Farrah Al Abdallat
AMMAN
The escalating confrontation between Israel, the United States and Iran is placing unprecedented strain on the regional system that has long depended on US security guarantees. Iran has demonstrated its readiness to retaliate beyond its borders, while Gulf states are increasingly exposed to the consequences of their close defence partnerships with Washington. As the conflict widens, a debate is emerging across the region over whether the political and economic costs of alignment with the US have become too high. Regional actors are reassessing alliances, deterrence strategies and their long-term place in a changing security architecture.
The confrontation is proving to be as much an economic war as it is a military one. Iranian strikes on energy infrastructure in Saudi Arabia and Qatar have already shaken markets, while the closure of the Strait of Hormuz signals Tehran’s readiness to expand the conflict into the global economic domain. Iran’s attempt to internationalise the confrontation by targeting Gulf energy infrastructure may ultimately backfire. Such actions risk widening the economic fallout of the war and increasing pressure for a broader international response.
President Donald Trump’s Iran policy has been based on pressure and deterrence, using sanctions, military threats and strong public statements. While this approach has reassured some allies, it has also created concern among regional partners who fear that escalation could quickly move beyond control. Trump entered his second term promising to avoid long wars in the Middle East and to focus on limiting US involvement in regional conflicts. However, the current confrontation has placed him in a difficult position, where backing down could be seen as weakness, while further escalation risks widening the war. This contradiction is being closely watched in Arab capitals, where governments still depend on US protection but are increasingly cautious about being pulled into a conflict shaped by Washington’s internal political pressures as much as by regional realities.
Israel’s role has also been central in pushing the confrontation forward. For years, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has treated Iran as the main strategic threat and has argued that a stronger response is necessary to limit Tehran’s military and political influence. Israeli policy has focused on stopping Iran from expanding its presence through missile programmes, proxy groups and military positions across the region. This position has brought Israel closer to several Arab states that share concerns about Iran, especially after the Abraham Accords, but it has also increased the feeling among others that regional security is being driven by a confrontational approach that leaves little room for diplomacy. As a result, the current crisis is not only about Iran’s behaviour but also about the growing belief that the regional balance is being shaped by pressure and force rather than negotiation.
The vulnerability of Gulf states quickly became evident as the confrontation expanded beyond Israel. Much of the US military infrastructure in Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and the UAE lies within the range of Iran’s short-range ballistic missiles, which are inexpensive and designed for rapid launch. As a result, retaliatory strikes were able to reach targets across the Gulf within hours of escalation.
Iranian missile and drone attacks against US facilities hosted in the UAE caused direct impacts on Emirati territory. Similar incidents were reported in Saudi Arabia, where an attack triggered a fire at the Ras Tanura oil complex, forcing Saudi Aramco to halt refinery operations. These developments highlight how proximity to Iran makes Gulf states the first arena of escalation whenever confrontation with the US or Israel moves into open conflict.
Strategically, the current pattern of strikes suggests that Iran has not yet used the full extent of its military capabilities. Tehran’s doctrine favours gradual escalation, relying on calibrated missile and drone attacks rather than an immediate large-scale response. Decision-making has also become more militarised in recent years, with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps playing a leading role and showing less willingness to rely on de-escalation efforts. Iranian planners appear aware that US policy under Trump has often prioritised short-term displays of strength, creating an incentive for Tehran to avoid a rapid, maximal response that could justify broader American intervention.
Recent defence cooperation between regional powers reflects a growing effort to reduce exclusive dependence on the United States. The UAE has expanded security coordination with India, particularly in maritime and technological fields, while Saudi Arabia continues to rely on long-standing military ties with Pakistan in training and defence support.
This pattern highlights a shifting deterrence dynamic in which regional powers tied to Washington are increasingly seeking to limit their exposure to escalation rather than rely solely on US protection. Regional actors are not abandoning Washington, but they are clearly seeking additional partners to reduce their vulnerability. The conflict has highlighted the costs that can come with US protection and may gradually push the region toward a more flexible security architecture rather than one centered entirely on the US.
If the conflict continues, Israel could emerge with a significantly stronger strategic position, particularly if Iran is weakened without the emergence of a new regional counterweight. Such a shift would reshape the regional order in ways that many states may view with caution, even as they share concerns about Tehran’s influence.
The author is a research analyst based in Amman.