How Chinese digital infra in other countries gives Beijing leverage

India banned TikTok, Taiwan cautioned about it, but the US bought it. President Donald Trump lived up to his reputation as a shrewd businessman when he signed an executive order transferring the ownership of TikTok’s US operations to a group of American investors. Trump’s latest move is raising serious questions. Will American investors truly control the algorithm? If they do, could it then become a propaganda tool, wielded this time by the Trump administration? If they don’t, will there be a real separation between the Chinese and American versions?

In both scenarios, a deeper concern remains for observers worldwide: the US-China deal is a warning sign. It suggests a future where apps, cloud service providers or entire software companies could become bargaining chips for world leaders, justified under the guise of national security. “If ownership [of TikTok] can be forced to change due to national security risks, then similar measures could apply in the future to applications, cloud service providers or software companies,” says Dr Kenny Huang, chairman of the executive council of the Asia Pacific Network Information Centre. India may have banned TikTok, but Huang cautions that China’s global programmes, like the Belt and Road Initiative, have enabled companies such as Huawei, ByteDance (TikTok’s parent company) and China Telecom to build digital infrastructure across many nations. “These platforms give Beijing significant leverage,” he says. Excerpts:

Excerpts:

1. Trump has been negotiating a business deal with China regarding TikTok. From a technological and governance point of view, how do you see this shaping up, and what are your concerns?

TikTok is very popular in Taiwan, with a large percentage of users, especially young people. From the government’s perspective, we see the need to consider regulation, but at present there is no law prohibiting TikTok. Introducing such legislation would be difficult, as Taiwan’s ruling and opposition parties hold divergent views, making consensus hard to reach.

At the same time, we are exploring technical measures. One option is to block local caching or storage of TikTok data within Taiwan, forcing users to connect outside the jurisdiction. This would make usage slower and less convenient, though not impossible. So, both regulatory and technical options are being studied in parallel.

2. Do you see TikTok’s ownership shifting to a US company, as a good development for Taiwan?

If TikTok’s ownership changes hands and the new structure is validated by the US government, Taiwan would likely accept that outcome. US verification could serve as a benchmark for us. However, TikTok is not our only concern. The Chinese version, Douyin, is actually more widely used in Taiwan than international TikTok. Even if TikTok’s ownership changes, Douyin remains a bigger challenge because it originates in China and has localised versions released specifically for Taiwanese users.

3. Can algorithm control or transparency be realistically achieved?

If ownership changes, there is potential for greater accountability, such as making the algorithm more transparent. Theoretically, governments could demand algorithmic disclosure but Taiwan’s government may lack the leverage to enforce such transparency. The real difficulty lies with Douyin, which is Chinese-owned and directly targeted at Taiwanese users. That makes oversight much harder.

4. Do you see the US action on TikTok as setting a precedent for negotiations with other foreign-owned tech companies?

Yes. This case establishes a precedent. If ownership can be forced to change due to national security risks, then similar measures could apply in the future to applications, cloud service providers, or software companies. Of course, such deals involve trade-offs, and there are always questions about what is being exchanged behind the scenes. But it shows that governments can intervene decisively when security is at stake.

5. What role do platforms like TikTok or Douyin play in shaping public opinion and elections?

The influence is significant. Social media platforms, including TikTok and Douyin, enable rapid creation of targeted content. AI and bots can generate large volumes of posts designed to attract attention and manipulate specific audiences.

This is especially dangerous during elections. People in Taiwan are highly engaged on social platforms and often cluster into groups with shared interests. These echo chambers amplify polarisation and make dialogue across divides more difficult. Once perceptions are shaped by repeated exposure, they are very hard to change, even with facts. Disinformation is not a one-time event but a continuous stream. Countering it also has to be continuous--through monitoring, fact-checking, and awareness-building.

6. How can democratic societies like Taiwan or the US counter such influence while respecting free speech?

The US government is powerful and resourceful, able to act decisively. In Taiwan, decisions must pass through the Legislative Yuan, which is divided among multiple parties. Building consensus for regulations, especially those touching on China, is very challenging. From a technological standpoint, we are working on tools to identify AI-generated content and to trace the origins of disinformation campaigns. If evidence shows content is linked to pro-China sources, publicising that helps citizens understand the manipulation at play. Balancing free speech with protection against disinformation remains a difficult but necessary task.

7. Some describe US-China competition over the internet as a new Cold War. Do you agree?

China has a very clear strategy: it wants to manage the internet within its borders and extend its influence globally. Through initiatives like the Belt and Road Initiative, Chinese companies such as Huawei, ByteDance, and China Telecom have built digital infrastructure in many countries. These platforms give Beijing significant leverage. Democracies like the US, Taiwan, or India cannot match this kind of state-led cyber propaganda because of our commitment to free speech. But freedom of speech is also being exploited through disinformation. The challenge is finding ways to defend open societies while countering deliberate manipulation.

8. In the Indo-Pacific, cyberspace is now a major security concern. How do you see this playing out?

Geopolitical tensions in Asia always spill into cyberspace. China and Russia are highly skilled at digital operations and conduct them routinely as part of state strategy. Most countries in the region are less prepared.

Taiwan, Australia, India, and others are maritime states and face additional risks under the sea. Submarine cables, power lines, and pipelines are critical but poorly protected. Sharing intelligence, technology, and best practices among partners is vital. Radar imaging, underwater vehicles, and satellite data can help monitor threats. Joint efforts, such as blacklisting suspicious vessels, would strengthen resilience.

9. What role do you see for India in regional cyber and maritime security?

India, like Taiwan, is a maritime nation. No country has sufficient protection for underwater infrastructure, so collaboration is essential. India can strengthen regulation, technology, and intelligence-sharing. Learning from each other’s practices-whether in legislation, monitoring, or capacity building-will be critical for the region.

10. Finally, what lessons has Taiwan drawn from recent global conflicts and hybrid warfare?

We must prepare for both physical and cyber dimensions of conflict, often in combination. Critical infrastructure-healthcare, energy, logistics, food supply, and even military systems-depends heavily on the internet. If the internet is disrupted, the impact could be severe. Taiwan must ensure resilience, so that even if the internet collapses, essential systems continue functioning. At the same time, we must quickly adopt emerging technologies like AI to strengthen security and services. Taiwan’s preparation has to cover every sector, with particular focus on cybersecurity. Geopolitical changes happen fast but technology changes even faster.