Constitutional loyalty or political compliance? The crisis facing India's civil services

In 1920, Lokmanya Tilak advised C.D. Deshmukh, who had topped the Indian Civil Services examination in 1918, not to join the political agitation for freedom, but to enter the civil service. Tilak believed the country would need trained administrators capable of running its government effectively after independence. Deshmukh went on to become cabinet secretary under Jawaharlal Nehru and also held the portfolio of Union finance minister. Tilak’s advice had anticipated a fundamental challenge to self-government: political freedom would need to be sustained by an impartial and professional administration.

But what happens when civil servants become more responsive to political expectations than constitutional obligations? And what happens when political leaders do not receive honest advice, or choose not to act on it?

These questions, according to Satyanarayan Sahu, former officer on special duty to president K.R. Narayanan, were answered by Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel. As the first home minister, Patel explained the importance of such independence explicitly to the Constituent Assembly in 1949. Warning against weakening the All India Services, he said: “The Union will go—you will not have a united India, if you have not a good All India Service, which has the independence to speak out its mind, which has a sense of security that you will stand by your word and that after all there is Parliament, of which we can be proud where the rights and privileges are secure…. This Constitution is meant to be worked by a ring of service which will keep the country intact.”

Today, citizens participating in the ‘Dilli Chalo’ protests are voicing disillusionment with the political class on scores of issues, from education to unemployment. The question gaining importance once again is whether responsibility for administrative or policy failures rests solely on elected representatives or on bureaucrats as well.

The demonstrations in the national capital over the past two weeks reflect a growing gap between the citizenry and the political class. Public servants, who are supposed to act as the people’s messengers, are missing in action, and the ‘steel frame’ intended to protect the executive and enable it to function seems to have lost its lustre. The problem did not begin today, but the outcome is visible on the streets: angry citizens, brute force by police, members of Parliament being beaten, and an ever-growing vacuum where people’s grievances should be heard.

While queues at the doors of the judiciary persist—with petitions filed by politicians and ordinary citizens alike—the long-term solution lies in restoring the institutional responsibilities of the three pillars of the Constitution: the legislature, the executive and the judiciary.

“Governance is a joint effort of both the politicians and the bureaucracy,” says Rajiv Mehrishi, who served as Comptroller and Auditor General of India between 2017 and 2020. “Be it developmental works or policies on education, skill development, health care, digital or economic growth, once decisions are taken, implementation has to be done by the civil servants or public servants.”

A critical task therefore rests on the shoulders of senior civil servants to understand ground realities and communicate where policies and government schemes fall short. “Bureaucrats have feedback mechanisms in place, and it is their duty to pass it on to the politician,” says Mehrishi, refusing to believe that bureaucrats are unaware of what happens outside government offices. If officials are unwilling to provide frank advice, he argues, there is no point having an adviser who is not going to advise correctly.

According to Mehrishi, the problem lies in what happens after that feedback reaches the political leadership. When advice is repeatedly disregarded, the incentive to speak candidly weakens. Civil servants become mere implementers of decisions. However, this breakdown has consequences beyond the relationship between ministers and officials. When policymakers do not receive an accurate assessment of public concerns or the likely impact of their decisions, the gap between elected representatives and the public widens.

Who serves the citizen?

Civil services such as the Indian Administrative Service, Indian Police Service and Indian Foreign Service comprise a major part of the bureaucracy that is expected to study ground conditions, coordinate with other institutions and translate government decisions into action. They are also responsible for identifying problems for the government before they become full-blown crises.

The challenges, therefore, are twofold. Firstly, civil servants must have the integrity to provide honest assessments, record their professional views, and accept responsibility for their work. Secondly, political leaders must create conditions in which such advice can be given without fear, and must be willing to consider it even when inconvenient.

The gradual erosion of independence within India’s civil services began decades ago, says G.K. Pillai, former Union home secretary. “But the transformation has become more pronounced in recent years, with bureaucrats increasingly reluctant to express independent opinions, excessive centralisation of decision-making and an administrative culture that rewards compliance over professional judgment,” he says.

Pillai notes that the first 10 to 15 years after independence were marked by politicians and bureaucrats who shared a larger vision for the country. “Although the system was never entirely free of officials who anticipated what their political superior wanted to hear, such officers were then a minority. More important, civil servants could record their disagreements without necessarily jeopardising their careers,” he says.

The ability to record an independent opinion on file is fundamental to the relationship between the political executive and the civil service. A minister has the authority to make the final decision, but that does not absolve a civil servant of the responsibility to offer professional advice.

Pillai recalls his experience working with Kamal Nath for about five years in the commerce ministry. The relationship, he says, was marked by disagreements, but those differences did not prevent him from recording his views. Pillai remembers a farewell gathering when he was leaving as secretary and Nath was moving to the ministry of urban development. Addressing the officers present, the minister acknowledged that the two had frequently disagreed.

“Mr Pillai and I had many disagreements, and we didn’t agree on many things, but when he wrote something down, I never overruled it,” Nath said, according to Pillai. The minister then made a remark that conveyed to the bureaucracy that anticipating political preferences and tailoring advice was not just detrimental to citizens, but risky as well: “Because of that, we both are not in jail.”

Therefore, if the bureaucrat’s job is to read the writing on the wall, why is citizen angst not reaching the politician’s ears?

The primary shift, according to experts, has been the movement of a state-level model of governance to the Centre—often referred to as the ‘Gujarat model’ of governance. In many states the chief minister exercises considerable control over law and order and development. District magistrates and superintendents of police work within a system where political leadership exerts substantial influence over administrative decisions.

When this model of governance reached Delhi, the bureaucratic culture changed. It shifted from one heavily reliant on studying files, drafting notes, making interventions and expressing opinions in policymaking, to a model largely aligned with the politician and the ruling party.

This was reflected in changes to the Rules of Business after 2014, which increased the requirement for prior approval from the Prime Minister’s Office for policy decisions across ministries. While the political establishment expected faster and better delivery of services, officials consequently became more inclined to await directions rather than exercise judgment within their own remits.

The upward shift in responsibility resulted in an initial gap with the citizenry. A second challenge followed when civil servants began focusing on the publicity surrounding highway inaugurations and the organisation of receptions or cultural programmes during political visits. What was meant to generate public awareness became event management handled by bureaucrats, who showed far less enthusiasm for monitoring the actual progress of those initiatives.

In the bureaucracy, career incentives have often been linked to post-retirement appointments and foreign postings.

Although the 360-degree appraisal system was introduced by the BJP government to overcome the complacency and corruption seen towards the end of the previous UPA regime, the appraisal process suffered from key gaps owing to its heavy reliance on subjective feedback. “Loyalty was equated with merit, as it brought consistency in delivery and determined the success of schemes brought by the political dispensation. The outcome was that very few bureaucrats chose to dissent, argue or flag concerns,” said a senior bureaucrat who retired this year.

The result was a process that ultimately left little scope for course correction, criticism or—most important—the redressal of citizens’ grievances.

“When some decisions were questioned by the public—such as the farm laws, the Citizenship Amendment Act and the mishandling of ethnic clashes in Manipur—the bureaucracy defended them by claiming the public was being misled for political reasons. Instead of taking corrective measures, they found it easier to let the public believe there was political will behind those decisions,” said an official.

Who bears the greater share of responsibility?

Much needs to be done to improve administrative efficiency, says Safi Ahsan Rizvi, who retired as special director in the Intelligence Bureau. “But bureaucrats alone are not to blame,” he says. According to him, the political class bears an even greater share of responsibility, given that the balance of power has shifted heavily into its hands over the decades.

Indeed, whenever a healthy relationship has existed between the political leadership and the civil service—with each fulfilling its constitutional and institutional obligations—policy implementation has had a transformative impact. “The contribution of civil servants to nation-building cannot be overlooked,” says Yashovardhan Azad, former central information commissioner, recalling how the Green Revolution transformed agricultural production and helped the country achieve food self-sufficiency. “It was not solely the achievement of political leadership or agricultural scientists,” he says. “It also depended on administrators to translate policy into implementation, coordinate institutions, and make decisions.”

Efforts have been made over time when this healthy balance was lost. “Over the years, there have been efforts to address structural weaknesses to keep this relationship in good health,” says Veerappa Moily, who was law minister in the Manmohan Singh government and chaired the Administrative Reforms Commission between 2006 and 2009. He recalls including a quotation attributed to Mahatma Gandhi in the ‘Ethics in Governance’ report: “You must be the change you wish to see in the world.”

Two decades later, translating reform proposals into meaningful institutional change remains a challenge.

Because the proper functioning of the system relies on each branch respecting its own boundaries, Moily says the basic structure of governance needs strengthening: “The three wings of the government—the legislature, the executive and the judiciary—must function within their own spheres. They cannot compromise one another’s constitutional position. If these institutions fail to respect their respective roles, the entire edifice of administration collapses.”

This constitutional principle was reiterated by the judiciary recently when the Allahabad High Court, in quashing National Security Act proceedings against a Delhi University student, observed that civil servants must realise their loyalty lies towards the Constitution, not the political executive.

This debate traces its genesis back to the Constituent Assembly, where Laxminarayan Sahu, representing Orissa, warned that political parties could adopt undesirable methods to influence appointments. Independent commissions were necessary, he argued, so that “no one may be able to suggest that the Services are working under the influence”.

The Constitution also established safeguards against the arbitrary dismissal of civil servants. “These protections were intended to provide security for the discharge of public duties, not to place officials beyond accountability,” says Satyanarayan Sahu. This insulation often functions well during crises.

This time, however, the crisis is neither for the political executive nor for the permanent civil service. The battle is being fought by citizens on the street. Whether civil servants sitting in the corridors of power—with their ears to the ground—can provide both the solution and the insulation of the ‘steel frame’ to de-escalate tensions remains to be seen.