OPINION | The 8-point Joint Statement: Strategic implications for India-China relations

National Security Advisor Ajit Doval and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi met on August 25 in Beijing for the 25^th round of Special Representative talks. While the Embassy of India in Beijing released some information on the outcome of the talks, there was no joint statement issued on the same day. However, a day later, both countries issued an identical 8-point Joint Statement on the outcome of the talks.

Initially, both sides reaffirmed their commitment to uphold the guidance received from the leaders of the two countries, maintain peace and tranquillity in the border areas and create an atmosphere for healthy and steady development of bilateral relations.

The most striking point of the joint statement is the commitment to advance negotiations on a framework for the settlement of the boundary question in accordance with the Agreement on Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for Settlement of the India-China Boundary Question signed in 2005.

The Special Representative mechanism was established in 2003, and in 2004 it was proposed to establish the political parameters and guiding principles for resolving the border issue. An agreement on this was signed in 2005 during the visit of Chinese Premier Wen Jiabo to New Delhi. The 2005 agreement was the first major step to amicably settle the border dispute after years of bilateral discussion by the two sides. However, since then, no progress has been achieved on a framework for a boundary settlement.

The 25^th round of SR talks, held more than 20 years after the signing of the 2005 agreement, led to an early settlement on the border demarcation. Both sides have agreed to advance discussions on an ‘Early and Substantial Harvest’ of boundary delimitation and border management, and both sides would be to agree on their respective terms of reference.

On the question of managing the ground-level situation, both sides agreed to promptly address the existing channels to avoid any miscalculation along the LAC. In this direction, an additional two meeting points were agreed for holding the General Level Mechanism/ Senior Highest Military Commander meeting (SHMC). Similarly, two additional channels of border military hotline in the Eastern and Middle Sectors were agreed. These mechanisms are expected to improve the day-to-day border management system.

On the other front, both sides agreed to increase the number of batches of Indian official pilgrimage Kailash-Manasarovar Yatra (KMY) in the Tibet Autonomous Region of China and the reopening of the three designated border trading points. The KMY was suspended due to COVID-19 and remained discontinued following the Galwan clashes until it was resumed in 2025. The decision to increase the batches would be an encouraging step for the pilgrims who wanted to visit the sacred site.

The three trade points, Lipulekh in Uttarakhand, Shipki La in Himachal Pradesh, and Nathu La in Sikkim, were also discontinued like KMY in 2020 and reopened in 2025 as part of measures to bring back the bilateral relations to normalcy.

Another important issue agreed during the talks and included in the Joint Statement was to hold the next meeting of the India-China Expert-Level Mechanism on Trans-border Rivers in September and maintain communication on issues including hydrological data sharing and renewal of the relevant MoUs.

This is an important issue as far as India is concerned, as China is reportedly constructing a massive dam across the Brahmaputra on the Tibetan side. Once completed, there are fears that the Brahmaputra river basin on the Indian side could suffer severe economic losses, and the release of a huge amount of water without any warning during the monsoon season may cause widespread damage in Assam and neighbouring areas.  Hence, sharing of the hydrological data is very important for India.

Overall, the statement offers a renewed sense of hope in improving the bilateral relations with China. At the same time, India must remain cautious about the Chinese intentions in agreeing to a mutually beneficial statement. Before Covid-19 Chinese side maintained its desire to have cordial relations with India, but all of a sudden, developments like the Doklam and Galwan issues created a trust deficit in bilateral relations.

August and September are the crucial months for both countries as they participate in crucial SCO and BRICS meetings, with India presiding over the 18^th BRICS Summit in New Delhi. Reports also suggest that Xi Jinping would lead a large business delegation during his visit to New Delhi.

In recent years, particularly since the Galwan incident, India has reduced trade and business interactions with China. The BRICS Summit is going to be a significant opportunity in recent years for both countries to reestablish cordial relations and also to revive trade and business prospects. opportunities.

For India, a fruitful BRICS Summit would be another achievement story. For China, reaching out to the biggest market in the world without any obstacles would not only showcase its trade and economic strength to the world but also be an encouraging opportunity to boost its domestic economy, which is now under tremendous strain due to the ongoing trade rift with the USA.

Meanwhile, some quarters in India are attaching too much importance to the sacking of PLA General Zhao Zongqi, who was commanding the Western Theatre Command of PLA during the Doklam and Galwan standoff amid improving bilateral relations. It was widely reported that Zhao has personally given the orders for the misadventure in Doklam and Galwan.

However, linking the removal of the General to Beijing’s intention to improve bilateral relations may be a misattributed interpretation. Given Xi’s political acumen, Zhao would have been sacked immediately after the Doklam incident had that military misadventure been found out to be solely his personal decision. Instead, he continued to lead the Western Theatre Command, which later saw another military misadventure in Galwan.

As President Xi is reportedly leading a large business delegation to attend the 18^th BRICS Summit in New Delhi this September, the composition of the delegation would provide an opportunity to understand priority areas of China. However, India must approach any olive branch extended cautiously.

(The author is a Senior Fellow, Centre for Public Policy Research, Kochi.)

(The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not purport to reflect the opinions or views of THE WEEK.)