OPINION | India-China border talks: An opportunity for an ‘early harvest’

The 25th meeting of the Special Representatives of India and China on the boundary issue was held in Beijing on August 25, 2026, with National Security Adviser Ajit Doval representing India. The meeting assumed importance in view of the SCO and BRICS summits, in which both India and China play a crucial role, as also the current tariff-related differences of both countries with the US.

Not much was expected from these talks other than periodic high-level engagement to maintain peace and stability along the Line of Actual Control (LAC). The eight-point consensus, therefore, comes as a surprise, particularly the proposal for an “Early and Substantial Harvest” in boundary delimitation in less disputed areas and the decision to establish two additional meeting points for senior military commanders.

From package to sector-wise delimitation

The most significant development is the decision to commence discussions on boundary delimitation. The Expert Group on Boundary Delimitation and the Working Group on Border Management under the Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination (WMCC) have been tasked to begin these discussions, including laying down their terms of reference.

The change in the Indian approach from treating the entire boundary as a package to considering a sector-wise discussion is a welcome step. If successful, it could become a stepping stone for tackling the more complex and severely disputed segments of the boundary.

Joint delimitation—meaning jointly defining the boundary on a map through an agreed treaty—is certainly desirable. At present, even from the Indian standpoint, only the Sikkim boundary, based on the 1890 Convention, and the eastern boundary along the McMahon Line are delimited. However, China does not recognise the McMahon Line. In practical terms, therefore, the Sikkim sector remains the only mutually accepted and delimited part of the India-China boundary.

The middle sector offers an early opportunity

If the complex issues relating to Ladakh, Arunachal Pradesh and the areas involving Bhutan are kept aside, the only logical candidate for an “early harvest” is the middle sector, comprising Himachal Pradesh and Uttarakhand.

This sector is comparatively easier to delimit because it is already well defined by the 1954 ‘Agreement on Trade and Intercourse with Tibet Region '”, also known as the ‘Panchsheel’ Agreement. This agreement identified six common passes in this sector, beginning with Shipki La in Himachal Pradesh and extending towards Lipulekh near the India-Tibet-Nepal tri-junction.

There are, however, some problems even in this sector. Barahoti was the first area in which China made a claim on the Indian side, whereas Lipulekh presents an additional complication because of the claim now being made by Nepal. Resolution of these irritants would be a prerequisite for any successful delimitation exercise.

If these can be resolved, the Middle Sector could provide the first practical demonstration that India and China can move from managing the boundary dispute to actually defining the boundary.

The movement beyond the Middle Sector in Arunachal Pradesh and Ladakh, however, would be challenging, as it will necessitate major concessions and a change in the stance of both countries.

Strengthening the military communication mechanism

The decision to establish two meeting points for senior military commanders at Joshimath in Uttarakhand and Tawang in Arunachal Pradesh, both important towns in the rear areas, is also a positive development. Regular meetings between senior commanders are essential to resolve differences that cannot be settled by the forward troops and to prevent incidents at the LAC from escalating into larger confrontations.

But there is an even more important need to establish more Border Personnel Meeting (BPM) points for the forward troops along the LAC. The existing four at Chushul, Nathula, Bumla and Kibithu are not sufficient to cover a frontier of approximately 3,400 km. Greater geographical coverage would provide the forward troops with more avenues for direct communication when incidents occur.

The Middle Sector is particularly important in this context because it does not have a BPM point of its own. Lipulekh was identified for such a meeting point under the 1996 agreement, but it has still not been established. One possible reason could be Chinese sensitivity to Nepal's claim in this area. Whatever the reason, this BPM point must be established as a priority. It would also be important for the delimitation of the Middle Sector, as being planned.

A small but important beginning

The eight-point consensus should not be interpreted as a breakthrough in the India-China boundary dispute. The fundamental differences, particularly in Ladakh and Arunachal Pradesh, remain. Nor should sector-wise delimitation be seen as a substitute for an eventual comprehensive boundary settlement.

However, the willingness to explore an early harvest in less disputed areas represents a potentially important change in approach. The Middle Sector provides a realistic opportunity to test whether this approach can work.

Defining the LAC in Ladakh and Arunachal Pradesh

The next, or simultaneous, logical step would be to explore the feasibility of defining the LAC in Ladakh and Arunachal Pradesh, without prejudice to the border claims of both countries. This would lead to a reduction in tensions and frequent clashes in these areas, thus creating a positive environment for the complex discussions beyond the Middle Sector.

These talks thus provide an opportunity to move, step by step, beginning with the less disputed Middle Sector. Its successful implementation could create the confidence necessary to address the more difficult sectors of the India-China boundary.

(The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not purport to reflect the opinions or views of THE WEEK.)