THE STORY OF INDIAN WARFARE | September 7, 1967: Giving the Chinese a bloody nose at Nathu La

The Chinese are fond of recalling the ‘lessons’ of the 1962 Indo-China War. Perhaps they themselves have forgotten the lessons of 1967 when they were given a bloody nose at Nathu La.

In September 1967, Indian and Chinese troops stood at heights of 14,200 feet at Nathu La, a strategic pass on the old Gangtok–Lhasa trade route on the Sikkim–Tibet border. Here, the opposing troops were just 30 metres away from each other—the closest at any point along the entire 3,488 km-long disputed border. This area had seen no fighting during the 1962 war, but it would erupt into the most violent confrontation between Indian and Chinese troops since that war.

The story actually began in 1965 when, at the height of the 1965 Indo-Pak War, China issued an ultimatum to India to vacate the posts at Nathu La and Jelep La in the Sikkim sector. Inexplicably, Jelep La was vacated; but at Nathu La, General Sagat Singh, commanding the 17 Infantry Division (The Black Cat Division), refused to budge, stating that the post was strategically important. He was supported in his decision by his Corps Commander, Lt Gen J. S. Aurora, and the Eastern Command Commander, Gen Sam Manekshaw. The triumvirate would go on to become the architects of the 1971 Indo-Pak War just a few years later. In 1965, after India refused to vacate the post, the Chinese made their usual threatening noises and even advanced up to the border line with fixed bayonets. But the Indians refused to back down, and the Chinese withdrew. Their bluff had been called.

Throughout the next two years, the Chinese continued their ploys. Intrusions across the border became frequent; incursions and skirmishes increased. The Chinese installed 27 loudspeakers which sent a non-stop barrage of propaganda across the border, and the Indians responded in kind. In August 1967, Gen Sagat decided to mark the border with a three-layer barbed wire fence. Work began on August 20, and though the Chinese protested against the laying of the wire and engaged in threatening actions, they did not cross over.

On September 07, the first scuffle took place. The engineers of 70 Field Company were upgrading the fence to a concertina coil when around 100 Chinese soldiers came across, asking them to stop. 2 GRENADIERS was deployed in the area of Nathu La, and their troops came out. A scuffle broke out in which the tough Jats got the better of their Chinese opponents. The Chinese withdrew and began hurling stones, to which the Indians responded in kind. Gen Sagat now passed instructions that the fence was to be completed by September 11, a day before he was due to depart on leave.

That morning of September 11 was bright and sunny, without the fog that usually enveloped the high mountain pass. 70 Field Platoon had commenced work at 05:00 am as usual. With them was a company of 18 RAJPUT, who had been tasked with their protection. 2 GRENADIERS held positions along the pass. Artillery officers were also deployed on the high, dominating positions of Sebu La and Camel's Back. From their positions, the Indians had excellent observation and fields of fire—an advantage denied to their adversaries, and one that would prove crucial. True to form, around 08:00 am as work was in progress, a Chinese party accompanied by the Political Commissar approached and ordered them to stop work. Lt Col Rai, the Commanding Officer of 2 GRENADIERS, came down himself along with his commando platoon and refused. In the altercation that followed, the Political Commissar was roughed up and hurled to the ground. The Chinese withdrew, threatening revenge, and after a while, wire-laying resumed.

Minutes later, a shrill whistle from the Chinese positions broke the sound of hammering pickets. It was followed almost immediately by the staccato of machine-gun fire, and murderous bursts raked the ground. The jawans of 70 Field Company and 18 RAJPUT were exposed with no cover and were mowed down, suffering heavy casualties. Lt Col Rai, who was out in the open, was wounded as well (he would later be awarded a Maha Vir Chakra for his role). Seeing their Commanding Officer fall, two officers—Capt Dagar of 2 GRENADIERS and Major Harbhajan of 18 RAJPUT—rallied their men and charged the Chinese positions. They succeeded in closing in with the enemy and even bayoneted a few, but were caught in a hail of fire and killed. Major Harbhajan received an MVC and Capt Dagar a Vir Chakra—both posthumously.

Indian troops now opened fire from their positions, but the Chinese were in well-fortified bunkers, and small-arms fire had little effect. Chinese artillery commenced firing as well, but at Nathu La, they were deployed in lower positions and lacked observation. Their fire proved ineffective. Indian artillery observers on the high grounds of Sebu La and Camel’s Back now directed effective artillery fire onto Chinese positions. We had the advantage of dominating them from high ground and had clear observation of their positions. Accurate artillery fire could thus be brought down on their positions, continuing for over three nights and days, destroying virtually every Chinese bunker and killing over 300 of their troops.

Perhaps the Chinese did not expect this kind of response. On September 14, they threatened to call in the Air Force, but it was an idle bluff. On September 15, an uneasy ceasefire was declared, and the dead from both sides were retrieved. General Manekshaw, Gen Aurora, and Gen Sagat were present during this grim exchange. A wounded soldier, still alive after being exposed for four days in the open, was also recovered—in what was nothing short of a miracle.

Nathu La was a bloody nose for the Chinese and an indicator that the Indian Army they faced now was different from the Army of 1962. But just 20 days later, on October 01, another face-off took place at Cho La, a pass just nine kilometres to the north. A newly formed unit, 7/11 Gorkha Rifles, had been inducted into the area and was deployed opposite Chinese positions just 200 metres across. As the unit was commencing its deployment, the Chinese commander of the post opposite approached the forward platoon and asked them to withdraw. Tensions were still high after Nathu La, and as the commanders got engaged in a heated altercation, the Chinese bayoneted Naib Subedar Gyan Bahadur Limbu, the Indian platoon commander. Seeing their commander fall, the Gorkhas attacked with open khukris, chopping off the arms of the attacker. The situation escalated into a shooting match, and as it escalated, the Indians did not back down. Rather, they attacked the Chinese positions with two battalions—7/11 Gorkha Rifles and 10 JAK RIF—pushing them almost three kilometres back to a feature called Kam Barracks. The situation stabilised after three days, but the Indians did not withdraw from the positions they occupied, and even today, that remains the line of the defensive positions.

After the two bloody skirmishes at Nathu La and Cho La, the border in that sector remained peaceful until the Doklam stand-off in 2017. That encounter claimed over 300 Chinese soldiers and 65 Indian lives. In comparison, 722 Chinese and over 3,500 Indians were killed in the 1962 War. To some extent, the ghosts of 1962, if not fully exorcised, were at least put to rest, and the spectre of Chinese superiority was finally expelled.

Please click here to buy the book 'India's Battlefields: From Kurukshetra to Balakot'