Widespread protests demanding the abolition of "refugee" seats in the legislature have erupted in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK), revealing Islamabad's systemic control over the region, which led to a brutal crackdown resulting in 15 deaths and 200 injuries, alongside the banning of the leading protest committee and severe restrictions on essential supplies. The controversy stems from 12 seats reserved for "Kashmiri" refugees not residing in PoK but spread across Pakistan, allowing Islamabad to manipulate election results and government formation, thereby marginalizing regional parties and eroding the distinct identity of PoK. This system, coupled with amendments to the "State Subject" definition, enables Pakistan to alter the territory's demographics and render any future plebiscite meaningless, while a disproportionate allocation of refugee seats, favoring those from the Jammu division, fuels local resentment and underscores the engineered nature of Pakistani representation claims for the Kashmir Valley, further exacerbated by the recent dismissal of concerns from the UK-based Mirpuri diaspora by Pakistani officials. The PoK Supreme Court's ruling that reserved seats cannot be altered by public pressure, combined with constitutional provisions requiring Pakistan's approval for amendments, solidifies Islamabad's perpetual control and highlights the illusory nature of PoK's "azad" status, a situation compounded by decades of direct Pakistani administration over Gilgit-Baltistan and recent legislative actions that have effectively consolidated executive and legislative authority under the Pakistani prime minister, actions that occurred without significant international scrutiny despite their parallel to India's revocation of Article 370.

Widespread protests demanding the abolition of "refugee" seats in the legislature have erupted in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK), revealing Islamabad's systemic control over the region, which led to a brutal crackdown resulting in 15 deaths and 200 injuries, alongside the banning of the leading protest committee and severe restrictions on essential supplies. The controversy stems from 12 seats reserved for "Kashmiri" refugees not residing in PoK but spread across Pakistan, allowing Islamabad to manipulate election results and government formation, thereby marginalizing regional parties and eroding the distinct identity of PoK. This system, coupled with amendments to the "State Subject" definition, enables Pakistan to alter the territory's demographics and render any future plebiscite meaningless, while a disproportionate allocation of refugee seats, favoring those from the Jammu division, fuels local resentment and underscores the engineered nature of Pakistani representation claims for the Kashmir Valley, further exacerbated by the recent dismissal of concerns from the UK-based Mirpuri diaspora by Pakistani officials. The PoK Supreme Court's ruling that reserved seats cannot be altered by public pressure, combined with constitutional provisions requiring Pakistan's approval for amendments, solidifies Islamabad's perpetual control and highlights the illusory nature of PoK's "azad" status, a situation compounded by decades of direct Pakistani administration over Gilgit-Baltistan and recent legislative actions that have effectively consolidated executive and legislative authority under the Pakistani prime minister, actions that occurred without significant international scrutiny despite their parallel to India's revocation of Article 370.

Widespread protests demanding the abolition of "refugee" seats in the legislature have erupted in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK), revealing Islamabad's systemic control over the region, which led to a brutal crackdown resulting in 15 deaths and 200 injuries, alongside the banning of the leading protest committee and severe restrictions on essential supplies. The controversy stems from 12 seats reserved for "Kashmiri" refugees not residing in PoK but spread across Pakistan, allowing Islamabad to manipulate election results and government formation, thereby marginalizing regional parties and eroding the distinct identity of PoK. This system, coupled with amendments to the "State Subject" definition, enables Pakistan to alter the territory's demographics and render any future plebiscite meaningless, while a disproportionate allocation of refugee seats, favoring those from the Jammu division, fuels local resentment and underscores the engineered nature of Pakistani representation claims for the Kashmir Valley, further exacerbated by the recent dismissal of concerns from the UK-based Mirpuri diaspora by Pakistani officials. The PoK Supreme Court's ruling that reserved seats cannot be altered by public pressure, combined with constitutional provisions requiring Pakistan's approval for amendments, solidifies Islamabad's perpetual control and highlights the illusory nature of PoK's "azad" status, a situation compounded by decades of direct Pakistani administration over Gilgit-Baltistan and recent legislative actions that have effectively consolidated executive and legislative authority under the Pakistani prime minister, actions that occurred without significant international scrutiny despite their parallel to India's revocation of Article 370.

The widespread protests in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK) demanding the abolition of ‘refugee’ seats in the legislature strike at the core of how Islamabad controls the territory. The security forces’ crackdown was brutal: 15 people were killed and 200 injured in the firing. Pakistani authorities banned the Joint Awami Action Committee (JAAC), which has been leading the movement, and imposed severe restrictions on the supply of food, fuel and pharmaceuticals to the region.

The PoK legislature consists of 53 seats. Twelve of these are reserved for ‘Kashmiri’ refugees, and eight for women and technocrats, leaving just 33 seats for direct election. Crucially, these ‘Kashmiri’ refugees do not reside in PoK; they are spread all over Pakistan. This dispersion makes it easy for the federal government in Islamabad to manipulate election results and engineer government formation within PoK.

This system of reserved seats has effectively eroded the distinction between the people of PoK and mainland Pakistan. Furthermore, the definition of a “State Subject” has been amended to allow anyone temporarily residing in PoK or Pakistan to be considered a PoK citizen. This has enabled Pakistan to alter the demographic composition of the territory, rendering any future plebiscite meaningless.

D.P. Srivastava

Every mainstream Pakistani political party has exploited these reserved seats to install their local chapters into power, resulting in the complete marginalisation of PoK’s regional parties. In the 2021 election, only one seat was won by a regional party—Sardar Atiq Ahmad of the All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference. Contrast this with the situation in Jammu and Kashmir, which has been democratically ruled by regional players like the National Conference or the Peoples Democratic Party for decades. While India accommodates regional aspirations, Pakistan systematically suppresses them.

The arithmetic of the refugee seats reveals a deep-seated injustice. There are 4,64,000 refugees in Pakistan distributed across the 12 reserved seats. Of these, 4,34,000 are from the Jammu division, yet they are allotted only six seats. The remaining six seats go to just 30,000 refugees from the Kashmir Valley. These 30,000 ‘Kashmiris’ make up less than 1 per cent of PoK’s 3.2 million population and only 6.4 per cent of the total refugee population. This massive over-representation is engineered solely to keep alive the fiction that Pakistan represents the Kashmir Valley, but it has created immense resentment among the Jammu refugees.

For decades, Pakistan has also weaponised a small community of Mirpuris settled in the UK, projecting them as ‘Kashmiris’ for its anti-India propaganda programme. These people were originally displaced from Mirpur during the construction of the Mangla Dam, and the UK generously granted them visas. However, when members of this diaspora began speaking out against the plight of their community back home, Pakistan’s defence minister Khwaja Asif publicly dismissed them, claiming the people of Rawalkot and Mirpur were not ‘true’ Kashmiris. PoK Prime Minister Faisal Rathore demanded an apology, which the minister flatly rejected.

The people have no judicial recourse either. The PoK Supreme Court recently ruled that the reserved seats are enshrined in the PoK constitution and cannot be altered through “administrative measures, political agreements, or public pressure”. Under Article 33 of that same constitution, any amendment requires not only a two-thirds majority in the legislative assembly but also the prior approval of Pakistan. This legislative trap ensures Islamabad’s control in perpetuity and completely exposes the fiction that PoK is ‘azad’.

The protesters are openly declaring that PoK is not a part of Pakistan. Islamabad claims the territory is free, but rules with an iron hand, leaving the people with a constitution that offers absolutely no pathway to a democratic future.

PoK received its “interim” constitution in 1974, which vested all key legislative and executive powers in the Kashmir Council, headed by the Pakistani prime minister. The powers of PoK’s own elected assembly were left entirely undefined—a system rightfully dubbed ‘Rule by Proxy’. While the 13th amendment in 2018 stripped the Kashmir Council of these powers, they were not transferred to the local assembly. Instead, Pakistan assumed direct legislative and executive authority over 32 subjects within PoK. Islamabad’s approval is still required to pass laws even on the remaining 22 subjects.

Furthermore, “Azad Jammu and Kashmir” constitutes only 15 per cent of PoK; the Northern Areas make up the rest. Renamed Gilgit-Baltistan (G-B), this territory has been directly administered by Islamabad from the very beginning. Pakistan historically justified this control through the 1949 Karachi Agreement, signed secretly with compliant PoK representatives because it violated the territorial status quo without a plebiscite. The agreement only came to light via a 1993 PoK High Court judgment, which slammed Pakistan’s actions as a direct violation of UN Security Council resolutions.

Because of its immense strategic importance, Gilgit-Baltistan is controlled with an even tighter iron fist. G-B borders both China and Afghanistan; it is the entry point for the Indus River and the multi-billion-dollar China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) into Pakistan. Under the Gilgit-Baltistan Order of 2018, the entire list of 61 subjects on which the local legislative assembly could previously vote was abolished. All powers are now concentrated solely in the hands of the Pakistani prime minister.

Through the 13th amendment in PoK and the 2018 Gilgit-Baltistan Order, Pakistan effectively finalised its executive and legislative takeover of these regions. Strikingly, both measures were enacted a year before India revoked Article 370. Yet, while India faced intense global criticism, Pakistan’s de-facto annexation of PoK and Gilgit-Baltistan went completely unnoticed by the international community.

Ultimately, Pakistan has economically and politically exploited both PoK and G-B. The current protesters are openly declaring that PoK is not a part of Pakistan. Islamabad claims the territory is free, but it rules it with an iron hand, leaving its people with a constitution that offers absolutely no pathway to a democratic future.

A former ambassador, Srivastava authored the book Forgotten Kashmir: The Other Side of the Line of Control.

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