The Northeast has never been a quiet corner of the map. A large number of ethnic groups, multiple parties and too many histories that don’t fold neatly into each other. In normal times, that mosaic gave the region its flavour. But these aren’t normal times. The One Northeast (ONE) rally on November 27, by parties from Meghalaya, Tripura, and Assam, sends an important strategic signal.
Fragmentation is the region’s oldest curse. Eight states, over two hundred ethnic identities, and a swarm of local outfits claiming to speak for their people. The result has been a political landscape that constantly undercuts itself. Delhi reads it as noise; outside players read it as opportunity. Whether it is debates over Sixth Schedule protections, land ownership, or the unease simmering in border districts, divided representation has often delivered divided outcomes.
One Northeast surfaced as a quiet but calculated pushback against the region’s growing political centralisation. The coalition’s leaders signalled that northeastern politics cannot orbit endlessly around Assam’s heavyweight establishment, even as elections draw close. Their move blends self-preservation with a search for collective leverage, reflecting deeper anxieties over identity, autonomy and shrinking negotiating room in Delhi. Yet the region’s diversity makes any unified pitch fragile. ONE’s future rests on whether it can move beyond symbolism, craft a real development-first agenda, and prove it is more than pre-poll choreography in a landscape where political space is always contested.
Pradyot Debbarma has been banging on this door for years. His pitch on Kokborok unity isn’t some sentimental line; it comes from watching communities repeat the same fights, state by state, with zero collective weight. Conrad Sangma seems to have reached a similar conclusion. By tasking James Sangma to weld these groups into a single platform, symbol, and charter, he is signalling something blunt: elections matter, but the bigger game is building political mass in a region where outside influence is scaling up faster than local cohesion.
A fractured political belt has always fed the insurgent economy. ULFA, NSCN factions, and the newer valley-hill groups thrived by slipping through gaps created by political turf wars. If ONE can actually bring together even 15–20 per cent of the electoral base across states, the old insurgent playbook gets disrupted. It may even revive what the Northeast Democratic Alliance (NEDA) briefly managed in 2016, forcing the national conversation to take the Northeast seriously again.
What makes this moment sharper is China’s three-front tightening across India’s eastern flank. This isn’t some dramatic military lunge; it’s a slow-motion chokehold.
Bangladesh is the first pressure arc. Chinese firms sinking themselves into the Teesta Basin under the banner of “water security” is not just hydrology. It places Beijing’s footprint uncomfortably close to the Siliguri Corridor, India’s most fragile strategic lifeline. Add reports of a Chinese-Pakistani-linked air facility at Lalmonirhat, just minutes from the Indian border, and the 90s-era memories of foreign intelligence piggybacking on Bangladesh to stir the Northeast suddenly don’t feel so distant.
Myanmar is the more explosive axis. Since the 2021 coup, the country has splintered into armed fiefdoms where China plays puppeteer via proxies like the Arakan Army and the United Wa State Party (UWSP). These networks pump weapons, narcotics, and logistics into India’s border belt. ULFA(I) has tapped into these channels; so have the armed groups roiling Manipur’s valley-hill divide. Refugee flows, broken borders, and militia pipelines make for a volatile mix — and Beijing sits in the middle, calibrating the churn.
Arunachal is the third front. China keeps claiming the entire stretch, stepping up patrols and ramping up soft-power pushes in Buddhist pockets. The military has held the line, but politics inside the region are still exposed. Where political fragmentation survives, influence campaigns follow through infrastructure promises, cultural outreach, or digital infiltration.
Put these three arcs together, and the pattern becomes obvious. Violence in Myanmar spills into Manipur. Shifts in Bangladesh stoke demographic tensions in Tripura. Chinese cultural plays ripple into Arunachal’s border districts. Add hard numbers: tens of thousands of refugees moving into Mizoram and Manipur, Chin-Kuki militia activity rising, narcotics routes switching with every security crackdown, fake identity networks blooming along the Tripura belt, and the Northeast starts looking less like a cluster of isolated disturbances and more like a targeted destabilisation grid.
If this spiral continues unchecked, India faces a serious strategic threat. A stressed Northeast means a vulnerable Siliguri Corridor. Any disruption there, even political risks, could cut off 45 million citizens and constrain troop mobility across the China front. The Brahmaputra basin, loaded with military assets, becomes exposed. A divided Northeast also gives Islamabad more room to coordinate with Beijing, tightening a two-front squeeze India has long worked to avoid.
This is why ONE matters, but only if it moves beyond slogans. Security has to be the spine of the whole project. Without that, everything else is noise. It means foolproof border fencing along the Indo-Myanmar stretch, not the symbolic stuff. It means putting eyes on the ground through layered sensors and tech that actually works in the hills, not in PowerPoint slides. And it means building a force that can move fast when a border incident breaks out, not days later, but in the same hour. It means insisting on budget lines for dual-use infrastructure, high-altitude roads, drone operating zones, and secure communication corridors. ONE can work with the NEDA when needed, but it must stand its ground on issues like Sixth Schedule autonomy and biometric controls to choke infiltration.
Delhi has its homework too. Act East has stalled; it needs resuscitation. Water diplomacy with Bangladesh must factor in Beijing’s Teesta penetration. Myanmar policy needs a reset, not moral posturing, but engagement with whoever actually controls territory. Intelligence coordination across agencies must tighten, especially for tracking Chinese-origin weapons leaking through the Arakan corridor.
The strategic challenge must be understood: economic sabotage via Teesta water leverage threatens Sikkim-Darjeeling agriculture; insurgent revival spikes violence (Nagaland extortion, Manipur clashes); narcotics addiction hollows demographics. Nationally, Siliguri's loss paralyses eastern commands, exposes the Brahmaputra basin, and emboldens Pakistan on the west.
Threat Vector |
Key Players |
Northeast Impact |
Strategic Risk |
| Myanmar Insurgencies | China-armed Arakan/Wa; ULFA camps | Refugee influx (60k+); arms/drugs to Manipur-Mizoram | Ethnic clashes; trafficking surge |
| Bangladesh Teesta/Lalmonirhat | China-Pak contractors; Yunus rhetoric | Corridor vulnerability; water leverage | Severance of Northeast access |
| Arunachal Claims | PLA incursions; cultural diplomacy | Border tensions: 90k square km dispute | Territorial erosion; proxy unrest |
| Insurgent Funding | NSCN-IM, ZRA, 26 groups | Extortion; youth radicalisation | Social decay; operational freedom |
Thus, the issue must be addressed on two fronts.
ONE must embed security in its charter: prioritise border fencing (1,643 km Indo-Myanmar), ISR integration, and joint patrols with ethnic groups/junta. Forge NEDA 2.0, but retain autonomy for Sixth Schedule enforcement and anti-infiltration biometrics.
Nationally, accelerate Act East: counter Teesta with Brahmaputra-Bangladesh pacts; quarantine Myanmar borders via Mizoram-Manipur reserves; expose Chinese arms via UN sanctions. Invest in Siliguri fortifications, including air defences, rapid reaction brigades. Promote local vigilance by citizens, blending development with deterrence.
A unified Northeast party fortifies India's east against Beijing's salami-slicing. ONE's success hinges on transcending state egos for collective shield land rights with lethality, culture with countermeasures. Fragmentation invites encirclement; unity commands respect. India cannot afford a hollow gateway to ASEAN when adversaries probe relentlessly.
