When a household in Pune turns a knob and a blue flame springs to life, it feels like progress—cleaner, seamless, modern. No cylinders to book, no delivery delays. Piped Natural Gas (PNG) seems like the future. And yet, in a world where a narrow waterway like the Strait of Hormuz can disrupt half a nation’s fuel supply, India faces a hard question: How much of this future is actually safe?
India’s cooking gas story is often told as a success. Over the past decade, LPG cylinders have reached nearly every household—over 33 crore connections. But beneath that success lies a vulnerability:
Over 60% of LPG is imported.
Nearly 90% of those imports pass through the Strait of Hormuz.
In a crisis, that’s not a supply chain—it’s a choke point.
India has already had a glimpse of what disruption looks like. During the recent tensions in West Asia, LPG imports dropped sharply, domestic production dipped, and consumption fell—not by choice, but by constraint.
PNG, on the other hand, is often presented as the better alternative. It flows through pipelines, bypasses cylinder logistics, and appears less dependent on West Asian shipping lanes.
But here’s the catch: PNG isn’t immune—it’s just differently exposed. PNG comes from natural gas, which India sources from two places: Domestic gas fields (roughly half) and imported LNG (the other half).
And here’s where reality bites:
About half of LNG imports also transit Hormuz.
India has very limited gas storage capacity.
LNG from far-off sources (like the US, Africa, Russia) is costlier and slower to arrive.
In short, PNG reduces risk—but doesn’t eliminate it.
There is a crucial but often overlooked distinction: LPG has a built-in strategic advantage that PNG lacks. LPG can be produced domestically in refineries as a by-product of crude oil processing. India can increase strategic crude oil reserves, indirectly boosting its ability to produce LPG during disruptions. LPG itself is easy to store and transport in large quantities.
In contrast:
LNG, for PNG, requires specialised cryogenic storage at -162 degrees C, which is expensive and limited in India.
There is no practical large-scale strategic reserve equivalent for LNG.
PNG depends on continuous pipeline flow, making it vulnerable to supply interruptions.
This asymmetry matters. In a prolonged crisis, LPG offers buffering capability, while PNG demands uninterrupted supply.
The scale problem nobody talks about
Replacing LPG with PNG sounds simple—until one runs the numbers. India consumes about 33 million tonnes of LPG annually. To replace that fully with natural gas would require a supply of 45 billion cubic meters (BCM). That gas doesn’t exist today. And it won’t, even with optimistic projections of new discoveries in the Krishna-Godavari basin. Older fields are declining, offsetting much of the new output. So, the idea of a full LPG-to-PNG transition? Not just ambitious—unrealistic. Instead of asking, “How fast can we expand PNG?”, the better question is: “Where does PNG make the most sense—and how far can we safely go?” The answer lies in geography and infrastructure.
Cities like Mumbai, Ahmedabad, Surat, Delhi NCR, Pune, Bengaluru, Hyderabad, Chennai, and Kochi are ideal for PNG expansion. They share three key advantages: Existing dense pipeline networks, proximity to LNG terminals or domestic gas sources, and high population density.
Cities such as Lucknow, Jaipur, Indore, Kanpur, Kolkata, and Patna have growing pipeline networks but rely more heavily on long-distance gas transport. Here, PNG can expand—but carefully. A dual-fuel approach (PNG with LPG backup) is the safer bet.
The no-go zone: Where LPG still wins
Rural India, low-density towns, and remote regions are simply not suited for PNG. Pipelines are expensive to build and maintain. Supply disruptions hit harder. LPG’s portability becomes an advantage. In these areas, LPG isn’t outdated—it’s strategically superior.
What’s the safe limit in peacetime?
The maths looks like this:
Supply & Allocation |
Gas volume in Billion Cubic Meters |
Remarks |
|---|---|---|
Domestic |
35 |
|
Gulf (LNG) |
19 |
|
Non-Gulf (LNG) |
15 |
|
Total Supply |
69 |
|
Allocation: |
||
Fertilizers |
20 |
Priority |
CNG |
7 |
Priority |
Power, Refinery, Industry, Commercial PNG, Misc & losses |
37–38 |
|
PNG for homes |
3–4 |
Priority |
An average PNG household uses about 180 standard cubic metres (SCM) of gas per year. So, 4 BCM ÷ 180 SCM ≈ 2.22 crore households.
In simple terms, India can safely support roughly 2.2 crore PNG households in peaceful times. Because beyond this, we would need much higher LNG imports, which could be expensive and uncertain, as recent events have proved.
What is the safe PNG limit in a Hormuz blockade situation?
India has an ambitious plan to scale PNG connections to 12.6 crore homes by 2032. That probably didn’t take into account the black swan event still unfolding in West Asia. Currently, India has 1.6 crore connections with 1 crore actively using it. We have headroom for expansion by another 60 lakh connections with the current availability of gas. It is contingent upon sourcing LNG supply on long-term contracts from Australia (9 days transit), Malaysia/Indonesia (7 days transit) to partially offset the loss from the Gulf. Spot contracts wouldn’t do for assured supplies, reasonable costs, and predictable LNG tanker transport.
Why not the other countries?
Supplies from the U.S. take 31 days in transit, and those from Russia are often subject to sanctions. In a crisis situation, they are not immediately accessible. To add to our problems, India’s $20 billion Area 1 LNG project in Mozambique is stalled since 2021 due to militant attacks. Assured supply from this field is also uncertain.
The bottom line
PNG is not a replacement for LPG—it is a complement. LPG can be buffered. PNG needs continuous flow. India’s energy security in cooking gas doesn’t lie in choosing one fuel over another but in balancing efficiency, supply, storage, and resilience.
The blue flame in our kitchens tells a story—not just of convenience, but of geopolitics, infrastructure, and hard trade-offs. PNG is the future—but only up to a point. Beyond that point, the very system meant to modernise India’s kitchens could become its weakest link. And in an uncertain world, energy security isn’t about maximum reach—it’s about knowing where to stop.
The author has worked at senior levels in VSNL, Ericsson, and academics.
Opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not purport to reflect the opinions or views of THE WEEK.
