EXCLUSIVE | ‘Imports cannot be the long-term foundation of India’s air power’: Air Chief Marshal A.P. Singh

Exclusive Interview/ Air Chief Marshal A.P. Singh

On October 31, Air Chief Marshal A.P. Singh will bid adieu to his illustrious 41-year-long career in the Indian Air Force (IAF). This interview with THE WEEK, possibly his last ahead of his retirement, comes out not as a farewell but more like a briefing note for his successor, the ministry of defence and the industry.

Singh will leave behind an IAF that is simultaneously vindicated and vulnerable. Vindicated, because Operation Sindoor—the 88-hour campaign across a 1,200km front in May 2025—was the first time in decades that the nation saw air power applied as the primary instrument of punishment, with precision, reach and zero collateral. Vulnerable, because the same operation also exposed the fault lines that every IAF chief in the last 20 years has warned about but no one has been able to address.

Having flown the MiG-21, Mirage-2000 and Su-30 and having led the Tejas flight test programme at the National Flight Test Centre, Singh speaks in the language of systems and timelines, not slogans. Which is why his tenure—September 30, 2024 to October 31, 2026—will be remembered not for a dramatic acquisition, but for a phrase he mentions in this interview: capability-driven approach. That phrase is at the heart of the IAF’s existential dilemma today.

On paper, the IAF is the fourth largest in the world, mandated to guard more than 40,000,000km3 of air space. In reality, it is down to 29 fighter squadrons against a sanctioned strength of 42—the lowest in its history. The last two MiG-21 squadrons were retired in September 2025 with ceremony and nostalgia. What replaces them? The Tejas Mk1A—180 aircraft ordered—is still trickling from the Hindustan Aeronautics Limited at two to four aircraft a year against a promise of 16, held up by GE F404 engine deliveries and supply chain issues that have become geopolitical bargaining chips. The Tejas Mk2 is in detailed design. The fifth-generation advanced medium combat aircraft (AMCA) has finally moved to an industry-driven execution model in May 2025, with five prototypes planned, but its first flight is still scheduled for 2028-2029 and induction is mid-2030s at best.

So Singh faces the classic question we put to him at the start of this interview: to buy or to make? His answer is revealing, and unsentimental. “I do not think the issue should be framed as a simple choice between buying and making,” he says. “The first responsibility of the Air Force is to ensure that the country has the military capability available, when it requires it.”

In February 2026, the Defence Acquisition Council accorded Acceptance of Necessity for the long-pending multi-role fighter aircraft (MRFA)—114 4.5-generation fighters, the majority to be made in India. At around 3.6 lakh crore, it will be the largest fighter deal in history, if signed. It is also the most controversial. Critics call it the death knell for atmanirbharta. Singh calls it a bridge. But he adds a caveat that defines his philosophy: “Imports cannot be the long-term foundation of India’s air power.”

That is why his “combined strategy”—MRFA to stop the squadron free-fall now, Tejas Mk1A/Mk2 to stabilise, the AMCA and a sixth-generation partnership to dominate later—is not hedging; it is survival.

The urgency is driven by geography. The Chinese air force now fields over 200 J-20 stealth fighters, J-16s and J-10Cs all with AESA radars and PL-15 missiles that outrange anything the IAF had until Astra Mk2 was cleared in December 2025. China has built more than 35 airfields in Tibet and Xinjiang, with fuel and ammunition dumps that IAF surveillance catches only days later.

To the west, Operation Sindoor proved IAF’s long-range precision capability—BrahMos-A, SCALP, indigenous long-range glide bombs hitting targets 200km deep—and its air defence. But Pakistan’s mass use of drones and standoff weapons also showed that the future will be a contest of networks, not just fighters. That is the second big shift Singh outlines in this interview—from platform-versus-platform to system-versus-system.

But the system is held together by duct tape. As Singh acknowledges in response to THE WEEK’s question on the multi-origin fleet, the IAF operates Russian Su-30s, French Mirage-2000s and Rafales, British Jaguars, American Apaches and Chinooks, Israeli and Indian radars and missiles, all on different data standards, maintenance philosophies and supply chains. The Integrated Air Command and Control System and the e-Maintenance Management System have managed to network them, but each spare still has a different original equipment manufacturer in a different capital that can say no in a crisis. Hence his insistence on “maintenance sovereignty”.

The third choice he confronts is the most political: theaterisation. With only 29 squadrons, can the IAF afford to divide its scarce air assets into theatre commands? Singh is diplomatic but firm: “The structures we create must be able to absorb shifts... not built by simply replicating models from other countries.” It is a polite way of saying: don’t freeze air power into land theatres; air power’s value is its ability to swing across the entire front, as Sindoor showed.

Excerpts:

Q/ Taking the dynamic changes in south Asia into account, how has the IAF’s war-fighting doctrine changed?

A/ The security environment around us has become significantly more complex. The Indian Air Force is preparing for a wide spectrum of contingencies, from limited, high-intensity engagements to larger and more prolonged conflicts. Our operational philosophy has evolved accordingly. We aim to be more agile, distributed, networked and effects-oriented.

The most significant change is that we can no longer think only in terms of platform-versus-platform warfare. The future contest will be between integrated combat systems. Sensors, shooters, electronic warfare, cyber capabilities, space assets, unmanned platforms and command networks will all combine to achieve the desired effect. Our doctrine and force design reflect this reality.

Q/ To buy or to make? Is it a better idea to buy foreign aircraft or to wait for the home-made Tejas?

A/ I do not think the issue should be framed as a simple choice between buying and making. The first responsibility of the Air Force is to ensure that the country has the military capability available, when it requires it. The IAF follows a capability-driven approach to inductions, based on threat assessment, operational gaps and long-term strategic needs. If a critical operational gap cannot be filled within the necessary timeframe through an indigenous programme, we must have the flexibility to acquire the required capability.

But imports cannot be the long-term foundation of India’s air power. Combat aircraft remain in service for thirty to forty years. Over that period they require weapons integration, software upgrades, electronic warfare modifications, spares and repeated capability enhancements. If we lack sufficient control over the design, technology and supply chain, we surrender a degree of strategic freedom. That is why indigenous programmes are important. These include the LCA family, future indigenous combat aircraft and indigenous weapons, sensors and electronic warfare systems. Our approach, therefore, is pragmatic and follows a combined strategy.

The IAF is committed to the Tejas programme and awaits the induction of the LCA Mk1A. We are also involved in the design and development of the Tejas Mk2 and the AMCA.

To bridge the capability gap, we are pursuing the acquisition of a highly capable 4.5-generation MRFA. We are also pursuing investment in suitable sixth-generation projects with strategic partners.

The long-term focus remains firmly on self-reliance, especially in critical technology areas. In the interim, a calibrated approach will ensure robust capability development and credible deterrence. Our answer to ‘buy or make’ is clear: we will make India’s air power self-reliant for the future, without ever allowing a gap in the nation’s defence.

Q/ What is your take on the IAF role during Operation Sindoor?

A/ As the primary stakeholder in the operation, the IAF demonstrated the decisive impact of air power on military outcomes. The operation showed that the IAF could generate precise and calibrated effects at considerable ranges, while simultaneously protecting our own airspace and retaining operational freedom of action.

One of the most important aspects of Operation Sindoor was the ability to engage selected targets with precision. Modern air power is not about the quantity of ordnance delivered. It is about creating the required effect, against the right target, at the right time, with the appropriate weapon. Equally important was our commitment to zero collateral damage from our action, and we achieved it.

Our indigenously developed weapons performed exceptionally, delivering precise and crippling blows deep into enemy territory. With calibrated targeting across the entire front, spanning 1,200km in breadth and 200km in depth, we made it clear that no place is beyond the IAF’s reach.

Combat aircraft, long-range precision weapons, intelligence and surveillance assets and networked command and control worked in combination. This enabled us to create effects without having to expose every platform to the adversary’s defensive systems.

Our home-grown, networked air defence performed to our expectations and beyond. Pakistan launched a large number of drones and stand-off weapons against us.The IAF’s surface-to-air missile and counter-UAS (unmanned aircraft system) units, ably supported by the Indian Army’s air defence units, operated effectively under the control of the IAF’s IACCS (integrated air command and control system) nodes. Our robust air defence infrastructure safeguarded our critical assets, and the adversary’s attack failed against that shield.

The IAF’s long-range surface-to-air missiles achieved some of the longest recorded kills in the history of aerial warfare. This seriously curtailed the adversary’s freedom of action, even within its own territory. We owned their skies, and that gave us a decisive edge.

Operation Sindoor also reinforced the importance of jointness. The desired effect was created through the coordinated application of capabilities across the defence forces, rather than through individual service actions in isolation.

The lessons of Operation Sindoor are already shaping how we train, equip and prepare.

Q/ What is the biggest challenge for the IAF now?

A/ The biggest challenge is to remain operationally ready for today’s contingencies while simultaneously transforming itself for tomorrow’s wars. Neither can wait for the other. The adversary will not pause while we modernise, and technology will not pause while we fight. Managing both at once defines our task, and we are addressing it on four fronts.

First, maintaining readiness. Combat numbers are certainly one part of this challenge. We require adequate numbers of platforms to meet our operational commitments, and the timely induction of new aircraft remains extremely important. This is why the scaling-up of indigenous production matters so much.

Second, accelerating technological adaptation. We have to make our acquisition and development processes much more responsive, and ensure that our platforms can be upgraded continuously, in weapons, sensors, software and electronic warfare.

Third, building indigenous capability. Imports cannot be the long-term foundation of India’s air power. Atmanirbharta is therefore an operational requirement as much as an industrial objective.

Fourth, building indigenous capacity through partnership. The IAF will work very closely with DRDO, DPSUs, private industry, start-ups and academia, while being very clear about operational requirements, quality and timelines.

The AMCA programme execution model, approved in May 2025, gives public and private sector companies an equal opportunity to compete. In September this year, the IAF held its first Dronathon at Pokhran. Over 20 defence companies, start-ups, MSMEs, DPSUs and innovators demonstrated their capabilities in unmanned and counter-unmanned systems.

Q/ What is the roadmap to make the IAF an aerospace force?

A/ The IAF is driving a comprehensive modernisation strategy focused on technological sovereignty, operational superiority and rapid capability enhancement.

The IAF has formulated a Capability Perspective Plan-2047, which sets out long-term priorities based on emerging technologies. It feeds into our intervening long-term plans, which run on ten-year cycles with periodic updates.

Our priorities for enhancing combat potential begin with contemporary fighter platforms and long-range aerial weapons, both air-to-air and air-to-ground, with stand-off ranges and high precision. Combat enablers are equally important, especially airborne early warning and control aircraft and in-flight refuellers. So are unmanned systems capable of operating in a contested environment, and multi-layered ground-based air defence backed by gap-free surveillance.

In the space domain, our broader direction is reflected in the IAF Space Vision 2047. Our space roadmap involves closer integration of space services with air command and control, and stronger indigenous surveillance, connectivity and supporting technologies.

Significant progress has already been made on the ground: in surveillance radars, surface-to-air guided weapons, utility and combat helicopters, light combat aircraft and unmanned platforms. A majority of these projects are being sourced indigenously. Where critical technologies are not available, or where certain platforms or equipment are unlikely to become available in the foreseeable future, we explore appropriate global options.

Antariksha Abhyas, conducted by the IAF with the Defence Space Agency over several editions, has brought the IAF and national space organisations together. Those editions have examined our dependence on space and the consequences of its denial. The iDEX, ‘Make’ and ADITI challenges give industry and start-ups a route to address service requirements.

As these technologies mature, commanders will be able to employ air and space capabilities together, reliably and as a matter of routine. That is the aerospace force we are building: sovereign in technology, seamless in integration, and ready for the challenges of 2047 and beyond.

Q/ The IAF doesn’t have a huge fleet of assets. How will it be impacted by the ongoing process of theaterisation? Where does the IAF go from here in the theaterisation, jointness and integration effort? Do you see consolidation of air assets post creation of theatre commands?

A/ The IAF is fully committed to jointness and integration. Future conflicts will be multi-domain by their very nature, and the three services will be planning and operating together much more closely than ever before. The question before us is not whether to integrate, but how to integrate in a manner that best serves India’s security.

Technology, adversaries and circumstances will keep shifting, often in ways no one can foresee.The structures we create must be able to absorb such shifts. They should therefore be evaluated in the context of India’s specific security requirements, and not built by simply replicating models from other countries.