INDOPACOM to PACOM: Of a failed US strategy in India-China theatre
When the US renamed its Pacific Command as the Indo-Pacific Command in 2018, it signalled the growing strategic importance of India in Washington's geopolitical calculations and underscored its view of New Delhi as a key partner in balancing China's rising power and influence in the region
More than anything else, the nomenclatural reversal of the oldest and largest of the US unified combatant commands—the INDOPACOM (US Pacific Command)—to PACOM (Pacific Command) on Tuesday (June 16, 2026), as announced by the US Department of War, is a reflection of the failure of US geopolitical
More than anything else, the nomenclatural reversal of the oldest and largest of the US unified combatant commands—the INDOPACOM (US Pacific Command)—to PACOM (Pacific Command) on Tuesday (June 16, 2026), as announced by the US Department of War, is a reflection of the failure of US geopolitical
More than anything else, the nomenclatural reversal of the oldest and largest of the US unified combatant commands—the INDOPACOM (US Pacific Command)—to PACOM (Pacific Command) on Tuesday (June 16, 2026), as announced by the US Department of War, is a reflection of the failure of US geopolitical
More than anything else, the nomenclatural reversal of the oldest and largest of the US unified combatant commands—the INDOPACOM (US Pacific Command)—to PACOM (Pacific Command) on Tuesday (June 16, 2026), as announced by the US Department of War, is a reflection of the failure of US geopolitical policy in the Asia Pacific region.
The Command’s area of responsibility is vast, extending from the West Coast of the US to the western border of India, and from Antarctica to the Arctic, covering about 52 per cent of the global surface area that is inhabited by about 60 per cent of the world’s population, with China right there bang in the middle of this geography. Quite the literal elephant in the room.
When, on May 30, 2018, the then US defence secretary James Mattis announced that the US PACOM was being christened as the INDOPACOM, short for Indo Pacific Command, the broad message was the centrality of the Indian subcontinent in US geopolitical strategy. But in particular, the fine print read the new christening as the pitting of India to counter an increasingly powerful and assertive China.
This 2018 alignment of India was to be read in conjunction with first-term President Donald Trump’s belligerent approach towards China that was exemplified by the empowering of the ‘Quad’ or the four-nation ‘Quadrilateral Security Dialogue’ comprising Australia, India, Japan and the US.
During his first term, Trump made ‘Quad’ the cornerstone of his foreign policy that focused entirely on China as an adversary.
But it had its fair share of problems. ‘Quad’ was a confused entity. There were no clear answers as to whether ‘Quad’ is a military, naval, maritime, economic alliance or a humanitarian and disaster relief effort.
There was resistance on the part of India to be a part of a NATO-like military pact under the aegis of the US, as it would pit India against its traditional friend, Russia. Nor was India willing to adopt an all-out bellicose posture against powerful China.
India’s idea of ‘Quad’ was more of an alliance of democratic nations that will focus on economic activity and set up infrastructure projects to promote connectivity to counter China's growing influence in the Indo-Pacific.
But what may have impacted the US’ geopolitical posture all the more was India’s refusal to be positioned as the gun that the US aimed at China.
Despite border rows, including the June 15, 2020, violent clash at eastern Ladakh’s Galwan valley and the US’ subtle prompting on India to up the ante, New Delhi refused to take the bait.
On the contrary, India-China trade boomed with China becoming India’s biggest trading partner valued at $151 billion, as against the total value of India-US trade at $140 billion.
And of late, India-China bilateral ties have considerably warmed despite a troubled history.
With the US already engaged in the Russia-Ukraine by proxy and proactively in the Iran conflict, its hands were increasingly getting tied and hence the recent visit of President Trump to Beijing in the hope of an honourable exit from the Iran mess. The US cannot afford the opening of another front, either in an overt or covert manner.
Therefore, the reinstatement of INDOPACOM back to PACOM is a story of going back to square one when all efforts have failed. In other words, a failure of US strategic policy.