Q/ Given that indirect talks in Geneva reportedly showed progress as recently as last week, how does Israel justify the timing of this massive escalation?
It was an American decision. The United States concluded that the negotiations were going nowhere — especially because Iran was unwilling to compromise meaningfully on the nuclear file. They also refused to discuss the threats that other countries face from their ballistic missile programme. As you know, Iran had been planning to build between 10,000 to 20,000 ballistic missiles — enough to devastate several countries. Additionally, they were unwilling to discuss their support for their proxies, the terrorist organisations which they arm and fund with advanced technology as a means to produce sophisticated weapons. So it was an American assessment, and Israel joined the effort after both the U.S. and Israel decided there was a combined need for military action to remove the threat. We might see negotiations coming back if Iran chooses to accept the American conditions.
Q/ What would you outline as American conditions at this point in time and, from the Israeli point of view, are you even hopeful?
I do not know what the conditions set by the US are today, but I think President Donald Trump was pretty clear that he sees a situation where this operation could prolong for weeks. It is up to the Iranians to decide whether they want to go back to the negotiating table, this time under the conditions set by the US. These conditions cover the nuclear programme, ballistic missiles, and support for proxy groups—that path remains open. But the US has now made it clear that it wants regime change, and until then, action is deemed necessary. Now the question is whether this change will take place inside the regime, or result in the removal of the entire leadership. In Venezuela, it was easily done, with the people in power leaving, but it is different in Iran because the military operation has already removed several senior military decision-makers, and it is up to the Iranians to decide if they want this to continue or stop.
Q/ Beyond the killing of Ayatollah Khamenei, what is the specific plan to ensure a transition to a stable, friendly government? Is there not a high risk that a vacuum will be filled by more radical elements within the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps?
The idea that a more radical leadership would replace the current regime is unlikely—the present leadership is already among the most hardline elements. I think people have to be reminded that Ayatollah Khamenei was the most radical element within the Iranian regime. All the people calling for modern or reformist policies in the last few decades were targeted. Reformist voices had been suppressed, and leaders were placed under house arrest. The entire regime was filled with people as radical as him. So to think Iran can have a more radical regime after this is a bridge too far.
Q/ What is the specific “end state” Israel is looking for, and how confident is Israel that Iran’s nuclear breakout capability has been permanently neutralised?
We have identified approximately 2,500 military targets, and we are conducting operations against them as we speak. At the conclusion of operations, we are aiming—together with the US—to completely neutralise the two existential threats from Iran’s ballistic missile programme and military nuclear programme.
Of course, in the medium and long term, if there is a change in regime, these programmes won’t be reinstated. However, if the regime remains unchanged, there remains a risk that these capabilities could be rebuilt. That is why both Israel and the US—unlike in the operation in June—have expanded the objectives this time and are calling on the Iranian people to seize the opportunity for change.
Q/ The US and Israel have expressed hope for an internal uprising, but history shows such strikes can often lead to a “rally around the flag” effect. Why do you believe this time will result in liberation rather than further radicalisation?
We are not prophets. We are also not in the place of the Iranian people, so ultimately it is up to them. But I think after the regime has demonstrated its ruthlessness with the killing of tens of thousands during past protest waves, more Iranians now understand that this regime does not serve their interests. Of course, there are a handful of hardcore supporters of the regime, but the question is whether they will continue to have the capability to oppress and kill those who want freedom. I don’t have an answer for that.
Q/ Recent missile strikes have raised concerns about the limitations of Israel’s air defence systems, like the Iron Dome, that are being exposed to a multi-front barrage.
The Iron Dome does not handle the threat of ballistic missiles. We use other systems, such as Arrow and David’s Sling, for that threat. Unfortunately, no system is 100 per cent impermeable. A recent strike resulted in casualties, as the missile hit one of the towns, Beit Shemesh, leaving 51 injured and killing nine people, which is tragic. This is a very substantial threat. But on the brighter side, I can tell you that we are intercepting roughly 90 per cent of incoming missiles. What can happen in the future is that the Israeli Air Force and the forces of the United States are going to continue hunting missile launchers on the Iranian side, which will bring down their numbers and reduce their firing capability over time.
Q/ With Hezbollah now launching retaliatory strikes from Lebanon, is Israel prepared for a sustained, high-intensity conflict on its northern border while simultaneously managing the Iranian front?
Yes. We anticipated that scenario, and we are completely ready. Hezbollah has made a serious mistake by firing at Israel and entering this conflict. The repercussions are going to be severe. We have already targeted several of its leaders, and we are going to hit hard at military installations in southern Lebanon. Evacuation orders have been issued in areas where Hezbollah military infrastructure is embedded among civilians, and that is happening as we speak. Israel will continue degrading Hezbollah’s capabilities. Another positive development is that since the last round with Hezbollah, Israel has also deployed a new laser-based defence system, Iron Beam, which is proving to be very efficient in adding another protective layer against rockets and drones. Though Hezbollah has fired many rockets and drones, its capability to penetrate and harm Israelis has diminished substantially as a result of Iron Beam.
Q/ Iran has been targeting Gulf travel hubs. Will Israel intervene to protect its new regional partners in the Abraham Accords?
Israel is already acting to protect its regional partners because we are now over the skies of Iran, and are hunting the missile launchers. We are planning the defence of the entire West Asian region together with our American friends and other friendly armies in the region.
Q/ Some analysts suggest that by making the Gulf States a target, Iran is forcing them into a “neutrality” that actually pushes Saudi Arabia and Iran closer together against Western intervention. How do you read this shift in regional strategy?
Actually, the opposite is happening if you read the statements that were issued by the countries that were attacked. They were attacking neither the U.S. nor Israel, but diplomatically, they were attacking Iran. So the attacks on these countries are seen as hostility coming from Iran, and they are not blaming Israel or the United States. That suggests Iran’s actions are isolating it further.
Q/ With the Strait of Hormuz effectively blocked and oil prices soaring, what is Israel’s strategy to mitigate a global economic meltdown that could turn international opinion against the objectives you are trying to achieve?
When it comes to international opinion, I think we are in a very good situation. We have seen many countries condemning Iran, and we have seen more and more countries joining to show support for the action against the Iranian regime. When it comes to the global oil market, I think the US has taken into account the possibility that prices will go up temporarily. But unlike the situation in the 1970s and 1990s, the capability of the Iranians to affect the oil market in the long term is pretty limited, both because the military options are going to diminish as time goes by and the ability to close the Strait of Hormuz is going to be non-existent. Right now, the diminishing of the movement of ships in the strait is a precautionary act that many companies are taking, and they are going to wait and see how this develops in the coming weeks and then take a decision on whether to allow ships to continue flowing.
Q/ Projects like the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) were built on the promise of regional stability. With a regional war in full swing, do you concede such ambitious connectivity projects face a huge challenge?
The fact that we are taking care of the Iranian threat is going to make the possibility of IMEC and other regional projects much higher. Because, in the past, many countries were hesitating whether to enter into projects in the region, fearing the military build-up that was happening in Iran and other places as a result of the Iranian regime’s effort to put pressure on the Arab Gulf countries…. If the ongoing military campaign manages to neutralise the Iranian threat, prospects for executing projects like IMEC become significantly higher.
Q/ We recently saw Prime Minister Narendra Modi in Israel, days before the military strikes on Iran. Do you think India’s position has shifted from neutrality to a strategic alignment with Israel, and what has driven this change?
India’s policy is in line with its own interests, and it is up to India to align with this country or another. What happened during Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s recent visit was that we substantially upgraded our strategic cooperation. We call it a Special Strategic Partnership, as we have reached agreements that are going to allow us to cooperate more deeply in creating solutions on the defence and security side and serve our interests. It comes at an opportune time because both India and Israel face challenges from radical forces, and both countries are embracing the future by creating the competitive edge that we need in order to succeed on the world stage.
Q/ India has millions of citizens working in the Gulf and remains a top importer of energy from the region. How does Israel plan to address New Delhi’s concerns regarding the safety of the Indian diaspora and the massive inflationary pressure this war is placing on the Indian economy?
Israel is ensuring the safety of Indian workers within its territory. We have very strict protocols regarding the safety of all residents of Israel, including citizens and non-citizens. When it comes to the Gulf, the fact that we are dealing with a more comprehensive way to counter threats from radical forces actually increases the prospects of a more stable Gulf region, both for Indian workers and Indian companies
Q/ We have seen the long-term chaos that followed regime changes in Iraq and Libya. Are there specific measures to prevent Iran from descending into a decade of sectarian civil war?
I think it is very difficult to compare the situation in Iraq or Libya to the situation in Iran. We don’t know exactly what will happen at this point in time, but what we know is that the situation is different and there will be a substantial change, either of the regime or within the regime. Iran not only has a civilisational history and background, but also the capability, politically and organisationally, to function as a responsible state. We do not support chaos, and hope things will move smoothly into an order that serves the interests of the Iranian people and the world, which will see a region that is more stable and more moderate once the radical elements are defeated and removed.
Q/ This is a historic action against Iran’s military nuclear infrastructure, as we have seen Israel raising concerns over the years. This operation must have been in the works for a long time. For how long has this effort been going on?
Israel has been working for nearly 30 years to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. This nuclear technology itself today is not new — it is over 80 years old. So it is not a very sophisticated technology. The fact that we have managed to prevent Iran from arming itself with nuclear weapons is only a result of our efforts. When it comes to the future, I think this operation and coordination with the U.S. give us much better prospects of preventing Iran from reinstituting its nuclear programme for a much longer period of time. But, if this regime continues to exist, I have no doubt that it will try to re-engage in reinstituting the nuclear programme. Therefore, we would like to see a situation in Iran where this operation not only degrades military capability but creates conditions for political change — leading to long-term stability. That is why we hope this military operation will help the Iranian people free themselves of oppression and engage with the world in a more positive way that will actually make all our effort, time, money, and blood in preventing existential threats to humanity worthwhile. We hope to get to that da