OPINION | The purge of Ma Xingrui and its political implications

To add to the growing list of purged senior Chinese Communist Party leaders, China expelled Politburo member and former Xinjiang Party Secretary Ma Xingrui on Tuesday, following allegations of corruption. Ma had been under investigation since April 2026 for “serious violations of law and discipline,” a phrase commonly used by the CCP for corruption-related charges. His removal underscores the continuing intensity of Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign, which has increasingly targeted high-ranking officials at the very core of the Party’s leadership.

Since the Deng Xiaoping era, China has started increasingly inducting technocrats into party positions, as Deng’s reforms and modernisation of China required more technocrats rather than revolutionary cadres. During Jiang Zemin’s period, China witnessed a surge of technocrats marked as the third generation of leadership taking up political leadership. The Politburo of CPC also witnessed many technocrats who have taken their seat in the highest decision-making body, and the Chinese governance system is often characterised as technocratic governance.

Ma Xingrui was one such technocrat who transitioned into full-time politics to assume larger leadership roles. He was a rocket scientist, served as General Manager of the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation and as Director of the China National Space Administration. During his role as a technocrat, he had been closely associated with the PLA’s various high-tech programmes and was presumably in touch with top PLA leadership.

After joining the active politics, he held key posts including Party Secretary of Shenzhen, Deputy Party Secretary of Guangdong, and later Governor of Guangdong, Party Secretary of Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. In October 2022, he was elevated to the Politburo, the CCP’s top decision-making body.

Ma Xingrui’s purge is not an isolated case, as several of his close associates from Guangdong and Xinjiang have also been investigated and punished for corruption in recent months, suggesting a broader dismantling of his political network.

Since Xi Jinping assumed power in 2012, China has witnessed large-scale purges, detentions, and long-term punishments of political and military elites, most often on corruption charges. The first major casualty of Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign was Zhou Yongkang, the former security chief and Politburo Standing Committee member. Though Zhou Yongkang was not considered a formal contender to Xi Jinping for the top post, his strong domestic network as a Politburo member who controlled the security network of China was viewed as a potential threat to the stability of the next generation leadership under Xi Jinping. During the 2012 transition, it was widely rumoured that Zhou Yongkang was resolutely opposed to the elevation of Xi and witnessed an intense behind-the-scenes manoeuvring.  

Just before Xi Jinping assumed office as China’s top leader, Bo Xilai, Party Secretary of Chongqing and a close associate of Zhou Yongkang, was removed from his post. In 2013, he was convicted on corruption charges and sentenced to life imprisonment, marking one of the most high-profile cases in the early phase of Xi’s anti-corruption campaign.

Sun Zhengcai, a rising political leader, Politburo member, Party Secretary of Chongqing and considered a sixth-generation leader and potential successor of Xi Jinping, was removed and punished for life term in 2017 on corruption charges. His downfall may have been caused by his inability to take strong actions against Bo Xilai's elements in Chongqing.

There is a marked difference in the above-mentioned cases and that of Ma Xingrui. Ma would have been an eligible candidate and strong choice for the elevation to the Standing Committee of Politburo of CPC in 2027, as he turns 67 next year, and the upper age limit for promotion to the Politburo Standing Committee is generally set at 68 years at the time of the Party Congress, which is typically convened in October every five years.  

The recent purges in the PLA and that of Ma Xingrui may be an indication of the backroom politics brewing up in China in the run-up to the Party Congress in 2027.  Since 2025, the PLA has witnessed large-scale and unprecedented purges, including that of Zhang Youxia, the first Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission of the PLA. Zhang was considered a childhood friend of Xi Jinping. The seven-member Central Military Commission, which was constituted in 2022, is now reduced to just two members, including Xi.

During the recent purges in the PLA, the most affected branch is the Rocket Force. The Rocket Force HQs is integrated into the Central Military Commission Command structure and overseas nuclear and conventional missile forces, including intercontinental ballistic missiles, medium-range ballistic missiles and cruise missiles, making them the most important arm of the PLA.

In 2025, numerous Rocket Force commanders and deputy commanders were removed from their posts amid corruption investigations. In the first two months of 2026, an additional 11 senior officers were purged from the unit. Among the most notable figures linked to the Rocket Force who faced investigation were Zhang Youxia, Vice Chair of the CMC, and Liu Zhenli, Chief of Staff of the CMC Joint Staff Department.

The purge of Ma Xingrui, together with the removal of senior leaders in the PLA, particularly within the Rocket Force, appears linked to a broader political manoeuvre unfolding in China in recent months. Ma’s early senior roles at the China Academy of Space Technology and the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation placed him in close liaison with the PLA, especially the Rocket Force, given the overlap between aerospace development and missile programs. This association may have heightened Xi Jinping’s suspicions that a close alignment between a Politburo member and influential PLA generals could pose a potential threat to challenge his plans for the 2027 Party Congress, when the next leadership transition is scheduled to convene. The examples of Zhou Yongkang, Bo Xilai, and Sun Zhengcai illustrate that Xi Jinping remains cautious and vigilant about any close political networking of senior leaders and their associates and has ruthlessly dismantled any such systems that could challenge his authority.  

(Senior Fellow at Centre for Public Policy Research, Kochi.)

(The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not purport to reflect the opinions or views of THE WEEK.)