

The summit therefore did not remove the structural differences. Recent reporting described the relationship as stabilised rather than transformed, with trade, technology, Taiwan and rare earths still unresolved. The likely reality is therefore neither permanent confrontation nor permanent partnership.

They will cooperate when cooperation serves their interests and compete when competition serves their interests. And therefore, the world, including the EU, Japan and Australia—long-term allies and partners of the US—also must prepare for both. India is not alone.

India’s strategic dilemma

India should resist the temptation to frame its choices simply as being “with” America or “against” China as is being driven by the strategic commentators of India. Both great powers seek influence over the strategic choices of other states. The instruments may differ, but tariffs, sanctions, technology controls, market access, investment, supply chains, financial systems and security partnerships can all create leverage.

No country in the world trusts either the US or China. Each is trying to rebalance their choices between the two powers out of compulsion rather than choice.  India, already on the path of strategic autonomy, must shape its choices carefully. Strategic autonomy does not mean equidistance. Nor does it mean hostility towards either power. It means retaining sufficient national capability and diplomatic space to make choices according to Indian interests. The best strategic direction is summed up by External Affairs Minister M. Jaishankar: “India has to look after the interest of 1.4 billion Indians.”

There is also a difficult reality that needs acknowledgement. India is not yet in a position to compete with China across the entire spectrum of national power. It is unlikely to even catch up in the near future as the gap is significant unless any radical event shapes the future differently.  The differences in economic scale, manufacturing capacity, infrastructure, technological capability, military-industrial capacity and accumulated national wealth remain substantial.

India has made significant progress in manufacturing, electronics, defence production and exports, but progress should not be confused with parity. Therefore, India must build power and not dependence. India’s answer should not be to imitate China or enter an artificial race for comprehensive parity. India possesses its own strengths. The demographic scale, entrepreneurial energy, democratic institutions, diversity, knowledge capability, strategic geography and a growing technological ecosystem. India should convert these advantages into productive national capability.

That means expanding manufacturing, improving human capital, aligning education with technological competition, developing globally competitive infrastructure and accelerating indigenous defence production. It means investing in critical technologies, strengthening energy security and diversifying energy sources. Most importantly, Indian institutions must learn to think and act over decades rather than merely through electoral or bureaucratic cycles.

India does not need to defeat China. It needs to become strong enough that China cannot ignore India and America cannot take India for granted. That is a more realistic strategic objective than competing with China across every domain or becoming dependent upon America as a friend or security partner.

Strategic autonomy means strategic choice

The Indian debate should therefore move beyond the question of, ‘Has Trump abandoned India for Xi?’ That question gives too much importance to the choices of another country. If America and China cooperate, India should be able to protect its interests. If they confront each other, India should still be able to protect its interests. If Russia moves closer to China, India must retain options. If regional countries come under external pressure, India must possess sufficient economic, military and diplomatic capacity to withstand it.

India’s national strategy cannot change with every American election, regional pivot or temporary adjustment in US-China relations. Strategic autonomy means having the capacity to make choices without being forced into choices by others.

Diplomacy is essential, but diplomacy alone is insufficient. National power ultimately determines diplomatic leverage. A country with a strong economy, capable military, advanced technology, resilient institutions and diversified strategic relationships possesses more choices. That is why India’s priority should not be anxiety about the Trump–Xi handshake. It should be the construction of Indian power.

Fly in our own strategic space

Neither the Eagle nor the Dragon should be romanticised or demonised. Both are great powers pursuing national interests. America may need India because of China’s rise. China may need India for trade, stability or regional calculations. But neither relationship should become a substitute for India’s own national capability.

The world is unlikely to become a permanent G2 condominium in which Washington and Beijing divide the world between themselves. Their interests are too divergent and their mistrust too deep. Temporary bargains, however, are entirely possible and such bargains may be reached without fully considering countries that are not at the negotiating table.

That is the real lesson for India. The objective should be neither to stand with the Eagle nor to live under the shadow of the Dragon. India must become strong enough to fly in its own strategic space. The future will not belong simply to countries that choose the right great power. It will belong to countries that possess enough national power to choose for themselves.

India’s strategic task, therefore, is not to choose between the Eagle and the Dragon. It is to build an India that can deal with both and remain capable of shaping its own destiny. India, as a civilisation, has been in existence for thousands of years, long before America came into being or before Hans crossed the Himalayas a few centuries back. The time of India has come, and Indians must believe and work towards a bright future.

(The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not purport to reflect the opinions or views of THE WEEK.)

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