Lesson from Dhaka: How parliamentary reform can turn street protests into lasting change

DHAKA

For nearly 17 years, Bangladesh endured a form of rule that choked democratic space. With electoral credibility weakened, parliament lost its vitality as a forum for debate. Representation without contestation hollowed out deliberation. In effect, the institutional arena where dissent should have been articulated and negotiated ceased to function.

In the absence of a credible parliament, citizens were left with no option. Dissent could not find a voice within formal structures and had to seek expression elsewhere. The street became not a choice, but a necessity.

Yet even this space proved constrained. Public gatherings were frequently restricted and eventually disrupted. Law enforcement responses prioritised force over facilitation. The pressures extended beyond physical spaces: enforced disappearances, arbitrary detentions and custodial abuses created a pervasive climate of fear.

Digital spaces, initially a refuge for expression, also came under scrutiny. Laws regulating online communication contributed to a climate of self-censorship. The cumulative effect was profound.

This points to a deeper crisis. When both parliament and the street fail as sites of expression, democracy loses its essence. Citizens are left without credible means to influence their country’s direction. The result is either disengagement or, at the other extreme, uncontrolled eruption.

The protests in Bangladesh revealed both the necessity and the limits of dissent under such conditions. These demonstrated resilience and courage, but also exposed that mobilisation could not easily be translated into structured political alternatives. This is why dissent must be institutionalised.

The energy of the 2024 uprising is undeniable. It brought down a regime and reshaped national discourse, focusing our collective mind on the imperative of reform.

The recent election was the vital crucible that forged Bangladesh’s future, translating the abstract idea of change into a concrete mandate. While street protests serve as a necessary safety valve, allowing frustrations to be aired and the powerful to be held to account, these cannot be the primary engine of statecraft. It is only through the ballot box that citizens can peaceably determine their future and confer legitimacy on their representatives. Elections are not the end of the democratic process, but its beginning.

This is where the concept of “dissent to rebuild” finds its true meaning. Healthy dissent must be captured, channelled and institutionalised. The alternative is chaos, which leaves a vacuum all too readily filled by anarchic elements and inimical forces with vested interests.

The true safeguard lies in the political mechanisms of a functioning democracy. The opposition, in particular, holds a critical role. An effective opposition provides the bridge between dissent and decision. It captures grievances, organises them, and translates them into policy alternatives. Without such a bridge, dissent remains suspended, unable to influence governance in durable ways.

Recent reforms such as ensuring opposition leadership of key parliamentary oversight committees and guaranteeing protected space for opposition business are critical steps in this direction. These are not concessions. These are structural pillars designed to prevent democracy from becoming substantively hollow.

The task, therefore, is to reconnect what has been separated. Protest and parliament must not stand apart. Protest should inform parliament, and parliament should respond to protest. When this relationship is restored, dissent becomes a source of renewal rather than instability.

Bangladesh’s recent history offers a stark lesson. When democracy is not institutionalised, dissent is first displaced and then constrained. Rebuilding requires reversing this sequence, strengthening institutions, restoring trust and ensuring that no citizen is left without a voice, whether in the chamber or on the street.

The author is an adviser to the prime minister of Bangladesh, with the rank of minister, and oversees the ministries of finance and planning.

Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Government of Bangladesh, its agencies, or any of its institutions.